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Perfilyev Cited on Hijacker, Relations With ROK

PM2207163190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent G. Charodeyev at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center under the "Panorama of International Life" rubric: "Soviet Position Remains Unchanged"]

[Text] V. Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, spoke at the latest briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. He emphasized that the decision of the Swedish authorities to hand over Soviet national D. Semenov, who hijacked an Aeroflot aircraft to Stockholm 9 June, to the Soviet legal authorities has been received with satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

"Air piracy is a very serious crime which frequently involves loss of life," the Foreign Ministry spokesman went on to say. "It must not, under any circumstances, go unpunished."

The problem of air terrorism concerns all countries. This is why the Soviet Union favors joint international efforts with a view to creating conditions to prevent hijacking, and also legal collaboration between states to ensure the legal prosecution of individuals whose actions endanger the safety of air traffic.

In handing D. Semenov over, the Swedish side set as one of the conditions for this decision that he should be charged only with hijacking rather than illegally crossing the border. On this and other questions connected with Semenov's extradition, complete understanding between the Soviet and the Swedish side has been achieved, the official conducting the briefing said.

In this context, the statements by representatives of a number of Soviet departments, carried by TASS, to the effect that during the trial Semenov will also face charges of having illegally left the USSR do not reflect the official Soviet stance and thus are the private opinion of their authors.

It is hoped in the Soviet Union that this authoritative explanation will remove the concerns which have arisen on the Swedish side and will open up possibilities for a speedy resolution of the question of the handing over to Soviet authorities of two other hijackers of Soviet aircraft--A. Mikhaylenko and M. Mokretsov, who are currently in Sweden, V. Perfilyev said.

During the briefing, IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked the first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration to comment on a UPI report from Seoul which says:

"President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR has sent a letter to President No Tae-u of South Korea in which he proposes that the talks on improving relations between the two countries should be continued. This was announced by the official spokesman of the president of South Korea.

"This letter is in reply to a message sent by No Tae-u to the Soviet leader shortly after their recent meeting in San Francisco.

"According to the official spokesman, Mikhail Gorbachev notes in his message that he views with satisfaction No Tae-u's proposal to continue contacts to this effect. The government has already informed Moscow that a South Korean delegation is ready to leave for the Soviet Union at the beginning of August. Its leaders have been empowered to conduct talks on the establishment of relations between the two countries."

Replying to this question V. Perfilyev said:

"You see, I have no information on this account, and I have not been instructed to comment in any way on the message reported by UPI.... On the whole, relations between the USSR and South Korea have of late been characterized by relatively dynamic development, despite the absence of diplomatic relations. Our trade, economic, scientific, and cultural ties are expanding. It is possible to say that, on the whole, Soviet-South Korean relations have good prospects.... As for the exchange of messages which you mention, we have no information on this subject."

Second Round of CSCE Talks Ends in Copenghagen

90UF0319A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, by S. Guk; place, date not specified; first paragraph is introduction: "From Vancouver to Vladivostok"]

[Text] The wooden gavel—the symbol of the chairman's power at the meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE—has been handed over from Copenhagen to Moscow. The second round of talks has just ended in the Danish capital (the first took place a year ago in Paris and the next conference is scheduled for Moscow in September-October of 1991). A broad summary document was adopted in which a delegation of 35 countries developed a number of unified criteria regarding basic human rights and freedoms. Participants in the Copenhagen forum think a large step forward has been taken. What this means specifically is the subject of this IZVESTIYA interview with the USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy, who participated in the legislative stage of the work of the conference in Copenhagen.

[Guk] The document that was adopted is the largest ever adopted by participants in the Helsinki process. The limits of human dimension are stretched even further. What is its principally new content?

[Petrovskiy] The document is indeed extensive not only in terms of volume; it also contains a number of new ideas and suggestions. In Copenhagen a basis was laid for practical consideration of human dimension in all three of its "hypostases." The first complex encompasses individual, sociopolitical, and collective human rights. The second includes contacts among people, which should lay a basis for the new Europe because up to the present day European relations have been represented, as a rule, by an interstate structure. The new Europe is a continent that is not divided into opposite worlds but is reinforced not only by interstate but also by human relations. The third complex includes questions of culture, information, and education.

There has been significant progress in each of these areas. The document lays a basis for a Europe-wide democratic space which, to use the apt remark of one of the conference delegates, extends today from Vancouver to Vladivostok. More concisely, a "continent of democracy," one not to be found on the maps, is beginning to be formed.

It is very important that the document was aimed at the development of Europe-wide legal standards. This means measures regulating relations among states and contacts among people. The idea of a comparative study of legislation of individual countries in the area of basic human rights and freedoms is extremely promising. It is intended to create a special conference of experts on this question.

[Guk] Is the idea to accumulate all the best from world experience?

[Petrovskiy] Quite right. This approach reminds me of the work of bees gathering nectar from flowers—we too want to produce our "Europe-wide honey." Participants in the conference attached primary significance to the human right to free elections. From our own experience we know that the rights of the individual, democracy, and general well-being are all unthinkable without this. The document gives the criteria for free elections which are recommended as guidelines for the participants in the CSCE. The idea of inviting foreign observers to na'ional elections was also approved. There is only one restriction: The guests must not interfere with the conducting of the elections. It is our conviction that this will increase the authority of the electoral process. And in general we need an integrated system of measures of confidence. Our document earmarks only the initial stage of it.

A large step forward has been taken with respect to individual freedom. True, even previously within the framework of the Helsinki process provisions were developed regarding, say, the right to travel and freedom of conscience. But today these standards have been developed with respect to freedom of opinion, peaceful meetings and demonstrations, and the creation of associations, including trade unions and legal protection organs. The rights of youth, the future of Europe, have been dealt with separately. It is intended to arrange real communication and not simply tourist excursions. The more profound and acceptable to real life the ideas of youth regarding other countries are, the more stable the entire Europe-wide basis of democracy will be.

[Guk] There is convincing proof of this: It is precisely because of mass free communication of youth that France and the FRG were able to overcome the age-old hostility between the two nations.

[Petrovskiy] This is indeed true. This is why the legislative document orients the states mainly not toward tourism but toward the creation of conditions for youth to live and study abroad through exchange programs. Exchanges of students in vocational and technical schools are especially encouraged. In some ways this reminds one of the times of Peter I. He opened up the road for Russian craftsmen who not only studied under foreigners but also took their own knowledge abroad. It would be useful for our students to travel to Europe.

[Guk] Judging from your discussion, no problems arose among participants in the congress.

[Petrovskiy] No, what do you mean. The question of interethnic relations was extremely difficult. They are now becoming apparent not only in our country or in East Europe during the course of the transformations but also in the West. At this conference we began a comprehensive analysis of the Europe-wide situation and in conjunction with Switzerland and a number of other countries we authored a proposal: during the first half of 1991 to conduct a special conference devoted only to ethnic problems. Although a resolution has not yet been adopted, the idea itself was approved. Finland, for example, will invite experts from 35 countries to a seminar next year to discuss the situation with ethnic minorities in this country. This problem is literally knocking on the door of Europe-wide policy, and we all must exchange experience and earmark common criteria for solving it.

[Guk] The problems you have named were also included, if only in general outlines, in documents previously adopted by the CSCE, beginning with the Final Act. It is easy to adopt a resolution and much more difficult to carry it out in practice. It is written in the Copenhagen document: We need "further steps to fulfill our commitments." Which of them are still on paper?

[Petrovskiy] I think that in all the areas we discussed, in addition to obvious progress there are also "unpaid bills." Take the sphere of legislation. So far we have adopted only one document, although it is very important—the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media, which was drawn up according to European standards. Three others are waiting on the sidelines: on public associations that guarantee political pluralism in our country; on entry and exit; and on freedom of conscience. It is extremely necessary for all three documents to be given legal status. Moreover we must keep in mind

that the Helsinki Final Act is a good guideline for developing new normative provisions.

[Guk] In 1975 the USSR signed the Final Act as an advance: Our rulers at the time had no intention of meeting a number of commitments, for example, concerning foreign travel or freedom of exchange of information. And although the situation with human rights in our country today cannot be compared to what it was in the seventies, one still cannot shake the impression that we are somehow "falling behind." Can you in all honesty assert that all our internal laws—actual and draft laws—correspond to the international commitments of the USSR?

[Petrovskiy] Correct, the 1975 law was adopted for the future. At that time there was stagnation in our country, above all in our thinking. We were living according to double standards. When signing international agreements today our diplomacy proceeds from the idea that they must be implemented in the USSR. It is now a priority for us to realize human rights at the level of internationally recognized standards. A clear example: The decisions of the London Information Forum, which turned out to be extremely painful for certain elements of our state apparatus, have been implemented. I have in mind halting the jamming of foreign radio stations, free circulation of the press, the right to access to copying equipment—all these have become a reality.

[Guk] I have my doubts about the copying equipment....

[Petrovskiy] You are right, there is a shortage of it, but this problem is financial rather than legal: The bans have been removed. I do not wish to say that all problems automatically disappear with the adoption of a law. We still have much that is stagnant and everything cannot be set straight all at once. Conservatism has put down deep roots: Many people have become used to living comfortably and they are still living in terms of the old structures; they are chained to the past. This psychological factor will continue to be in effect. But where there is a political will for change reinforced by a new power mechanism one has confidence in the final result.

[Guk] "A rule-of-law state does not mean simply legality," it says in your document. Then follows a detailed list of conditions under which rights and freedoms are assured in reality. There is also this section: "The armed forces and police are under the control of the civil authorities and accountable to them." Is this control reliable enough in our country today?

[Petrovskiy] This question is now a subject of discussion in our country. I hope this formula will be applied in our practice as well.

[Guk] That is, to put it simply, the control cannot yet be deemed reliable.

[Petrovskiy] Let me put it this way: Here we must act in keeping with this formula.

[Guk] A diplomatic answer. Well, all right: Other commitments are also included in the document—the independence of the courts, humane conditions for keeping people under guard and in places of incarceration, presumption of innocence—these and a number of other provisions are still in the area of the future for us. You approved the new document on behalf of the USSR. Do you think your mission ends with this or does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intend to use its influence to convince the USSR Supreme Soviet to make the necessary adjustments to the existing laws and practice?

[Petrovskiy] By no means do we consider our mission ended with this, since the task of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not only to develop and adopt international legal documents but also to check on adherence to the commitments that have been made in our internal life. For us the adoption of a new document is only the beginning. When the next CSCE forum on the human dimension convenes in Moscow we would like to be able to say that the commitments that were made are being carried out.

[Guk] Incidentally, how did you feel at this conference? After all, in the past such meetings were transformed into tribunals against the USSR which met with a chorus of accusations of human rights violations.

[Petrovskiy] This time the feeling was different. The accusing tone had completely disappeared. The delegations spoke frankly about their problems, their "sore spots," and nobody tried to hide them. Not a single one of the delegations was allergic to discussing any problem. This was explained well by the head of the United States delegation, Max Kampelman. He said that no government could ever be perfect; they are all made up of people, who are fallible. During all four weeks, diplomacy, if one may put it this way, worked with its sleeves rolled up.

[Guk] Participants in the congress made a commitment: Within no more than four weeks to give answers to the questions of the other states. This has to do with the system of mutual control in the area of observing human rights and freedoms. It would be interesting to know whom the Soviet side intends to question in the near future, and about what.

[Petrovskiy] We do have questions: For example, about the position of Soviet citizens abroad. And then I can also say that there is not country in which there have been no lapses in the observance of human rights. We want to figure out and learn the causes of this. The diplomacy of the new thinking should be concerned about citizens—our own and others'.

[Guk] The third meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension will take place in Moscow. But even now participants in the CSCE have made so many commitments that it will hardly be possible to carry them all out by that time. What do you think will be discussed this time?

[Petrovskiy] I was also asked this question at a press conference in Helsinki. Indeed, at first one gets the feeling that the document has covered everything. But that is only the way it seems. Far from all the "i's" have been dotted. Take, for example, the national minorities problem: We merely designated the general direction in which we are to move. But we need specifics. A number of issues in the area of human rights remain open. The most difficult sphere is providing for social justice. And can a society feel complacent when there are people who end up in its gutters. In Moscow it will be necessary to take the rights of youth and women more seriously. Or take the "brain drain." Frequently one hears: In order to prevent the outflow of talent it will be necessary to close off the borders again. But we have already "gone through" all that and the problem cannot be solved this way. Incidentally, this problem bothers the Americans too; they have an "outflow to Japan," and they are not the only ones. We must think about this problem together. Even with all the egoism of certain countries it is still possible to find a solution. We must not close ourselves off within our national borders. In the interests of each country we must create joint open laboratories and technological centers. We must contribute to the common pot. To do this we all must overcome the paranoiac obsession for secrecy, especially ourselves. Only together can we make scientific and technological progress with maximum effectiveness and save forces and money. Otherwise there is isolation, and the one who loses is the one who cooks in his own pot. The understanding of the need for changes in this area is now ripening. So the Moscow conference will not be left with nothing to do.

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["International Observers Roundtable" program with Presenter Nikolay Agayants and Radio Moscow foreign policy commentators Viktor Nikolayevich Levin and Vladimir Georgiyevich Pasko]

[Excerpts] [Agayants] Hello, esteemed comrade listeners! "International Observers Roundtable"—our traditional Sunday program—is on the air. At the microphone is your presenter Nikolay Agayants. [passage omitted]

In the studio with me are my colleagues Viktor Levin and Vladimir Pasko, commentators on foreign policy for all-Union radio. They have just returned from assignment—Viktor Nikolayevich in the North Caucasus, where he was covering the Soviet-West German talks, and Vladimir Georgiyevich in Kabul. [passage omitted]

[Levin] And so, what was the main outcome of the Soviet-West German talks? Agreement was reached in principle between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany on how the transition to the time when a single Germany will gain complete sovereignty is to be accomplished. As soon as German unification occurs, an appropriate treaty will be signed. Then Germany, with all the rights of sovereignty, will tackle the problems facing her. This goes for political problems. If I might jump ahead a little and move on from the meetings in Arkhyz to the Paris conference of foreign ministers under the "two-plus-four" formula, I should say that a very important agreement was reached there—first of all at the talks between FRG Foreign Minister Genscher and Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski, and then the agreement received the blessing of the entire "two-plus-four" conference—to conclude a treaty on the inviolablity of the Oder-Neisse border. This treaty will be concluded just as soon as a single German state is set up. This phraseology, or rather this formula, worked out in Paris completely satisfies the Polish side, and—as Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze said at the press conference in Paris—satisfies us also.

Even though no mention of this was made either at the press conference in Zheleznovodsk or in the other speeches made by Mikhail Sergeyevich and Helmut Kohl, I believe the question of the Polish-German border was probably touched upon. At any rate, I am firmly convinced that the Soviet Union has always—and still does—actively support her good neighbor, friend and ally, Poland, on this matter. That, I believe, is also one of the results of the Soviet- West German summit meeting. [passage omitted]

[Agayants] I got the impression that the Arkhuz decisions had the effect of—if you like—an exploding bomb across the ocean. Now they are upset over there that the decision was not announced in the presence of all the leading powers. They are also saying that the "two-plus-four" talks were placed in some doubt, were quite simply superfluous. What would you say to that, Viktor Nikolayevich?

[Levin] It could not have come like a bolt from the blue for the United States of America. Let us right away—and this is perhaps the main point—sort out one fundamental question. Yes, indeed, just a few months ago the Soviet Union was insisting on its view that a single Germany membership in NATO was unacceptable to us. And this led to a certain corresponding reaction from the FRG and the other NATO countries.

At the same time, though, we never said that our stance was frozen, so to speak, fixed once and for all. Quite the opposite. We said the problem lay in NATO as it existed at that time. We made it clear that, if NATO changed and if the situation generally changed, then we would approach the issue from a different angle.

[Agayants] Viktor Nikolayevich, the situation has changed.

[Levin] Yes, that's the point. The situation has undergone a dramatic change. You must understand that Mikhail Sergeyevich—well, I don't know, either he foresaw the question, or at any rate had a premonition—but at the Zheleznovodsk news conference he went into great detail, saying that agreements—he took the whole

package of agreements reached in Arkhyz—had been preceded by very intensive work in all directions. In this connection he recalled his visit to the United States. He mentioned his meetings with French President Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Thatcher. And he singled out the London summit session of the NATO Council, which did indeed begin a new page in the history of the alliance.

In the light of all these changes... [changes thought] of course, Baker might have learned of the details at Shannon, during his brief stopover, but the trend, the drift in the Soviet Union's movement on this issue was, I believe, obvious. At any rate, it did not have the effect of an exploding bomb on the participants in the Zheleznovodsk news conference. I don't mean to say that it was expected—I spoke to many West German journalists, and even after the press conference a leading television commentator asked me whether we were dropping our objections to a unified Germany's membership of NATO.

There is a small nuance here—a nuance which should be picked up. We phrase the issue thus: a sovereign Germany will decide on this on a sovereign basis. As for how, that is a matter for the German side. On this point, the proposal put forward by the Party for Democratic Socialism in the GDR for a referendum to be held in both German states on whether a unified Germany should or not join NATO could be a very serious one. Incidentally, even though the opinion polls would appear to suggest that all Germans are in favor of NATO, I am not sure what the outcome of such a referendum would be, though I am sure that it will not be conducted.

[Agayants] Alright. Now let's change the emphasis a little. It is not hard to imagine that the outcome of the meeting between USSR President Gorbachev and FRG Chancellor Kohl will meet with differing reactions here in this country. There could well even be irritation over the fact that, supposedly, here we go again with our unilateral concessions, surrendering our positions without a fight, one after another. What is the truth of the matter? Who has made more concessions, Viktor Nikolayevich? Who has gained more, and who has lost out in the compromises of today—and possibly tomorrow? I realize that the question is far from simple, but nevertheless I should like to hear what you have to say on the subject.

[Levin] I don't intend to give an exhaustive explanation. I have myself come across that interpretation. I have been asked, for example: How much did we get for selling out on the GDR? Comrades, that—to put it mildly—is an uncouth attitude! We cannot trade on the German Democratic Republic. That republic, on the expression of the will of its own people, has decided to amalgamate with the Federal Republic of Germany to create a single German state. What has that to do with us? This is not in question. I believe the problem must be approached from a different angle. Incidentally, this topic came up for very substantive discussion at the Paris news conference after the "two-plus-four" conference. Genscher was asked how much Germany has paid for the opportunity to unify. In answering this question, the West German foreign minister stressed that one should not be speaking of price when what we have here is mutual understanding. Germany and the USSR, stressed Genscher, have good prospects for developing their relations. Much better than in conditions of division. Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze went along with that opinion, and stressed that the establishment of state sovereignty for the nation is not and will not be traded on. The sovereignty of each nation is its natural and legitimate right.

I do not rule out that some people who contend that we have made too many concessions and we are surrendering without a fight that which our fathers liberated, or that we have sold the GDR to the FRG for a sum of money—it is immaterial how much—will take grave offense, but I will say it all the same: This is a reversion to imperialist thinking. And we who dwell in a socialist country, who profess communist ideals, have no right to descend into imperialist thinking. Yes, this does have its roots with us. But let us now, in this period of perestroyka, rid ourselves of it. And as for who as gained most and who has lost most—you know, that again is not the question to ask. This is an occasion on which there are no losers, only winners. [passage omitted]

[Agayants] We have already mentioned the "two-plus-four" conference of foreign ministers in Paris. But Comrade Shevardnazde's talks in the French capital were not limited to discussion of the German question. Last Wednesday the USSR foreign minister held discussions with the U.S. secretary of state on regional problems. James Baker's announcement of new aspects to the U.S. policy on Cambodia came as a sensation. The United States no longer intends to recognize as that country's legitimate government the trilateral opposition coalition, whose main fighting forces are the so-called Khmer Rouge. I should like to take you back once again to the latter half of the 1970s, when the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia was famed for its horrific crimes. For the Khmer Rouge wiped out at least 2 million of their compatriots. In 1979 Vietnamese troops helped the Cambodian overthrow the Pol Pot regime. But the United States refused to recognize the new Cambodian leadership. Last September Vietnam pulled her troops out, and now the United States has started demonstrating a more flexible position on Cambodia. In the words of Fitzwater, a State Department spokesman, this flexibility is to be found in the U.S. readiness to hold talks with Vietnam on a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian problem. Vietnam's representative at the United Nations has welcomed the shift in the U.S. position, stressing that his government backs any attempts to prevent the Khmer rouge returning to power in Cambodia.

Incidentally, the question of an Afghan settlement was also touched upon at the meeting. I should like to dwell on this in rather more detail, and not just because of the

topicality of the problem. There is a clear narrowing of the stances of Moscow and Washington on the subject of an Afghan settlement. Nevertheless, the sides have not yet got down to a detailed discussion of this matter, but instead have postponed it until their next meeting. Judging by everything, difficulties remain here.

[Pasko] I agree with you, Nikolay Ivanovich. Over the past few months, I have had occasion to work directly in Afghanistan and, to a certain extent, to see the problem of the Afghan settlement from the inside.

The fact that peace may be attained in Afghanistan only through talks is axiomatic. It requires no proof. The problem lies in how to make the opposing sides sit down at the negotiations' table.

Well, as far as the state authorities are concerned, everything is clear here. Although the March antigovernment revolt showed that the policy of national reconciliation is supported far from unanimously by the supporters of the present regime. Nevertheless, that policy has been adopted by the state authorities and is being implemented in a concrete way. [passage omitted]

That is to say, the policy for achieving peace is quite visible here. Let's take a look at what is being done on the past of the opposition. Things are more complicated here.

In the first place, I would like to note that the position is far from being uniform here. Part of the opposition is prepared to go in for cooperation and is going in for cooperation with the government authorities. [passage omitted]

In reply to a peace initiative by the government in the middle of June, well, quite recently, the irreconcilables convened a conference of their field commanders, upon whom a resolution rejecting any compromises whatsoever with the state authorities literally was thrust. And so, it precisely concerns these persons. It is exceptionally difficult to persuade them to sit down at the negotiating table.

[Aganyants] It is here, as far as I understand, that the question of the role of the Soviet Union and of the United States in an Afghan settlement arises.

[Pasko] Well, you know, since 1985 our position has consisted in the fact that we must proceed from the realities. Of what do these realities consist? Of the fact that the present leadership is in power in Afghanistan. Of the fact that that leadership is striving for peace. Of the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States, nor anyone else can foist any kind of decision upon the Afghans. We can only promote a settlement.

Well, it seems to me that now, the United States recently has begun better to accept these realities, too. Well, just look! Recently, its position has undergone a substantial change. Last year the United States of America still was saying that the Afghan problem can be resolved only by military means. Last summer, the United States began to speak of a solution of the problem by peaceful means. Now, they are already examining variants to the approach. Moreover, here, too, there is quite a bit that is new and quite a bit that is interesting. At first, the United States maintained that the leadership of Afghanistan should resign and leave the country after which elections could then take place under international supervision [kontrol]. Naturally, Kabul rejected that. Why should it? The regime has hunmdreds of thousands of supporters, it is firmly in power.

Last November, President Najibullah put forward his plan for a settlement in stages. He proposed that a nationwide peace conference be held in which the conflicting sides participate and that a leading council be set up to prepare the elections under international supervision. In January, a considerable addition was made to that plan—the government declared that it was ready to undertake to agree with the outcome of elections and not to have recourse to force to influence their outcome, provided, of course, that the opposition made similar assurances.

We supported that plan as the basis for elaborating a mechanism of settlement within Afghanistan.

In February, the United States essentially agreed to transition in stages, however, attaching a number of provisions to it, in particular, that the emigrant government of the opposition hold beforehand a consultative assembly in order to expand the base of its supporters. It is clear why that proposal has arisen. The Afghan opposition is torn by contradictions. The Peshawar opposition cannot agree between itself, nor with the groupings based in Iran, nor with the Afghan emigrant authorities.

[Levin] Judging from publications in the U.S. press, Washington has not changed its position regarding a special electoral commission, consisting of representatives of the conflicting sides, being placed in charge of preparations for the elections. Telegrams from Paris following the meeting between Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and James Baker noted that it even would seem to be a question of the elections taking place under the surveillance and supervision of a foreign commission.

If all that takes concrete shape, it may be possible to say that hopes will arise for a positive solution. However, the question remains still one of principle. But will the United States succeed in persuading the opposition?

[Pasko] Well, it is namely that which, Viktor Nilolayevich, in my opinion, is the most important thing. How can the irreconcilables be made to sit down at the negotiating table?

[Agayants] Meanwhile, President Najibullah stated recently that if such a commission was set up, the government might be able to discuss the question of transferring part of its authority.

[Pasko] In essence, that is yet another manifestion of the aspiration of the Afghan leadership to seek a way out of the impasse which has resulted. The problem, Nikolay Ivanovich, I repeat, lies in the extremist part of the opposition. But it should be noted that not only in it. Its roots lies in the certain duplicity of the U.S. approach to an Afghan settlement.

On the one hand, there is progress toward recognizing the realities. We already have spoken of that. It is namely that, incidentally, which caused points of contact to arise between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the Afghan problem. Both sides want to see Afghanistan independent, nonaligned, and neutral and come out in favor of a political solution of the problem, for its solution on the basis of general, direct, and secret elections, for active involvement in the Geneva process of the UN secretary general for lending Afghanistan comprehensive aid in its restoration.

However, differences also remain. The United States has not renounced complete support of the Peshawar opposition and its desire to resolve the problem by forceful methods. The duplicity of the position of the United States lies in this. On 8 July, noting an accusation of the irreconcilables of betrayal, Thomsen, a special envoy of the United States attached to the armed opposition, stated that the volume of aid to that opposition remains at the same level as in previous years. And it should be said that that volume is exceptionally high. According to Afghan sources, since March of last year, the armed opposition has received from abroad 600,000 units of shells, alone.

You know, it is very difficult somehow to imagine all these figures. But I should say that that it is mountains of weapons, moreover, in the direct meaning of the word.

However, compared with total supplies, it is, of course, a drop in the ocean.

[Agayants] But we also supply arms.

[Pasko] Nikolay Ivanovich, that is a special question. Due to the time limit, I would not want to touch upon it here. But I will note a significant feature. Yes, we do supply weapons. However, the government of Afghanistan, which receives our weapons, is going in for reconciliation with the opposition, while the opposition which receives weapons from the United States is rejecting reconciliation. And so, in no way should our supplies of weapons to Afghanistan be put on an equal footing with U.S. supplies to it.

[Aganyants] Unfortunately, our progam has run out of time. Its participants thank you for your attention and wish you all the best.

United States & Canada

Bush Reiterates Need To 'Retain Armed Forces'

PM2207142790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report under the rubric "TASS, REUTER, UPI Reports": "Statement by President G. Bush"]

[Text] U.S. President G. Bush reiterated the need for the United States to retain a powerful Armed Forces. "We have yet to enter the era of eternal peace," he said Saturday [21 July], speaking at a ceremony to launch the new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington at the military shipyard in Newport News, Virginia. The President moreover recalled George Washington's words: "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."

U.S. To Establish Contact With Opposition Party

PM2107153990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Shalnev: "Washington Shifting Emphasis"]

[Text] New York—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has announced that the Washington administration "will establish contact with the opposition" in the Soviet Union. Judging by the clarifications obtained by a WASHINGTON POST correspondent, opposition means above all those people who have withdrawn from the ranks of the CPSU during the recent party congress and immediately afterward.

"If you take a look," the secretary of state said, "at the approach we adopted in similar situations in East European countries, you will see that we tried to establish contact with the opposition there and get communication going with a view to getting to know what this opposition represents and ensuring that it knows what we ourselves represent. I believe that there is no reason not to do this in respect of the Soviet Union just because it is the Soviet Union."

James Baker's statement marks a very substantial shift in the way the White House and the Department of State view the events taking place in the Soviet Union.

Demands that serious contacts be established with those representatives of the reformist movements in the USSR who do not entirely side with the supporters and followers of President M.S. Gorbachev, who disagree with him on specific aspects of the Soviet state's domestic and foreign policy, have been voiced and are being voiced in the United States relatively vigorously. Yet every time such demands were made, including, among others, by experts within the administration itself, President Bush and Secretary of State Baker, who is regarded as being the closest to the head of the White House among all the other top Washigton government officials, let it be unequivocally known that "Washington takes the view that it should bank exclusively on Mikhail Gorbachev." According to THE WASHINGTON POST, "Bush and Baker extolled the Soviet President as the leading reformist in the Soviet Union and tried to create no complications for him."

Now the emphasis is shifting. So far it is unclear what shape the U.S. Administration's contacts with the opposition in the USSR will take. It is unclear, for instance, whether the Americans will go as far as to offer aid, as America has done in many other countries, especially in Poland where millions of dollars were spent on providing assistance to noncommunist opposition movements.

Arkadiy Maslennikov, head of the Soviet president's press service, has already given an assessment of Baker's statement. He warned that in certain circumstances U.S. contacts with the Soviet opposition could be viewed as interference in the USSR's domestic affairs.

This is a valid point, but the scope of its application is very broad. In the selfsame Washington, the Soviet Embassy maintains constant and well-established contacts with the U.S. opposition—the Democratic Party—its congressmen, senators, governors, and so forth. No one would describe these contacts as interference in America's affairs. These are normal working ties that are entirely necessary to understand what is what in America. Naturally, it would be an entirely different matter if money began to flow from our embassy into the Democrats' coffers and the opposition party candidates' election funds.

However, judging by appearances, there is no threat of this with regard to America in the foreseeable future....

Baker, Latvian Premier Meet in Washington

LD2607121590 Moscow TASS in English 1138 GMT 12 Jul 90

[Text] Washington July 21 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met on Friday Latvian Premier Ivars Godmanis, now on a private visit here. During the talk an unofficial exchange of views was held on the situation in the Baltic republics.

Godmanis told journalists after the meeting with Baker that the Baltic republics' principal aim at present was to secure Moscow's consent to the holding of talks under the "three-plus-one" formula (referring to the demand that the Soviet Government negotiate with all three Baltic republics together).

"Juridically we have already declared independence. Practically, it means having an independent economy and, consequently, the right to organise economic and political life in the republic.... We shall achieve it and we are going towards this way very fast," Godmanis said.

This is Baker's second meeting with representatives of the Baltic republics. On Thursday, Baker met Estonian foreign Minister Lennart Meri.

'Center for Democracy' Seen as Cover for Spying

PM2007155190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Jul 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by V. Antonov under rubric "Foreign Press Testifies": "Back Into the Trenches?"]

[Text] Late in the evening of 17 May Central Television showed a routine session of "Press Club." The authors of the program constantly stress the "independence" of the opinions, assessments, and judgments expressed in this program. The people gathered in the studio were shown videotapes of an interview with V. Bukovskiy, whom the journalist addressed amicably as "Volodya," and episodes from a recent conference in Prague apparently discussing vital things—peaceful routes to democracy, processes in social life in the USSR, and so forth. Then they were asked to state briefly their reaction to what they had seen.

Opinions varied. The organizers of the conference had experienced "moral torment in gathering the money" to hold it, one person sympathized. "Well, let them seize power. Let them seize it when all is said and done!"—that is roughly what another exclaimed in the heat of argument, referring to the participants in the conference.

So what happened at the Prague conference, and who were its participants?

While calls for the consolidation of communists were ringing out in Moscow at the 28th CPSU Congress, in Prague an international conference was meeting with the aim of consolidation of another kind—"boosting the opposition movements in the USSR." And although the conference was called "The Peaceful Route to Democracy," it manifestly smacked, if not of the powder, then definitely of the smoke of the "cold war." There was talk of exerting pressure on the Soviet leadership through strikes and propaganda, stimulating national strife and civil conflicts, and materially encouraging sedition.

The instigator of the conference was the emigre "Center for Democracy" (headquarters in the United States). The key figure was Vladimir Bukovskiy, activist of the organizations "Resistance Internationale" and "Prodemca'-'—the former supports the Afghan Mujahidin, the latter is a lobby for the Nicaraguan contras. Bukovskiy demanded the "disbanding of the Soviet Union" and gave long interviews, but failed to mention on whose behalf he was speaking. This ticklish question was once raised by the reputable U.S. magazine NATION and discussed by the influential Danish newspaper INFORMATION. What emerged?

The fact that the "Center for Democracy" was set up and is financed for espionage purposes. This is carried out through the U.S. National Foundation under the presidency of Carl Gershman, a former aide of Jeane Kirkpatrick at the United Nations. NATION writes that Gershman sympathizes with Bukovskiy's statement that "Gorbachev's reforms intensify the Soviet threat to the West" and that "under Gorbachev the Soviet Union is becoming far more dangerous inasmuch as it is having far greater success. Indeed, it may disarm the West both morally and physically." According to Bukovskiy, the West "must step up the pressure. I think that the time has come to put pressure on them, rather than show indulgence."

NATION published a document in which the tasks of "Center For Democracy" are spelled out in detail. Basically the idea is "to use Soviet organizations of human rights fighters to gather political and military information about the USSR, where a broad internal information network and channels for sending this information abroad have been set up." This network, the document notes, can supply information on such topics as the black market, the government and its functions (laws, instructions, rules, norms of secrecy), the militia, and the KGB. The "center" is supposed to set up "a network for collecting fresh information about the USSR via people arriving from the West who can ensure the safe export of information through the use of the necessary technical means."

The authors of the document note that, of course, by no means everyone will voluntarily agree to spy. Therefore it is proposed to make use of people "in the dark," as is said in intelligence jargon: "It must be emphasized that our friends in the Soviet Union act not from political interests, but from their own personal convictions. They cannot be relied upon to act consciously exclusively as sources of intelligence data. However, facts of interest to specialists can always be found in the broad stream of information which they supply."

Gershman's foundation allocated $50,000 to establish the need to set up the "Center for Democracy," in 1986 it granted the "center" $200,000, in 1987 it gave $125,000, and in the following year it gave another $40,000. The foundation refuses to answer questions about how it uses the information which the "center" supplies. It is certain, however, that it does not conceal it from the CIA. What is more, facts testify that the "center" is used not only as an espionage but also as a subversive organization.

S. Bratkowski, chairman of the alternative Union of Polish Journalists, stressed at the conference that the mass media, including underground radio stations, played a decisive role in the "the overthrow of the former regimes" in the East European countries. He reported that around 1,000 radio stations which had been used in Poland to jam television audio signals in cities and to broadcast signals containing a different text have been transferred to the Baltic republics, Belorussia, and the Ukraine from Poland.

Let us note that on 16 May London's THE TIMES reported the smuggling across the Polish-Soviet border of photocopying and typographical equipment, matrices, and silk screens. The international wing of "Solidarity" has also sent photocopying equipment and matrices as "gifts" to nationalist front groupings operating under the

label of cooperatives. As soon as the cooperatives receive this equipment they disband, and the equipment then moves on to illegal publishing houses. Free lessons in the technology of publishing, distribution, and propaganda are offered to Ukrainian activists traveling to the West.

Having made public the documents about the espionage character of the "Center for Democracy," NATION described its plans as "reckless and provocative." The conferences in Warsaw and Prague show that these plans have not been abandoned. On the contrary, they have been broadened and deepened, and operations in the worse traditions of the era of confrontation have been launched. No, it was not a peaceful route to democracy that the organizers of the conferences in Warsaw and Prague were proposing. They are dragging us back into the trenches of the psychological and propaganda war which was cut short thanks to perestroyka.

Impact of U.S. Opposition to Bush Assessed

PM1907110190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Melor Sturua: "Under Fire of Criticism; White House Repels Attacks of Neoconservatives and Rightists"]

[Text] Washington—Since time immemorial Americans have lived as though poised for flight, they are hereditary isolationists. Events taking place two oceans away begin to interest Americans only when they affect them directly. And to this day we can regard as such events or rather phenomena, since they are permanent, only two things—the Japanese technology threat and the Soviet military threat.

It was the latter circumstance—this is not a paradox but reality—which lay at the foundation of the hospitable meeting which the Americans rendered to the Soviet president. They believe that perestroyka and the new political thinking have considerably reduced the Soviet threat. All public opinions register this shift, just as they do approval for the results of the Washington talks between the USSR and U.S. presidents.

Everything would seem to be good and clear. But no. If you imagine American society as a pyramid, then with regard to the summit meetings we get what at first sight seems a very strange picture. At the very summit, or to be more specific, President Bush and Secretary of State Baker welcome the results of the talks. The reaction is similar on the part of the broad base of the pyramid, that is the so-called ordinary American. But between the summit and the base there is a quite considerable stratum which attacks the meeting and its results.

We cannot fail to take this into account. It is a case of highly influential and powerful forces. They are represented even in Bush's closest entourage—in the National Security Council and the administration. The presidents' meeting is being criticized by the Democrats and is being subjected to a literal hurricane fire by the neoconservatives and right wing of the ruling Republican Party.

The liberal democrats' criticism, if that is the right word, is well intentioned. Their complaints are rather in the human rights field.

The neoconservatives and right-wing Republicans are another matter. They have resolutely taken up arms against the results of the summit meeting. Artillery preparation began in good time—with Baker's May visit to Moscow. This trip was branded as "a journey to Canossa." Baker was accused of embarking on intolerable concessions to Moscow and virtually betraying U.S. national security interests. After the summit meeting the fire switched to President Bush himself. The tone was set by the high priests of the journalistic elite—William Safire in THE NEW YORK TIMES and George Will in THE WASHINGTON POST. And then the heavy howitzers like Paul Nitze and Richard Perle were brought in. Our SS-18 ICBM's play the part of Carthage which must be destroyed.

The U.S. side believes, and quite rightly, that the SS-18 missiles present the greatest threat to U.S. security because they are a destabilizing weapon, a first-strike weapon. It would seem that the neoconservatives and right-wing Republicans should only have been exultant and rejoiced that Baker had brought back from Moscow the Soviet Union's agreement to halve its SS-18 missiles—from 308 to 154. But nothing of the kind. Baker's critics believe that—with his boss' agreement—he has either embarked on a deliberate concession or has fallen into a concealed trap.

On what is this criticism built? On the fact that the U.S. side has recognized our right to a limited modernization of the SS-18. Nitze and Perle assert that this modernization is far from limited and that the modernized model compensates qualitatively for the quantitative reduction in the SS-18 missiles (instead of 308 missiles with 10 MIRV'd warheads there will be 154 missiles with 20 MIRV'd warheads each).

Of course both in our country and in the United States you will find specialists who, arming themselves with figures and calculations of the two sides' nuclear missile potentials, will prove without difficulty that if there has been a concession then it is we and not the Americans who have made it. Here there will also be references to the number of U.S. sea-launched missiles, to bombers armed with missiles, and to the nuclear warhead quotas.

But this whole "figures game" brings us back to the pre-perestroyka times when at talks at any level with the Americans there was discussion of the balance of forces, which cannot be clearly calculated, and not of the balance of interests, which is far easier to calculate. So if we reject the "magic of figures," then it is easily becomes clear that quantitative discrepancies in no way reduce the peacemaking potential of the future Soviet-U.S. agreement.

Politics, like nature, has an attraction for symmetry. Just as our conservatives criticize Gorbachev's foreign policy course, so the U.S. conservatives criticize Bush's foreign policy course. In both camps moaning about capitulation and virtually about betrayal can be heard. For both camps criticism of foreign policy is merely the overture to the revision of domestic policy and a way of approaching the crucial question—the question of power.

Bush came to the White House with the help of and as a representative of the right centrist wing of the Republican Party. But the Republican elite has always suspected Bush of liberalism of the Rockefeller kind. Now, this elite believes, its suspicions are being justified. Bush, who swears that he will follow Reagan's course, is obviously changing it, the neoconservatives and rightists assert. His main sin is his threat to the inviolability of the present tax system. Despite his election promises Bush is now saying that taxes may be increased. Bush's anti-abortion stance—the touchstone of "true" republicanism—is becoming increasingly less clear. The neoconservatives and rightists are horrified that Bush has received a deputation of homosexuals in the White House, that he has pardoned the well-known industrialist Armand Hammer, who "props up the communists," and has not pardoned the 100 percent anticommunist and patriot Oliver North. Bush is also reproached for his high degree of popularity among the population. The neoconservatives and rightists believe that in the chase after personal popularity Bush is weakening the Republican Party.

But despite all this the threats from the right are so far not worrying Bush very much. The rightists must realize that without Bush the Republicans could lose the White House at the 1992 presidential elections. The rightists have no second Reagan to set against Bush. The threatened change of leader could come about only if Bush "slips up," as happened to Nixon (the Watergate affair). But neither involvement in the "Iran-Contras" scandal nor the financial misdemeanors of his son are enough for a "Bushgate." Well, a drastic deterioration in the economic situation in the country which, incidentally, is not predicted, would not so much play into the hands of the right-wing Republicans as boost the Democrats' chances.

The right wing of the Republican Party and the neoconservatives "forgave" Reagan for his foreign policy with regard to the Soviet Union (four summit meetings; the conclusion of the treaty on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles; the announcement that the USSR was no longer the "evil empire"; and so forth). They forgave him because he was "Mr. Republican" in his philosophy on internal affairs. Bush is not forgiven for his foreign policy because his devout republicanism is under great doubt.

Criticism of Bush's foreign policy course intensified sharply after his last meeting with M.S. Gorbachev. It is indicative that the rightists were particularly agitated not by the official results of the Bush-Gorbachev meeting, including the signing of a trade treaty, but by its unofficial part—at Camp David. Why? Because there arose "the threat of a special relationship" between the two presidents, who reached the conclusion that they should communicate more often by telephone and with the aid of other White House-Kremlin "hot line" technical facilities, bypassing official bureaucratic channels.

After Reykjavik where, according to a legend which has already acquired a semblance of truth, Gorbachev almost "seduced" Reagan, the rightists advanced the slogan of not leaving the White House incumbent one on one with the Kremlin incumbent. In the case of Reagan this was explained by his inadequate foreign policy "grounding." In the case of Bush—however paradoxical this may seem—the reason given is the fact that he is too well "grounded!" Bush, as is well known, came to the White House with experience as a parliamentarian, director of the CIA, chief U.S. representative in the United Nations, U.S. ambassador to China, and, finally vice president. So that is precisely why, his critics assert, Bush scorns the advice of experts, especially if they do not adhere to the same opinion as the president.

The "purge" in the White House apparatus following immediately after the Washington meeting caused a great storm. Robert Gates, the president's deputy assistant for national security and a former vice director of the CIA, is being "removed" from U.S.-Soviet topics and switched to "less important" problems. Perhaps he will soon leave the National Security Council. In addition, it is expected that another expert on Soviet problems, Robert Blackwill, will leave the National Security Council and return to Harvard University to teach.

The rightists believe that the reason for the "purge" lies in the negativism of Gates and Blackwill with regard to perestroyka and Gorbachev personally. They accuse Bush and Baker of being too "involved" with the Soviet president and prepared for far-reaching diplomatic concessions as long as they can "prop up" the latter. Newspapers describe the dramatic conference in the White House, in Bush's Oval Office, at which it was decided where or not to accept the unexpected amendments to the future treaty on the reduction of offensive nuclear arms proposed by Gorbachev. Baker's advice was "yes." Cheney's advice was "no." The U.S. defense secretary believed that the United States would pay too high a price for it. Bush took the side of his secretary of state. Cheney then allegedly said:

"Mr President, I shall not resign because my post is too important to leave."

The point of Cheney's retort came down to the fact that he did not want to leave Bush one-on-one with Baker, still less with Gorbachev.

China

Lukyanov, PRC Counterpart Discuss Friendship

LD2107112290 Moscow TASS in English 1117 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 21 TASS—Soviet parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov received in the Kremlin today a delegation of the National People's Congress of China led by its Vice-Chairman Peng Chong.

During the talk the sides expressed satisfaction with the development of Soviet-Chinese good neighbourly relations after the 1989 summit.

They emphasised the importance of deepening and extending contacts and cooperation in a variety of areas, including ties between supreme and local bodies of government, in the interests of promoting friendship and good neighbourliness between the Soviet and Chinese peoples, ensuring peaceful development, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

Chinese Economic, Trade Cooperation Meeting Ends

LD2107174590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 21 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The fifth sitting of the joint Soviet-Chinese Commission on Economic, Trade, and Scientific-Technological Cooperation has ended in Beijing. Li Peng, chairman of the PRC State Council, today met the members of the Soviet delegation headed by Comrade Maslyukov. The two sides reaffirmed their mutual intention of continuing their joint efforts to expand still further their trade, economic, and scientific-technological cooperation.

Agreements Signed

OW2207184490 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 22 Jul 90

[Text] After attending the fifth meeting of the Sino-Soviet econmomic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation committee in Beijing, Maslyukov, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, said: Generally speaking, we are satisfied with the meeting. The two sides signed the agreements on protecting investment and avoding double taxation after the meeting. Enterprises from both sides, as cooperation partners, will enjoy most preferential treatment with these agreements. In addition, the work group studied questions concerning cooperation in transport, energy, finance, and foreign affairs. The two sides agreed that the Chinese side will supply goods to the Soviet Union according to Soviet standards.

China's Effort in Cambodian Cease-fire Sought

OW2307054790 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 16 Jul 90

[Text] Talks on the Cambodian issue by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council opened in Paris on 16 June. The talks are aimed at coordinating international efforts to settle the Cambodian issue.

The last round of such talks by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council started in January and ended in New York two months ago. Station commentator Shchedrov writes in this connection:

The conflict between the Cambodian Government, supported by Vietnam, and the contradictory coalition parties of the opposition has continued for 11 years. Sihanouk, political leader of the opposition, and Son Sann, leader of one of the opposition factions, receive support from the West, while the Khmer Rouge, with the strongest military strength, is supported by China. In such circumstances, international participation in the mediation of the Cambodian conflict is necessary. Meanwhile, all the five pernament members of the UN Security Council hold that to have various Cambodian parties reach an agreement is of primary imporatance while holding consultations among members of the UN Security Council is secondary. The outcome of such consultations depends on the progress in the search for internal conciliation.

The positive dialogue among the various Cambodian parties, which began early last year, brought people the hope of achieving peace in that country as soon as possible. However, the prospects for mediating the Cambodian conflict have dimmed over the past two months. This crisis has been caused by the Khmer Rouge, a clique which slaughtered 3 million people during its rule over Cambodia. Preventing this clique from returning to power is the necessary condition for mediating the Cambodian conflict on which all parties agree, except the Khmer Rouge itself. The Khmer Rouge claims to favor participation in the government after the war, but in fact it openly attempts to restore its own political power.

During the Tokyo talks in June, the Khmer Rouge deliberately carried out military activities in an attempt to obstruct various parties of the conflict from signing an agreement. It seized Kompong Thom Province, 120 km from Phnom Penh. This shows the ambitions of the Khmer Rouge.

Indonesia's efforts to convene an unofficial meeting of various parties of the Cambodian conflict are also futile. It seems that an atmosphere of no confidence prevails at the meeting being held by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in Paris. They apparently do not expect that the present meeting will achieve important results.

But I think that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council can and should do something—here, I

refer to seeking a cease-fire by the hostile parties. Beijing, which supports the Khmer Rouge, should make efforts first in this regard. Such an action can prevent the situation from deteriorating any further and bring various Cambodian parties back to the negotiating table.

More on Reducing Armed Forces Along PRC Border

OW2307055090 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 12 Jul 90

[From the "World Today" program]

[Text] After several rounds of consultations, Soviet and Chinese diplomatic and military experts have decided on the date of talks concerning the reduction of Armed Forces along the border between the two countries. According to the agreement reached between the two sides, the talks will commence in the fall of this year in Moscow. Our foreign affairs reporter (Sunheiv) has the following comments:

The process of normalization of relations between the two countries agreed upon at the Beijing summit in May last year is of great importance in terms of military affairs. This refers to the measures to ensure mutual trust in reducing military confrontation and consolidating the 7,500-km boundary between the two countries. The confrontation and estrangement that prevailed not long ago have often strained the situation along the border and given rise to military conflicts and bloody incidents. It was not accidental that in the Soviet-Chinese joint statement promulgated after the Beijing summit, both sides declared that they would reduce to a minimum their Armed Forces along the border. An agreement on the principles guiding such reductions was signed last April when Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Moscow. The intention of the Soviet Union and China to cut their respective Armed Forces was a favorable condition for this agreement.

But what should be cut, after all? Kireyev, head of the Soviet experts delegation and chief of the Socialist Countries of Asia Administration of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said:

[Begin Kireyev recording, in Russian fading into Mandarin translation] First of all, it is necessary to cut the offensive forces on both sides along the border. According to the agreement, the remaining forces on both sides after the reduction should be merely defensive in nature. An important point is that the agreement does not affect either side's previous commitment to other countries, nor does it hurt any third country or the interests of any third country. [end recording]

What is your view on the prospect of the Soviet-Chinese talks to be held in Moscow in the coming fall?

[Begin Kireyev recording, in Russian fading into Mandarin translation] I would not say that the reduction is an easy task because it involves a most subtle and sensitive aspect of the activities of both sides—the military aspect. For decades, the two sides have been in a state of military and political confrontation and have been suspicious of each other instead of trusting each other. With regard to the process of organizing the future talks and the preparations for the talks, the last meeting between the two sides indicated that both would like to make concessions in order to arrive at mutually acceptable plans.

Northeast Asia

ROK's No Tae-u Views Soviet-Korean Ties

90UF0342A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 29, 18 Jul 90 p 14

[Interview with ROK President No Tae-u by Vladislav Dunayev, NOVOSTI press agency and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent; date and place not given: "Asia Is Open to the Winds of Change"]

[Excerpts] [Dunayev] Mr. President, all of us who have lived until the last decade of the stormy 20th century were glad to witness the truly surprising events. The avalanche of democratization that rolled over Europe would seem to have brought us right up to the point of solving the unsolved problems left from World War II and then also of the cold war. It is logical to expect the warm winds also to reach the Pacific Ocean region which, not by accident, looks forward to the great future of a uniting nations. In this connection how do you assess the significance of your recent meeting in San Francisco with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev?

[No] I think that the meeting of the leaders of the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union on 4 June of this year in San Francisco was an epochal event. It not only advanced bilateral relations but also melted some of the ice of the cold war in the Pacific Ocean region.

We paid a great deal of attention to the two speeches of Mikhail Gorbachev—in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk. I think that with the very fact of the meeting in San Francisco, which was a practical embodiment of the idea expressed in these speeches, the Soviet Union demonstrated not only to the population of the Korean peninsula but also to the peoples of East Asia and the entire world its firm resolve to pursue a policy of peace and cooperation in the Pacific Ocean region. I am convinced that the steps taken by your president will advance the movement toward peace and cooperation in this area of the planet.

[Dunayev] Mr. President, how do you envision the path to the most rapid restoration of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union? What is your assessment of the real possibilities and the scale and form of economic cooperation between our countries even in the near future?

[No] As a result of the annexation of Korea by imperialist Japan and subsequently as a result of the cold war

between the East and West, the good-neighborly relations that were established between Russian and Korea in 1884 were severed for 86 long years. President Gorbachev and I agreed that putting an end to this ill-fated period in the history of the relations between our two countries is completely in line with the "new thinking" and should contribute to strengthening peace in the region.

But we have not yet solved the problem of how to successfully activate bilateral exchange and cooperation under conditions in which Moscow and Seoul will be consulting in order to restore full diplomatic relations as soon as possible. In this connection I wish to discuss my speech of 29 June of this year which was broadcast on Korean television. In my address I called for the development of active economic ties with the Soviet Union, which corresponds to the goals of achieving peace and unity on the peninsula and serves to improve the well-being of all Koreans. In this speech I spoke in favor of pursuing a firm policy directed toward the creation of joint enterprises, a policy that would serve for optimal utilization of the economic advantages of each of the sides on behalf of mutual interests. The Republic of Korea is prepared to begin talks with the USSR government on questions of deepening bilateral cooperation and improving relations between our countries. The time has come to move on to concrete actions directed toward the establishment of constructive economic cooperation. This problem cannot be solved within the framework of nongovernmental contacts alone. We must take advantage of intergovernmental channels to eliminate all the obstacles on the path to bilateral cooperation.

It must be noted that the Republic of Korea, having achieved considerable economic successes during the period of the sixties through the eighties, today has become a powerful industrial state. The unique experience of economic development, the technology developed in our country, and the so-called "know how" in the sphere of control of production could be a real contribution to the cause of implementing economic reforms in the USSR, which in a certain sense could be even more effective than the experience in modernization of any other country of the West. Moreover, I am convinced that the ROK and the USSR naturally augment one another, and this opens up truly inexhaustible opportunities for bilateral economic cooperation for the good of both countries.

The Republic of Korea has effective production capable of satisfying the broadest demands of its Soviet partners. Business circles of the ROK are capable of organizing and starting up production of various consumer goods, contributing to the construction of plants and joint enterprises in your country, and providing equipment and technology for them. The production structure of the ROK encompasses the full spectrum of goods in daily demand so that, with a favorable investment climate, many Korean companies even today are prepared to begin the construction of a broad network of enterprises for producing all of these products in the USSR.

In addition to this I wish to say that Korean businessmen already have a number of plans for effective development of the raw material resources of Siberia in conjunction with their Soviet partners. They are prepared to begin the creation of infrastructure complexes, including the construction of ports, railroads, and highways. They are prepared for long-term investment in the construction enterprises of the electronics industry, hotel complexes, department stores, the sphere of services as a whole, and so forth. I hope that on completion of the 28th CPSU Congress the Soviet Union will activate its policy of reform and thus all the earmarked projects can be successfully realized, contributing to the well-being of all the people.

Enterprises of the private sector play a key role in the market economy, so for effective economic cooperation it is necessary to have a favorable climate in which the companies need not worry about the future of their capital investments. This dictates the persistent need for close intergovernmental cooperation which should be based on a number of agreements—on investment guarantees, customs tariffs, and so forth. It is therefore obvious that close, fruitful cooperation presupposes as a mandatory condition the establishment of full-fledged diplomatic relations.

At the same time, our country needs the advanced scientific and technological developments of the Soviet Union. It is important for the governments of the ROK and the USSR to reach an agreement quickly and determine the framework of constructive cooperation. As I told President Gorbachev, given favorable development of bilateral relations, trade between our countries, whose volume should exceed $1 billion this year, will reach the level of $10 billion in the next four-five years.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, I wish to emphasize once again that the people of the Republic of Korea are not only striving for normal relations with your country but above all want to make their contribution to the cause of perestroyka and contribute to mutual well-being through cooperation both within the framework of intergovernmental relations and on the level of personal contacts. We also hope that through the establishment of good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union it will be possible to convince the leadership of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to enter on the path of openness and reform as you have done in your country and thus achieve real peace on the Korean peninsula. We consider ourselves responsible to current and future generations for the fate of the planet and for peace in which all peoples of the earth will be linked through ties of cooperation and friendship.[passage omitted]

[Dunayev] What is your idea of the 21st century, on whose threshold we are standing?

[Roh] Although it is not easy to predict the future, I believe that the 21st century will be an era of bright hopes for mankind which will open up possibilities of a worthier life. The last century, which has seen two world

wars, many large and small regional conflicts, and, finally, the cold war, which has lasted almost a half century—all this is a good lesson for mankind. We must not allow the useless ideological confrontation to continue in the future. The time has come to achieve through joint efforts an awareness of the community of human values—freedom, peace, and well-being.

We are convinced that it is time to put an end to the confrontation between the North and the South on the Korean peninsula. The waves of renewal initiated by the Soviet Union will bring changes throughout the world. Taking into account the fact that a positive consequence of this process was the arms reduction undertaken by the superpowers, I think that we can also hope for cooperation between our nations.

[Dunayev] What wishes would you like to convey to the Soviet people?

[Roh] Since the Soviet Union has a large territory that spans the Eurasian continent and since this country is rich in history and culture, it exerts an immense influence on the situation in the world and on the fate of all mankind and, consequently, it bears responsibility for the constructiveness of its policy. I have read President Gorbachev's book "Perestroyka" and it made a deep impression on me. I give the Soviet leader and his advisers their due for having begun and for consistently implementing the policy of reform. It is remarkable that such a courageous decision was made by your country on the threshold of the 21st century.

I am deeply convinced that through their joint efforts the Soviet people will achieve success in implementing reforms, although many problems await them on the path of perestroyka. Conducting reforms in any country involves considerable difficulties and frequently leads to serious complications or even situations of conflict. But I believe that it is only through overcoming such difficulties that society can make a really significant leap into the future. The reforms being carried out in your society are leading to the elimination of the old order not only in the USSR but also throughout the world. I am convinced that the policy of perestroyka will not only bring great success and well-being to all the peoples of the USSR but will also be an immense contribution to the cause of building a more harmonious world, a world without war.

The peoples of Asia are hopefully expecting that the warm wind of glasnost and reforms will blow in this region of the world, thus putting an end to the period of prolonged confrontation in the cold war era. For many years our people have been deprived of communication with one another, but I am convinced that now contacts will increase, helping us to understand one another more deeply, to establish relations of true good neighbors and friends, and to build a unified, harmonious world.

Rally Marks DPRK-Soviet Month of Solidarity

SK2107041190 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] As we have already reported, the traditional month of solidarity with the Korean people's struggle for the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and for the peaceful reunification of their country on a democratic basis from 25 June to 27 July is being observed in the Soviet Union. On 17 July, a rally of solidarity with the Korean people was held at the Moscow Machine Tool Plant. Functionaries from the DPRK Embassy in the Soviet Union were on hand in the rally.

In the rally, (Vladimir Pilsov), secretary of the party committee of the plant, spoke:

[Begin recording in Russian fading into Korean translation, read by announcer] Today, workers, office workers, and technicians of our plant have gathered here to express solidarity with the Korean people who are struggling for the peaceful reunification of their country. I sincerely extend congratulations to the Korean friends and, through them, express friendship and solidarity with all of the working people in the DPRK. The Soviet people unanimously and consistently want Korea to be reunified peacefully and on a democratic basis. [end recording]

After this, (Yuriy Krapchepskiy), deputy manager of the plant, spoke:

[Begin recording in Russian fading into Korean translation, read by announcer] The month of solidarity with Korea which is observed every year in our country is regarded as a great political function which proves the Soviet people's sincere aspiration to strengthen friendly cooperation with the people of the fraternal country. We support the Korean people's just struggle for normalizing the situation on the Korean peninsula and for founding a unified national state. The Soviet social circles have supported the DPRK's new proposals to preserve solid peace on the Korean peninsula and in Southeast Asia.

Our people's sincere friendship has a deep and long historic (?tradition). It has become solid in blood and has been (?achieved) through the joint struggle for freedom and for the founding of a progressive society. We rejoice over the success attained by the working people of the DPRK and wish them success in their devoted efforts to build a new society. [end recording]

In his reply address, Kim Hui-su, DPRK charge d'affaires ad interim to the Soviet Union, expressed thanks to the leaders of the plant for their invitation to the solidarity rally and for their support to the Korean people's struggle, and wished the Soviet people success in their perestroyka and glasnost of society.

After the rally, the Korean guests inspected workshops in the plant, several products which are well known in the DPRK, and the museum of the plant.

ROK Bid To Open Border, DPRK Response Viewed

PM2307091690 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jul 90 p 3

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent A. Platkovskiy: "Will the North Not Move Toward the South?"]

[Text] Pyongyang—South Korean President No Tae-u has announced the decision to open a sector of the military demarcation line in Panmunjom for free passage and contacts between the inhabitants of North and South for five days beginning 13 August. For the first time in 45 years of history the barrier will be lifted between the two parts of Korea, which continue to exist in conditions of total isolation from each other. This step was taken in response to a similar proposal from Pyongyang: to open Panmunjom on 15 August to mark the 45th anniversary of the liberation of Korea. The sides have finally reached a consensus.

President No Tae-u gave assurances that northerners will be able to visit various places in South Korea and meet freely with their southern blood brothers. They will be guaranteed all conveniences, as well as their safety. This last is of particular significance, since a law is still in force in South Korea whereby inhabitants of the DPRK are regarded as representatives of an "antistate organization." Seoul is thereby once again affirming its readiness no longer to regard the DPRK as a "hostile party."

The inhabitants of the South, No Tae-u stated, hope that Pyongyang will give them the opportunity freely to visit various regions of the North and meet with people. Is the DPRK prepared to do this?

Foreign observers in Pyongyang and Seoul are studiously avoiding optimistic forecasts in anything relating to inner-Korean relations. Their skepticism is prompted, for instance, by Pyongyang's recent decision to break off talks on preparations for an interparliamentary conference. DPRK delegates deemed it impossible to attend talks on 19 July, because a criticial situation had arisen in the South Korean National Assembly: Opposition parliamentarians, in protest against the ruling party's violation of the democratic norms of discussion and adoption of a number of laws, decided to resign their deputies' mandates. Furthermore, having postponed for a month the meeting with South Korean parliamentarians, Pyongyang demanded the resignation of the ruling party in South Korea, the dissolution of parliament, and the holding of new elections. From the viewpoint of international law, this is patent interference in internal affairs, and gross interference at that. That is how the move was assessed in Seoul. The breaking off of the talks "cannot fail to affect North-South talks," it was noted there.

Obviously it should be borne in mind that Pyongyang does not recognize South Korea as a sovereign state formation. I do not know how far this fact will clarify the reasons for Pyongyang's recent actions. In any event, let us not be in a hurry to make predictions about a possible historic meeting in Panmunjom in mid-August between inhabitants of North and South.

Stop Press

A message in reply to No Tae-u's statement has been issued in Pyongyang. The North side assessed it as "fallacious publicity." In order to test the South's sincerity, it was proposed that a whole series of conditions be fulfilled. Chief among them are: to remove by 12 August the ferroconcrete wall erected to the south of the military demarcation line and to repeal the law on national security which bans Southerners from contacts with Northerners.

Will Seoul be able to demonstrate that it is not what the North believes it to be?

Asia-Pacific Political Prospects Analyzed

PM2007131590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA international observer V. Vinogradov under the rubric: "World Today: Problems and Opinions": "Asia: Will There Be Two-way Movement"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] We know perfectly well that nothing good happens of its own accord. It must be sought out tirelessly. Especially since Asia also has a detailed program for moving forward set out by M.S. Gorbachev during his well-known Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk speeches. Moreover, the Soviet Union has not only set out this program but has already taken corresponding steps in this direction, starting to cut back its Armed Forces in the Asian part of the country and the Pacific Fleet.

In this respect we cannot fail to be encouraged by reports from the Korean peninsula. In observers' opinion, the accords secured in Panmunjom by North and South Korean representatives to speed up the talks whose participants are trying to prepare an unprecedented meeting between the two hostile countries' prime ministers, represented a major breakthrough. Delegates from the two states on the Korean Peninsula agreed to hold another meeting 26 July in order to sign an agreement incorporating the basic outlines of the proposed agenda and other procedural questions within the framework of the preparations for a meeting of the prime ministers. It is thought that the unification of the two Korean states will be one of the main topics on the agenda at the coming meeting.

It is extremely indicative that Son Khan Kho, South Korean delegation head in Panmunjom, expressed the hope that the coming talks between the DPRK and ROK

prime ministers would make it possible to open a "new chapter to realize the idea of the peaceful reunification of the peninsula." "We have no right," he told his North Korean colleagues, "to cling to the 'cold war' logic and disregard the changes on an international scale."

The talks between the DPRK and South Korean prime ministers may be held in August in line with accords secured in principle at previous meetings between the two countries' representatives. If these talks take place, they will be the first meeting between the two top government leaders of North and South since partition in 1945.

It is hard to overrate the positive role that the normalization of the situation on the Korean peninsula would also play for the Far East and for the entire Asia-Pacific region. However, there are forces putting up all manner of opposition to this turn of events. The fact that Seoul has announced at this time an accord whereby Washington will supply the South Korean Air Force with 120 U.S. F-18's can hardly be considered accidental.

Readers are entitled to ask the reason for these shipments of combat machines. In this connection I would recall that this January the DPRK unilaterally suspended dialogue with South Korea in protest against the "Team Spirit" joint U.S. and South Korean military maneuvers, which Pyongyang asked to be cancelled. The result was that the talks were suspended for six months. Isn't that the reaction from Pyongyang that those who announced the sealing of the new deal are counting on?!

But for the time being, as we can see, both Pyongyang and Seoul are taking the first steps to accommodate one another under the influence of the changes taking place in the world. What about Tokyo, which could, beyond any doubt, make a considerable contribution to normalizing the situation both in the Far East and throughout the Asia-Pacific region? Unfortunately, people there still think in the old ways. The latest example of this being the "special position" adopted by the Japanese representative in Houston at the annual meeting of the seven largest Western countries. Its "specialness" resided in the fact that the Japanese Government once again displayed the chronic devotion of some of the country's conservative circles to "cold war" dogma and their reluctance to help further include the USSR in the system of global economic ties. How else can we explain Japanese Premier T. Kaifu's attempts to talk the other participants in the Houston meeting out of their intention of expanding the scale of their economic cooperation with the USSR? T. Kaifu backed up this stance with irritating references to the Soviet Union's refusal to meet Japan's territorial claims.

While Premier T. Kaifu was upholding his "special position" in Houston, I. Ishikawa, head of the Japan Defense Agency, traveled out to the Sasebo Air Base and said that Japan allegedly sees no positive changes in Soviet military policy in the Far East and must therefore arm itself. He said the following in response to journalists' request for him to express an opinion of the strategic situation around the Japanese islands: "I don't think that the military threat from the Soviet Union has disappeared in the Asia-Pacific region."

Japan, the Defense Agency chief said, must continue its efforts to create "corresponding military might."

The current talks between the United States and Singapore are clearly in the same negative vein. Their aim is to conclude an agreement enabling the Pentagon to keep its F-16 combat aircraft in that country and send its warships there for refueling and repairs. It is well known that Singapore does not object to this agreement and is even trying to persuade other countries in the region of its "usefulness." For instance, when in Jakarta recently, Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore minister of trade and industry, claimed that the U.S. military presence in the region serves ASEAN's interests and it is therefore in its interests for the United States to keep this presence there as long as possible.

Let me cite the opinion of Thailand's THE NATION, which published an editorial in connection with the possibility of U.S. warships and aircraft turning up in Singapore. It says, in particular: "The U.S. military presence has always served to defend only narrow American interests, determined by the forward deployment strategy developed 40 years ago to contain communism. One can only wonder what communist enemy the United States is trying to contain when it is once again giving China most-favored-nation status and considering the question of wide-ranging aid for the Soviet Union in order to help M.S. Gorbachev stay in power."

Europe's example shows that if there is interest, goodwill, and a desire to abandon outmoded stereotypes on all sides, a great breakthrough is possible. But this example also shows that this process, including in Asia, must not be a one-way process but two-way.

Nikitin Heads Cooperation Talks in Mongolia

LD2107172890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 21 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The 38th session of the Soviet-Mongolian intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation has taken place in Ulaanbaatar.

[Correspondent T. Lordipanidze] Power engineering, mining, and geology are traditional spheres of cooperation between us. The intergovernmental commission charted ways forward for integration in these industries, noting at the same time that scientific-technological progress will receive priority.

Mention was made of this at the briefing held for Mongolian and Soviet journalists by delegation heads Dashiyn Byambasuren and Vladilen Valentinovich

Nikitin, first deputy chairmen of the councils of ministers of their respective countries.

Many enterprises built with Soviet assistance and on Soviet credits function well below capacity, and sometimes even at a loss. As a result, Mongolia is finding it hard to service its debts—not least to our country.

The correspondents were told that, at the request of the Mongolian side, it has been decided to reschedule the start of paying off the credits supplied previously from 1991 to 2000. A broad range of questions dealing with deepening the interaction between the two countries was discussed during a meeting between the Soviet delegation and Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, the chairman of the Presidium of the Mongolian People's Great Hural.

The commissions work is drawing to a close. The leaders of the delegations here sign the documents agreed upon. The most important of these will mean that as of January next year accounting between the countries will take place using world prices and in freely convertible currency.

Mongolia's Upcoming Election, Parties Examined

LD2207140490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 22 Jul 90

[Text] [Announcer] Ulaanbaatar: Today is the last day of the registration of candidate—deputies to the People's Great Hural. The elections to the highest legislative body of Mongolia are to be held next Sunday. It must be said that for the first time in the country's history, the elections are being held in conditions of a multiparty system. Over to Sergey Pravdin, our special correspondent in the Mongolian capital:

[Pravdin] These elections will be the first open and free elections in the country for many decades. There are over 2,500 candidates for 490 seats in the People's Great Hural. They represent the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] and also almost 15 different political organizations, parties, and movements. The MPRP advocates in its program building a humane, democratic, and law-governed society, speeding up perestroyka and the transfer to regulated market economy, and reviving the national culture, traditions, and customs.

The major opposition force is represented by the Democratic Union of Mongolian, which before the elections became the leader of the coalition set up by a number of political parties. It is precisely this union, organized at the end of last year by Mongolian unofficial forces, that was the initiator of numerous speeches, meetings, demonstrations, and hunger strikes last spring, which brought about major changes in the country. An extraordinary MPRP congress and early sessions of the People's Great Hural were held. The party and state leadership was completely renewed in the country, and the power monopoly of the ruling party was abolished. An important law on foreign investment came into effect.

It should be noted that these and many other changes in the life of the Mongolian people were the result of a dialogue between the government and the opposition, though the latter quite frequently also resorted to using pressure. It is precisely as a result of the mutual accord that the government has agreed to extend the registration of candidates for the forthcoming elections until today, and handed out 300-400,000 tugriks to each party for the electional campaign. It suspended the activities of party organizations in the Army, in internal affairs bodies, and in state security. The last opinion poll showed that the MPRP currently enjoys the support of approximately 58 percent of voters, and the Democratic Union of Mongolia, of 42 percent. But there is still a whole week to go till the elections.

[Announcer] I would like to add to this report by Sergey Pravdin from Ulaanbaatar that the first stage of elections to central and local bodies of power, people's hurals, is taking place in Mongolia today. And a unique feature of these elections is that foreign observers are present at them.

Japanese Minister Makes 'Tactless' Remarks on Aid

LD2007195590 Moscow TASS in English 1933 GMT 20 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kopnov and Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo July 20 TASS—Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama made a tactless pronouncement today which is possibly unprecedented for statesmen of his rank.

Explaining the position of the Japanese Government on financial aid to the USSR at a meeting with members of the business community in the city of Nagoya, he said, according to the KYODO TSUSHIN news agency, that giving government aid to the Soviet Union would be like "throwing money into a ditch."

He pointed to the need for "drilling understanding of a market economy into Soviet leaders."

Referring to political sources, the agency notes that Nakayama's expression about "a ditch" is unseemly for a foreign minister and is fraught with problems.

Fearing a scandal, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was forced to make a hurried explanation concerning the pronouncement by its minister which was made a month and a half before a visit, which is scheduled for early September, to Japan by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

The explanation says that Nakayama meant to say that under the conditions when a considerable part of the Soviet budget is channeled for military spending and reforms to switch to a market economy are not being implemented sufficiently well, giving government aid to the USSR will not yield desired results.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

UN Renews Appeals To Settle Cambodian Conflict

PM2007111990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by V. Ganshin under the rubric "Apt Comments": "Another Step Toward a Settlement"]

[Text] In the French capital representatives of the five UN Security Council members have completed the latest round of discussions designed to reach a political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. The meeting, which was held behind closed doors at Paris' Hotel Crillon, was attended by the deputy foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain, France, and China.

The document adopted at the end of the meeting points out the pressing need for an end to hostilities in Cambodia and renews the appeal to the warring sides to start talks to reach an agreement as soon as possible on the question of creating a Supreme National Council—the organ which will exercise power in the country during the transitional period.

However, it was not just the document agreed by all sides that attracted the media's attention. During a news conference U.S. Secretary of State James Baker stated that the United States intends to enter into direct dialogue with Hanoi.

Explaining Washington's position, the secretary of state observed that direct discussion with Vietnam of contentious problems will make it possible, in his opinion, to exert greater influence on shaping a situation in Cambodia where free elections are possible. Moreover, as Baker stressed, such a stance will give the United States a greater opportunity to oppose the coming to power of the Khmers Rouges. According to Baker, "we will be doing all within our power to prevent the Khmers Rouges returning to power." It seems that in this question the United States has embarked on a path of constructive cooperation with those countries and organizations which have long been seeking ways to a political settlement of the conflict. [passage omitted]

The change in the U.S. stance could, by all accounts, favorably influence the whole Cambodian settlement process, given the powerful political and economic levers which Washington has at its disposal for exerting pressure on one or the other side if need be. However, while according due importance to Washington's step, specialists are stressing that progress in this question will depend no less upon how Beijing-Hanoi dialogue fares. China, as is well known, has played an extremely important role in this protracted conflict.

Nevertheless, the reports from Paris on the results of the talks among the "Five" and the reaction in other countries to the step taken by Washington do allow one to hope for a favorable development of the situation concerning Cambodia.

Rogachev Comments on Cambodia Talks in Paris

LD2007122590 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] As we reported earlier, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have had another round of consultations in Paris on a settlement in Cambodia. The Soviet delegation at the talks was led by the deputy foreign minister, Igor Rogachev. Our Paris correspondent Oleg Maksimenko interviewed him right after the meeting. What would you say about the results of the talks was the first question:

[Begin Rogachev recording in Russian fading to English translation] In two days of concentrated work we discussed two key questions. First, how is Cambodia to be governed in the interim period before holding a general election; that is, how power is to be shared in the Supreme National Council. As to setting up such a council, that's not in doubt; there is a consensus about it. Then what powers should the United nations administration be given; and finally what powers should the present two governments keep—one is the Phnom Penh government and the other is a coalition in emigration. Another point of our talks concerned the military aspects of the settlement. By the end of our two-day discussions we had arrived at very interesting and meaningful compromises. We had argued quite a lot, but succeeded in taking a large step toward a final political settlement in Cambodia. [end recording]

Right after the Paris meeting of the five, the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, announced important changes in his country's Asian policy, continues Igor Rogachev. We find those changes positive and encouraging for the talks. That concerns the U.S. decision to open a direct dialogue with Vietnam on the problems of Cambodia settlement.

Next our correspondent asked Rogachev about the joint declaration addressed by the Paris meeting to the warring Cambodia sides. Do you think this appeal will be heeded?

[Begin Rogachev recording in Russian fading to English translation] You will understand, I think, who is meant in the first place in that appeal for ending bloodshed, refraining from violence and exercising reserve: It's for the Khmer Rouge, who stay away from talks and torpedo agreements. As for the Hun Sen government, it's pursuing a policy of reconciliation and is ready to meet the opposition half way any time to form a Supreme National Council. We hope the latest appeal by the five will be properly understood. That would be a guarantee of eventually reaching a settlement on that long-suffering land. [end recording]

Changed U.S. Policy on Cambodia Examined

BK2107101790 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Commentary by station observer Oleg Alekseyev]

[Text] The United States no longer has the intention of recognizing the opposition tripartite Cambodian alliance as the legitimate government of Cambodia. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said this to reporters after he met Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Here are comments by our observer Comrade Oleg Alekseyev on this issue.

In the words of the U.S. Secretary of State, Washington has taken this new position because of Khmer Rouge's activities. The United States opposes the return of the Khmer Rouge, who are guilty of destroying millions of lives, to Cambodia. This is why the Washington administration has decided to stop recognizing the tripartite alliance in which the Khmer Rouge plays a key role. The U.S. Government's decision shows that in its Cambodian policy, Washington wants to overcome the protracted difference between what is said and what is done.

I would like to remind that the U.S. Administration affirmation opposing the Khmer Rouge's return to power in Cambodia has been heard in the U.S. capital for a long time, that is since the Cambodian problem arose. Furthermore, the current U.S. president and previous White House occupants have repeatedly said that they consider Khmer Rouge leaders criminals. This is why there is no reason to deal with these people. However, these statements did not really go hand in hand Washington's real policies.

It is true that the United States has not dealt with the Khmer Rouge as a military-political organization. However, how does one expect to view the fact that Washington, during all these years, has legitimately recognized Pol Pot officials in the United Nations as representatives of Cambodia. This is not all. Up till today, the United States, as people know, has been providing vast military aid to the opposing Cambodian side. It is clear that this aid was not destined for the Khmer Rouge but for the Sihanouk and Son Sann groups. But strangely, in practice, these U.S. weapons have instead strengthened the fighting capability of the Khmer Rouge. Why? This is because the majority of these weapons have been seized by Pol Pot fighters who control major roads channeling these weapons into Cambodia. It is this that has given critics of U.S. policies, including those in the United States, a pretext to state that this military aid was in fact aimed at returning the Khmer Rouge to power in Cambodia.

Judging from James Baker's statement, those critics of Washington's policies, perhaps, no longer have any excuse for leveling this type of accusation. This is welcomed because the United States in particular, like other major powers such as the Soviet Union and China, can actively take part in solving the Cambodian problem. In the process of this solution, the danger of the Khmer Rouge seizing power should be completely eliminated because once they really do seize power, it would mean the resurgence of the bloody genocidal regime in Cambodia, concludes our observer Comrade Oleg Alekseyev.

Radio, Television Agreement With Cambodia Signed

LD2107144590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] A protocol on cooperation and exchanges in the sphere of television and radio broadcasting between USSR Gosteleradio and the television and radio of Cambodia for this and future years was signed in Moscow today. The document provides for the further development of cooperation.

Aeroflot To Resume Flights to Indonesia

LD2307082490 Moscow World Service in English 0700 GMT 23 Jul 90

[Text] After a seven year interval, the Soviet airline Aeroflot resumes regular flights from Moscow to Indonesia's capital Jakarta.

The 10,700 km-long route, with stopovers in Dubai on the Arabian peninsula and in Singapore, will be serviced by Soviet Il-62m jets once a week.

The first resumed flight is to be completed at the Sukarno-Hatta International Airport on 26 July.

Provision for Displaced Vietnamese Workers Noted

PM1907132190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On Plans To Use Vietnamese Workers in the USSR"]

[Text] Hanoi, 17 Jul—Vietnamese-Soviet cooperation in the sphere of the utilization of manpower is currently undergoing significant changes. This is mentioned in an article by Nguyen Thi Hang, deputy minister of labor, war invalids, and social welfare, published in the paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.

Recent talks in Hanoi between delegations from the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and from the Vietnamese ministry showed that the sides still want to continue cooperation in the next five-year period. In view of the prospect of the Soviet economy's switch to the market, the author writes, a range of measures is envisaged regulating the use of Vietnamese workers employed at Soviet enterprises.

At present, the article points out, there are 80,000 Vietnamese citizens working in the USSR, who have concluded contracts for between four and six years. Since the number of jobs at some Soviet enterprises is bound to be reduced as a result of the economic reform, a certain number of people, including Vietnamese workers, will find themselves unemployed. In such cases SRV citizens, with their consent, will be given work in other places. At the same time, the wishes of those who want to go home will be granted, and they will be credited with the full term stipulated by the contract.

Vietnam Rebuts 'Rumors' of Arrested Dissidents

LD1907193790 Moscow TASS in English 1634 GMT 19 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Papandin]

[Text] Hanoi July 19 TASS—A Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman disproved rumours that dissidents were arrested recently in the country and described the information as "ill-intentioned anti-Vietnamese slander".

Foreign Ministry Press Department Head Ho The Lan told a briefing here that during the renovation and democratisation processes, which recently began in Vietnam, serious progress has been reached in the field of human rights.

She said humanitarian problems that emerged after the war are being resolved and guarantees of the population's civil rights have become stronger. In Vietnam, as in any other country, those who violate laws, including those infringing upon state security and public order, should be punished in conformity with the law, she said.

Near East & South Asia

India's Prime Minister Singh to Visit 23 Jul

Upcoming Visit Previewed

PM1807104590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[N. Paklin report: "India-Pakistan: Talks in Prospect—Dialogue Renewed"]

[Text] Delhi—An Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman has officially announced that talks will be held between India and Pakistan 18-20 July with the aim of improving relations between the two countries. The talks will be held at the level of foreign policy department external affairs secretaries, which in our terms corresponds roughly to deputy minister level.

An important detail: The possibility that the question of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region will be discussed at the forthcoming talks is not ruled out in either capital. This is one of the most "painful" questions in relations between India and Pakistan: The sides accuse one another of seeking to get hold of nuclear weapons and even, the Indian papers write, "do not rule out the possibility of a nuclear conflagration on the subcontinent." Remember that neither India nor Pakistan has placed its signature on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that has been in force for more than 20 years now.

Relations between India and Pakistan have deteriorated sharply in recent months. The main cause of this is the events in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir—to be more precise, in the Kashmir Valley, where an anti-Indian separatist movement has intensified. Troops were moved toward the borders on both sides and firefights took place. Delhi and Islamabad began to talk about war. The international community was alarmed at the prospect of the outbreak of a new regional conflict in Asia. Many political leaders directly or indirectly sent messages to Delhi and Islamabad unambiguously supporting a lowering of the tension between India and Pakistan through bilateral talks. The confronting sides were clearly given to understand that, this time, whoever launched a conflict could not rely on external support. This approach reflected the move by East and West, by the great states first and foremost, from rivalry to cooperation in the international arena, including Asia.

The messages were received in India and in Pakistan alike with understanding. As early as the beginning of June, India unilaterally withdrew its troops from their forward defensive positions in the region of the western state of Rajasthan. For its part, Pakistan proposed holding a meeting at foreign secretary level. India accepted this proposal. The ice, as they say, had begun to melt....

Of course, it is difficult to rely on the two sides' managing to settle their disagreements, especially over Kashmir, at this meeting. The experience of Indo-Pakistani relations testifies that by no means all top-level meetings have led to positive results. However, all the signs suggest that the forthcoming meeting is opening up a process of consultation between the two neighboring countries. Agreement has already been achieved for the initial meeting of foreign secretaries in Islamabad to be followed by another at the same level in Delhi. "Both sides hold the conviction that the answer to problems and disagreements must be dialogue aimed at overcoming them," Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto emphasized a few days ago. This kind of statement sharply contrasts with the bellicose pronouncements uttered only recently by Pakistani politicians in Islamabad.

Judging by the initial reaction, public opinion in both countries not only welcomes the renewal of dialogue, but even insists that it be deepened. In late June a group of eminent public figures and statesmen in a joint statement came out in favor of a meeting of the two countries' prime ministers, V.P. Singh and B. Bhutto, in order to avert "the threat of the outbreak of war." A number of proposals are put forward in this document aimed at normalizing bilateral relations, first and foremost the mutual withdrawal of troops from the forward borders. You do not need to be clairvoyant to predict that the removal of tension in relations between India and Pakistan will have a favorable effect on the political situation in Asia as a whole.

Aim: To Develop Relations

LD2007190490 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT 20 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Zaytsev]

[Text] New Delhi July 20 TASS—The first visit by Indian Prime Minster Vishwanath Pratap Singh to Moscow is aimed to develop Soviet-Indian relations which gained international importance, Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman Aftab Seth told a news conference here today.

Singh attaches much significance to a dialogue with Soviet leaders, during which he would like to discuss important changes in the USSR, East European countries and the world.

In the kaleidoscopically changing situation, he noted, of special importance is close cooperation between India and the Soviet Union in the struggle against international drug trafficking, international terrorism against sovereign states and the threat to security and stability of nations.

It is important that there are no contradictions between India and the USSR on the main issues of our times. Bilateral relations are firmly developing on the basis of mutual understanding and the account of the interests of the two sides and mutual advantage.

The Soviet Union has always been on the side of India in difficult times, has helped raise its prestige in the international arena and has been giving economic assistance.

The treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation is of special significance in the texture of bilateral realtions. No matter what changes take place in the two countries, this document underlies mutual cooperation, influencing the development of international relations, he stressed.

Seth told TASS that the national front government remains committed to India's traditional policy based on the development of relations of friendship and cooperaiton with the USSR.

The spokesman said that the forthcoming visit would open a new period in the development of bilateral relations. This is the first meeting between the national front government and the Soviet leadership. The USSR and India have changed their views on some issues. Therefore, an exchange of opinions on various problems will promote better interaction of the sides in the international arena.

India hopes that the visit will strengthen friendly relations between the two nations, Seth concluded.

'Stable, Dynamic' Ties Expected

LD2107063790 Moscow TASS in English 0628 GMT 21 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow July 21 TASS—"Indian Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh's forthcoming official friendly visit to the USSR is fresh evidence of the vital importance to the Soviet Union and India of their bilateral cooperation and interaction," Soviet Foreign Ministry South Asian Countries Department head Oleg Bostorin believes.

"This visit is very timely also in terms that it refutes the allegation, circulated recently by some circles, that the Soviet Union lost interest in India just as in Third World as a whole," Bostorin told TASS today.

"Traditional friendship between the Soviet Union and India is deep-rooted and relations between the two countries have been developing successfully for many years," Bostorin said. "Ties between the USSR and India have been developing in a stable manner, evenly, for over 40 years. Changes in the international climate and the world political situation did not affect them.

"In recent years, interaction between the two countries has reached a qualitatively new level and the ideas and principles, on which it is based, were formulated in the Delhi declaration.

"The declaration is not merely a bilateral document. It is a manifesto of new political thinking. The ideas proclaimed in it actively work for detente and the movement towards a better world—the world without wars, violence, weapons of mass destruction, the changing, interrelated and interdependent world, the world in which inter-state relations are based on the standards of democracy and civilised conduct.

"The Soviet Union believes that the results of Singh's visit to the USSR will undoubtedly contribute to a further stable and dynamic development of Soviet-Indian ties.

"In today's diverse world the importance of Soviet-Indian relations goes far beyond the two states' direct interests. They exert a positive influence on the world climate and the international relations as a whole and will continue to do so in future," Bostorin said.

Singh Notes Expectations, Goals of Visit

Discusses Bilateral Relations

LD2007081890 Moscow TASS in English 0757 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 20 TASS—Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union has always been a stabilising factor in the region and the world, Indian Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh said in an interview published in the latest issue of the NEW TIMES magazine.

"I see great possibilities for the future expansion of our cooperation in the international arena. Our countries share a common approach to key human concerns," he said.

"The lessening of tensions and growing trust and cooperation have created favourable conditions to solve vital problems facing humanity, as declared in the Delhi

Declaration—economic development, ecological problems, illiteracy and population growth.

"We welcome perestroyka. We fully support and welcome the efforts by your leaders and people to create a more dynamic and progressive society. Relations between our countries, like relations between people, are never static. Friendship is becoming stronger as time flows by.

"A powerful vitality, which helps promote mutually beneficial cooperation, is inherent to Indo-Soviet relations. I believe perestroika's success will provide greater opportunities for Indo-Soviet trade and economic cooperation and will expand human contacts.

"Being situated in the Indian Ocean and having long sea borders, India cannot help but be alarmed by the presence of foreign navies near its borders. We are well aware of our role in the Indian Ocean, and in the context of our legitimate interests, as a coastal state, we want to have a peaceful environment to expand cooperation with other states in the region.

"Asian security problems are complex. They are rooted in age-long poverty, ethnic conflicts, economic disbalances and colonial heritage. At the same time, some countries in the region have great potential and a dynamically-developing economy. This is why great patience and persistence are needed when addressing the problems of reliable security in Asia. Asian security can be strengthened only on the basis of political trust and within the framework of economic inter-dependence," Singh said.

Calls Ties 'Deep-Rooted'

LD2107112690 Moscow TASS in English 1113 GMT 21 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kapustin]

[Text] New Delhi July 21 TASS—"Soviet-Indian ties are deep-rooted," Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh of the Republic of India said in an interview with Soviet journalists ahead of his official friendly visit to the USSR.

Singh emphasised that in assessing Soviet-Indian relations, one should be aware of one important point: These are relations between the two nations. The historic tradition of durable friendly links, devoid of transient considerations, is inherent in them.

Singh said that for the people of India these relations are living reality and, therefore, Soviet-Indian friendship extends from the capitals to most remote villages. Singh cited stability as the all-important element of Soviet-Indian relations.

Singh said many changes were taking place in the world largely due to President Mikhail Gorbachev's bold initiatives. Leaders should meet in order to compare their views. Singh said he looked at his visit to the USSR exactly in this context: To cement the two countries' friendship at the political level and given an impetus to cooperation in a variety of areas.

Speaking about the results of the 28th CPSU Congress, Singh stressed that it demonstrated the strong approval of Gorbachev's stance, his vision and political wisdom. He said India hailed the policy of perestroyka and openness pursued in the USSR, and supported the Soviet leader's major initiatives on the internatioal scene, which affected the important problems of disarmament, nuclear arms reduction and confidence-building.

Touching on economic cooperation between the USSR and India, Singh pointed to its fruitful and mutually beneficiai nature. He expressed confidence that deep changes in the world would open new opportunities, ways and forms of the two countries' interaction. He said he would prioritise this issue during his visit.

Singh said he hoped to receive first-hand information about various aspects of life in the USSR. He said India looked with hope at prospects for a more fruitful cooperation.

Asked about the foreign policy of the national front government headed by him, which took office seven and half months ago, Singh said that one of its priorities was to improve relations with neighbouring countries. He said progress was made in this direction in India's relations with China, Nepal and Bangladesh. He said Pakistan was the only exception. Although relations with that country have worsened, India favours good neighbourliness.

In its aspiration for peace, India unilaterally withdrew its troops and tanks from the Mahajan range, Rajasthan, Singh said. It also proposed a package of confidence-building measures leading to a dialogue and negotiations.

As to Afghanistan, the settlement of the situation in that country cannot be achieved through violence and outside interference, Singh said.

Expects 'Peace, Security'

PM2207144990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "On the Visit to the Soviet Union by Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh of the Republic of India"]

[Text] Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh of the Republic of India is arriving in Moscow on an official friendly visit 23 July at the invitation of the Soviet leadership.

V.P. Singh was born in Allahabad City 25 June 1931. He has higher education in the sphere of natural and humanitarian sciences.

Between 1969 and 1971 he was a member of the Uttar Pradesh State Legislative Assembly, and between 1971

and 1977 a deputy of the Lower House of the Indian Parliament. In 1974 he joined the country's government first as deputy minister and then as minister of state for trade. In 1980 he became chief minister of Uttar Pradesh State. In 1984 he became India's minister of finance, and later minister of defense. He resigned this post in 1987 and withdrew from the Indian National Congress (I) Party.

In 1988 he became the initiator of the establishment of the Janata Dal party and was elected its president. This party headed the alliance of a number of organizations opposed to the R. Gandhi government —the National Front (NF).

When the NF emerged victorious from the parliamentary elections in November 1989, V.P. Singh became prime minister of India.

Under his leadership the government has preserved the continuity of the peace-loving foreign policy course and is implementing a policy of close friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Soviet people cordially welcome Prime Minister V.P. Singh of the Republic of India and express confidence that his visit will become a new important milestone on the path of the ongoing development of Soviet-Indian relations and will make a substantial contribution to the cause of strengthening universal peace and security.

Hopes for 'Fruitful Cooperation'

LD2307082190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 23 Jul 90

[Text] The official friendly visit to our country by Vishwanath Pratap Singh, the Indian prime minister, begins today. By the way, he visited the Soviet Union for the first time in 1955. This is how he remembers it:

[Begin Singh recording in English fading into Russian report] And there, Vishwanath Pratap Singh noted in an interview to Soviet television and radio, I could feel the warmth of the Soviet people's attitude toward India. I was able to visit your country later, as well. I have very good memories. I hope that during the present visit to the Soviet Union, the prime minister stressed, I will be able to add to them with new impressions. The prime minister noted that India is following attentively and welcomes the profound changes taking place in our country which, in his words, have an influence on events in international life as well. The transformations in the USSR open up new possibilities, ways, and forms for cooperation between our countries in many different areas: in the spheres of politics and economics. It is precisely to these questions that I intend to give paramount attention during my visit to the Soviet Union. I hope, Vishwanath Pratap Singh said in conclusion, that my visit will help strengthen Indian-Soviet friendship and give a new impulse to developing fruitful cooperation between our countries. [end recording]

Gorbachev Welcomes India's Singh 23 Jul

LD2307095490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 23 Jul 90

[Text] As we have already reported Vishwanath Pratap Singh, prime minister of the Republic of India, arrived in Moscow today for an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Soviet leadership. At the airport the indian head of government and his wife were met by Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and his wife and other officials.

A cortege of vehicles left the airport for the Kremlin. A welcoming ceremony was held for the Indian visitor in the Georgiyevskiy Hall of the Great Kremlin Palace. Prime Minister Singh and his wife were warmly welcomed by USSR President Gorbachev and his wife. A brief conversation took place between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Vishwanath Pratap Singh.

Visit Reaffirms Bilateral Ties

LD2307100990 Moscow TASS in English 0727 GMT 23 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow, July 23 (TASS)—Indian Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh's official friendly visit to the Soviet Union, which begins today, reaffirms the vital importance of bilateral cooperation and intervaction between the Soviet Union and India, Oleg Bostorin, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Directorate for South Asisn Countries, told TASS.

"The visit refutes the allegation, made recently in some circles, that the Soviet Union has lost interest in India, and in the Thrid World as a whole.

"The traditional friendship between the Soviet Union and India has deep roots and for many years relations between the two countries followed an upward trend," Bostorin emphasised.

"Relations between India and the Soviet Union have consistently and stably developed for over 40 years. They have "been unaffected by changes in the international climate or in the world political situation.

"In recent years cooperation bewteen the two countires reached a new qualitative stage. The idea and principles on which it is based were formulated in the Delhi declaration.

"The declaration is not simply a bilateral document. It is a manifesto of new political thinking. The ideas proclaimed in it actively promote the relaxation of tension and advance to a better world—a world without wars, violence, weapons of mass destruction. In this changing, inter-connected and inter-dependent world, relations between states will be based on norms of democracy and civilised conduct.

"The Soviet Union believes that Vishwanath Pratap Singh's visit will undoubtedly promote the further consistent stable and dynamic development of Soviet-Indian relations," Bostorin said.

"In today's diverse and multi-polar world the importance of Soviet-Indian relations goes far beyond the two states' direct interests. They exert a positive influence on the world climate and on international relations as a whole. This influence is unambiguously positive and, as is perfectly clear, will remain such in future as well," Bostorin said.

Trade Representative Discusses India's Debts

PM2007123190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview by IZVESTIYA correspondent N. Paklin with G.A. Shcherbakov, USSR trade representative in Delhi under the rubric "The World and Us": "When Credits Are Paid on Time"—first paragraph is Paklin introduction]

[Text] Delhi—The debts of a number of foreign countries to the Soviet Union, which our newspapers, including IZVESTIYA, have reported have become a topic of discussion by the Soviet public. The following idea is even being voiced: Should we not ask the debtors to return their debts on time, using the funds acquired to satisfy our priority needs? The biggest debts among the developing countries—8.9 billion rubles [R]—are accounted for by India. Is that a lot or a little? Is it good or bad for us? I put these questions to G.A. Shcherbakov, USSR trade representative in Delhi.

[Shcherbakov] First of all I should like to draw your attention to the fact that this substantial debt did not form suddenly but as a result of many years of cooperation between our countries. With the Soviet Union's assistance over 70 establishments in the most important sectors of the economy have been installed in India. Right now about 50 others are at various stages of planning and construction. We make a substantial contribution to the consolidation of the defense capability of this country which is friendly to us. But it seemed to me that a doubt had slipped into your questions: Will India be able to pay in time for the credits supplied to it and will we not have to defer or write off at least part of its debt as, unfortunately, we have to do for several countries? It may confidently be said that this will not happen.

[Paklin] On what is your confidence based?

[Shcherbakov] First this is borne out by all preceding practice of our countries' credit relations. They began with the 2 February 1955 signing of the first intergovernment agreement on cooperation in erecting the Bhilai metallurgical plant. Over these years India has used Soviet state credits worth over R14 billion to develop its economy and defense capability. Of these it has already paid back R5 billion. The debts are being extinguished in accordance with agreements between banks which stipulate the payments schedule precisely. I want to stress that India has always paid its credits and the interest on them on time and there has been no case of it withholding payment or defaulting.

Second, the Soviet Union is in a more favorable position than India's other creditors. There exists between our countries a clearing system for accounts in Indian rupees whereby no hard currency is needed to extinguish debts. We use all funds coming in to pay for credits in India itself to purchase the goods we need.

[Paklin] And what is India's foreign debt as a whole?

[Shcherbakov] It is in excess of $60 billion. But how to assess whether this debt is a big one for India itself—a huge country with a population of 820 million? There are various methods of determining the "gravity" of foreign debt. Sometimes foreign economists divide it by the numerical strength of the population and obtain an average "per capita" indicator which is compared with similar indicators for other countries. Here too India looks relatively well off. But in my view it is not a matter of the size of the country's territory and the numerical strength of its population. Whether or not the country has anything to cover its foreign debt is far more important. The Indian Government pays great attention to foreign debts and the state of the country's balance of payments. India is making efforts to avoid the "debt trap."

[Paklin] But perhaps we have granted and continue to grant India credits for political reasons on some preferential terms? Incidentally, exactly what credits do we supply to India?

[Shcherbakov] In our credit and economic relations with India we are guided primarily by considerations of mutual advantage. The Soviet Union provides India with so-called "project credits." That means that the funds are used to pay Soviet organizations' expenditure on deliveries of equipment and the drafting of technical documentation for Soviet-Indian cooperation projects determined by intergovernmental agreements. As for the degree to which the credits are preferential, I want to note that the Soviet Union supplies credits to India on tougher terms than the leading capitalist countries. There is an indicator of how preferential credits are—the grant element. It takes into account the deadline for extinguishing them, the interest rate, and several other terms. If the grant element is 100 percent, then the credit is a gift. So the grant element of Soviet credits in India is 48.4 percent compared with 64-73 percent for U.S. credits, 63.7 percent for Japanese credits, 65.4 percent for French credits, and 85.5 percent for FRG credits.

[Paklin] The following question then arises. Why does India take credits from us for Soviet equipment?

[Shcherbakov] As I have already said, India uses foreign aid extensively. It is provided with credits by virtually all

developed countries and international financial organizations. Credit is an important but not the only factor in choosing a partner to install a particular project. Much depends on the price, the delivery schedules, the system of accounting, the quality and reliability of equipment, the supplying country's experience, and so forth. India values the quality and reliability of our equipment.

The main avenues for our cooperation with India are the base sectors of the economy: power engineering, ferrous metallurgy, and coal and oil extraction. These are capital-intensive sectors where the funds invested take a long time to be recovered. International practice attests that deliveries of equipment for enterprises in these sectors are possible only on credit.

[Paklin] Consequently, credit is a means of promoting our machinery and equipment onto the foreign market?

[Shcherbakov] Absolutely right. The granting of targeted credits to India has enabled us to increase the share of machine building output in our total exports to that country to 30 percent while in Soviet exports as a whole it scarcely reaches 15 percent. And if we take the capitalist and developing countries alone this proportion is just two percent. A substantial difference, as you can see.

[Paklin] How does India's extinguishing of Soviet credits influence our bilateral trade?

[Shcherbakov] In the most positive way. Right now about one-third of Soviet imports from India are paid for through the Indian side's extinguishing of our credits. The presence of such a large reserve enables us in particular to react promptly to leaps in consumer demand in our country.

[Paklin] The result is that issuing debts is advantageous?

[Shcherbakov] That is not a simple question. Naturally, in the initial period funds are diverted from our own national economy. But we have already passed through this period in relations with India and now we can assess the advantage of credit relations.

3-Day Talks With Palestinians End in Moscow

LD2107204590 Algiers Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1702 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] The three-day proceedings of the joint Palestinian-Soviet political committee have concluded in Moscow. Matters related to the latest developments, the current situation in the Middle East and [words indistinct] were discussed.

(?Palestinian sources) said that the committee dealt with bilateral relations between the two countries, the dangers posed by the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, and the tense situation in the region due to the Israeli policy, which is hostile to peace.

Sources said that the U.S. stance was also assessed in light of the visit by Gennadiy Tarasov, deputy foreign minister in charge of Middle East affairs, to the United States, the United Nations, and his talks with officials there.

Sources pointed out that the Palestinian and Soviet sides agreed to continue consultations and political coordination between them in connection with the peace process in the Middle East.

The Palestinian delegation to the joint committee meetings was led by Brother Abu Mazin [Mahmud 'Abbas], member of the Executive Committee of the PLO.

Jordan's King Husayn on Ties, Middle East

PM2007105790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jul 90 Second Edition p 7

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent An. Stepanov under the rubric "Our Interviews": "Descendant of the Prophet: King Husayn Talks With PRAVDA's Correspondent"]

[Excerpts] Amman, July—"Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown"—King Husayn of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan probably cites this quotation from Shakespeare more frequently than others, emphasizing the tremendous responsibility that lies with a head of state (a state, moreover, situated at the very epicenter of the dangerously explosive Near Eastern conflict).

"Many people even in Jordan itself," King Husayn said in conversation with PRAVDA's correspondent, "doubted whether our state would survive the blows of the dramatic events in the region. But we have held out with a sense of dignity and responsibility. We were considered a weak link among the Arab states opposing Israeli aggression, but we have proved that this is not so."

Indeed, the rule of King Husayn has come at one of the stormiest periods in the country's history. His throne has been threatened repeatedly by Israel's expansionist sallies, regional extremism, and demographic upheavals, not to mention serious economic difficulties. Moreover, the monarchy has constantly been shaken by inter-Arab contradictions and the political maneuvers of Western powers. However, King Husayn has managed to find a way out of crises. This has strengthened his reputation as a flexible politician. The combination of the prestige of kingly authority, loyalty to traditions, and dynamism is the secret of success. [passage omitted]

Important changes have been occurring in the country recently: The first free parliamentary elections for 22 years have been held, the martial law imposed back in 1967 has been lifted, and a decisive turn has been made toward democratization and political pluralism.

"This idea," King Husayn told me, "emerged not without the influence of perestroyka in the Soviet Union and the consequences of the new political thinking which

is becoming established in the world. We already had some experience of democracy, albeit not always simple and unequivocal experience. 'Perestroyka' in Jordan means the possibility of different schools of thought and different political trends and of expressing one's own viewpoint, and it means involving people in the process of formulating and adopting decisions, in the practical management of society, and in ensuring its progress. We are now open to the whole world and are revising our former views on everyone and everything, and we are taking a very critical look at the path traveled. It is now the turn of the commission for compiling a national charter which, supplementing the constitution, will serve as a way to ensure national unity on a democratic basis.

"But we do not forget," the king continued, "our chief national duty to resist Israeli aggression and defend the Palestinians' righteous cause, although, quite frankly, we are aware of our limited possibilities. We do not conceive of the fulfillment of our duty outside the context of the Arab world and Arab solidarity, since we are an indivisible part of this world and have never stood aloof from the resolution of any pan-Arab problems," Husayn said. "I see Arab unity in the future as economic integration. We took the first step in this direction by forming the Arab Cooperation Council together with Iraq, Egypt, and North Yemen last year.

"We are deeply worried by the urgent problems of the Arab world—the continuing tragedy of Lebanon, the unsettled nature of the Iran-Iraq conflict, and, of course, the Palestinian problem, which is very close to us.

"Our principle is the need for sensible compromises and for the interests of all sides to be taken into account. We advocate strict observance of human rights in the region as a whole and in the occupied territories in particular. We do not object to the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union, but their rights must on no account be realized at the expense of the rights of another people—the Palestinian people. We show great sensitivity with regard to the demographic aspect of the question: For Jordan this is a problem of preserving its statehood. We believe that peace here must be just and lasting. Unfortunately, an unrestrained arms race is continuing in the region against a background of the general warming of the international climate. Jordan resolutely supports the Iraqi and Egyptian proposals to remove mass destruction weapons—chemical and nuclear—from the Near East. We hold the United States responsible for the buildup of weapons in the region, for it continues to supply Israel with whatever it wishes for.

"The Soviet Union," the king continued, "has set us an example of bold, farsighted policies in international affairs. As regards the shortest path to a Near East settlement, in our opinion it goes by way of an international peace conference with the participation of the PLO. This is an obligatory condition. The PLO is ready for a serious dialogue and has fulfilled all the necessary conditions for this. But Israel is resisting. Serious and honest talks are needed, but the Israeli ruling circles are essentially evading a constructive position. Israel still refuses to make concessions or a sensible compromise acceptable to all. The chief factor in settling the conflict is not the possession of land as a trump card but responsibility, trust, and mutual respect. We hope that the Israeli Government, however hard it may try, will nonetheless be unable to go for long against the new trends in the region and throughout the world."

To conclude the conversation the king said: "I have formed a very good impression of Gorbachev. I feel profound respect for him and trust in him. Despite the obvious difficulties being experienced by the Soviet Union, I admire perestroyka. I hope that in a changing world our relations will develop still more dynamically for the good of the two countries, in the name of humane aims."

The king's Arab and Western biographers note his openness, the rare fusion of enlightenment and allegiance to tribal and Muslim religious traditions and values, his political flexibility, his capacity to perceive imminent changes in the country and the region, and his ability to make the right decisions in accordance with new conditions.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Ambassador to Tanzania Notes Plan to Halt Aid

EA0707194490 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 1900 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Text] Dar es Salaam—The USSR has said that it will halt its aid to developing countries because it is faced with a difficult economic situation.

Dr. (Vladimir Karlomov) the deputy Soviet ambassador to Tanzania, told reporters that his country's difficult economic situation is forcing his country to cut down tremendously on military expenditure. Dr. (Karlomov) admitted that the current changes in the USSR had caused more obstacles than those foreseen when they were instituted, but he said his country has now been forced to continue with the reforms for its own future benefit.

Africans Urged To Implement OAU Proposals

PM1807114590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jul 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent under the rubric "International Information": "Where Is Africa Drifting: Problems of the Black Continent and the OAU"]

[Text] Addis Ababa—The fountain which adorns the stairway at the entrance to Africa House has dried up, turned off by the plumbers. The OAU anthem is no longer heard under its arches. The 26th assembly of heads of state and government of this regional forum's members has passed into history. The leaders of Africa—

over 20 of them gathered in Addis Ababa this year—have returned home, to their numerous and difficult troubles.

However, it is unlikely that they were able to forget them even for the three days during which the OAU's highest governing body was working. The same African poverty and backwardness familiar to them in other countries was constantly peering in through the windows of the luxurious Mercedes cars put at their disposal by the Ethiopian Government. And at the assembly sittings the talk was understandably about the economic, social, and political problems of the peoples living in this poorest part of the world.

None of the speakers disputed the fact that the overwhelming majority of the continent's countries are experiencing a deep crisis. Average per capita income in Africa as a whole fell by 2.6 percent in the period 1980 through 1987. In the same period the growth of gross domestic product has frozen at the wretched mark of 0.4 percent. And even when they quote the fact here that last year it was 2.9 percent, nobody dreams of applauding. After all, the population has grown by three percent—a little more here, a little less there, completely swallowing up the increase.

Other depressing statistical computations were also cited inside Africa House. Only 23 percent of Africans, whose average life expectancy is only 49 (in West Europe the figure is 75), drink clean water. Sixty-five percent are completely illiterate. Every doctor has to treat 24,000 people. If you add to this the fact that Africa, which not only cannot clothe itself but cannot even feed itself, is burdened by a foreign debt that weighs increasingly heavy (a decade ago Africa's liabilities to creditors amounted to a little over $48 billion; by the beginning of this year the figure was almost $260 billion), even then the full grimness of the overall picture does not emerge.

Economic chaos is also fomented by political instability in many regions of the continent. At the assembly, however, as before, interstate conflicts were looked into individually. On this occasion, the questions of the Senegal-Mauritania conflict and the Chad-Libya territorial dispute were considered and individual resolutions on them were adopted.

After almost three decades of the OAU's existence Africa is in many respects no better off than before. Virtually none of the aims it was set have been achieved. Africans have long been asking themselves: What have we come to? But most importantly—Will we be able to overcome the storm of economic, political, and other problems? These questions were addressed first and foremost to African leaders.

Proposals about where the African ship should be headed have come out of Addis Ababa. They were formulated in an approved declaration on the political and socioeconomic situation in Africa stating that stable economic development is impossible without advancing toward political democracy. Africa must combine its economic efforts. To this end it has been decided to get right down to working out measures on setting up an African economic community—the continent's "common market."

I think that the ideas proclaimed from the platform of Africa House are the right ones. They should not be left hanging in the air, as they have repeatedly been left in the past. Otherwise 10 years from now and possibly for decades to come African leaders, as they do today, will still be gazing at the poverty, pain, and suffering of their peoples through the tinted glass of their limousines....

6,000 Soviets Apply To Emigrate to South Africa

LD1907222990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2015 GMT 19 Jul 90

[From the "Television News Service Program"]

[Text] The RSA ambassador in Helsinki said that this year more than 6,000 Soviet citizens have sent by post applications to emigrate to his country.

Shevardnadze, Cape Verde Minister Mark Ties

LD1307165490 Moscow TASS in English 1606 GMT 13 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 13 TASS—The Soviet foreign minister and his Cape Verde counterpart have exchanged congratulatory telegrams on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Eduard Shevardnadze expressed confidence in his message that relations between the Soviet Union and Cape Verde meet the interests of both nations.

Cape Verde Foreign Minister Silvino Manuel da Luz praised the development of relations between the two countries and called for strengthening friendship and solidarity between the Cape Verde and Soviet nations.

Madagascar President Thanks Gorbachev for Message

PM1907141190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Thanks for Congratulations"]

[Text] President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar Didier Ratsiraka has sent a message to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev expressing gratitude for the congratulations and best wishes on the 30th anniversary of the country's proclamation of independence and 15th anniversary of the revolution, and also appreciation for the Soviet state delegation's participation in the celebrations marking these events.

The telegram expresses the belief that relations of friendship, cooperation, and solidarity between the Soviet Union and Madagascar will continue to strengthen.

East Europe

Restrictions on Oil to Czechoslovakia Viewed

LD1907183490 Prague Television Service in Czech 1730 GMT 19 Jul 90

[No video available]

[Text] We have already informed you that the direct cause of the whole situation [gasoline panic buying] was the restriction of Soviet supplies of crude oil to Czechoslovakia. Boris Pankin, Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, granted us an interview on this issue today.

[Begin P[illegible]ecording, in Russian with superimposed Czech tr[illegible]] I would like to emphasize that these causes are [illegible]y economic. I recently spoke about this with a number of your representatives. Premier Calfa has sent a letter to Nikolay Ryzhkov through me. I also discussed this problem with Slovak Premier Mr. Meciar. Naturally, I handed all these impulses of alarm to Moscow and I know that this question and all its ramifications are now being very attentively studied there. I understand that this is no consolation, but these problems concern all East European countries to which we supply crude oil. Our premier said at the 28th congress that as a result of our problems we shall be unable to supply a total of seven million tonnes. I am an official representative, and I therefore cannot make unsubstantiated promises and assurances. The only thing I can assure you is that, as a result of signals received from Prague, this question is indeed being carefully studied in Moscow, and I hope that we shall find possibilities of easing the situation, which has arisen for objective reasons. [end recording]

Albanian Peoples' Flight, 'Democratization' Eyed

PM2007181590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jul 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Tanin: "Albania: Expectation of Change"]

[Text] The recent events in Albania, which have attracted the world public's attention, in many ways proved unexpected, although hardly anyone abroad, still less in Albania itself, expected the now apparent process of the democratization of social life to develop painlessly. The impatience of a public yearning for very rapid changes had inevitably to be manifested in one form or another. And it was manifested—with thousands of Albanian citizens besieging foreign missions in Tirana in a desire to go abroad without delay.

Many of them are already far from their motherland now—mainly in the FRG, Italy, and France. They have been housed temporarily in resettlement camps, where they wait for their future fate to be determined. Some are to leave for third countries, where they intend to settle, while others would like to stay where they have been put, but they will all have to adapt to totally new living conditions. It will certainly not be easy to get used to them because of the inevitable complexities associated with not knowing the language, with poor qualifications, and with a different standard of education.

It is hard to say whether this move has exhausted the flow of refugees. The embassies of certain Western countries in Tirana do not rule out a new influx. It is not by chance that access to diplomatic missions is being closed to Albanian citizens on various "technical" pretexts. This is a temporary measure and certainly does not imply a curtailment of diplomatic ties.

The Albanian authorities—and this should be pointed out—have sought to resolve the refugee problem, which developed suddenly and is in many ways dramatic, without resorting to extreme measures. To all appearances, they have managed without bloodshed, although certain Western agencies have reported people injured and even killed during the storming of foreign missions. However, such reports have not been subsequently confirmed.

What is evidently the most suitable way out of the situation was found through the direct mediation of a representative of the UN secretary general. The authorities ensured the sovereign nature of their actions, while the UN representative coordinated the efforts of a number of countries.

The Albanian authorities' circumspect approach to resolving this acute problem shows that they intend not to interrupt the process which has begun, and that Tirana's readiness to seek and find compromise solutions to the refugee problem is based on its interest in not creating additional obstacles to the country's joining in the European process of security and cooperation. Ultimately, the replacement of the ministers of internal affairs and defense at the very height of the events may also be regarded as an indirect condemnation of their inclination toward tough action. Were this to happen, doubt would be cast on the country's new foreign policy guidelines.

Many versions are now being advanced as to what awaits Albania after the upheaval it has experienced. Some—like Britain's THE TIMES, for example—take a plainly inflammatory stance: It claims that "it will be surprising if the Albanians do not take to the street when the totalitarian ruling party finds itself pinned to the wall." Others are more circumspect and see the acceleration of political and economic reforms as a guarantee to prevent social explosions.

The Soviet Union perceives the processes under way in Albania as exclusively its internal affair and condemns any attempts, from wherever they might stem, to influence them from without.

Television Coverage of Events Noted

LD2207161590

[Editorial report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1430 GMT in its "Vremya" program on 22 July carries a 2.5 minute report on Albania. The announcer

begins: "The first Soviet television film crew for many decades has just visited Albania. It is already at work on a long documentary film about that country, but meanwhile we bring you a reportage by our special correspondent Viktor Lyubovtsev on his first acqaintance with Albania."

Lyubovtsev says that Albania is a beautiful country but backward and cut off. In the main square in Tirana, he says that the breaking of links with the Soviet Union in 1961 was "largely our fault." Normalization has begun. He describes the scene, with background facts. Video shows the national history museum, a big new hotel and other buildings.

Lyubovtsev states: "In the building of the republic's government, we were the first Soviet journalists to be received by Niko Gjyzari, the secretary general of the Council of Ministers. We hope, he said in part, that the questions of restoring our diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union can be settled in the very near future: In a few weeks or even days. We would like Soviet-Albanian relations to develop not only in the political sphere, but also in the sphere of commercial relations and cultural, sport, and other contacts. We hope that in the future, as in the past, our ties will serve friendship and cooperation between our two peoples. Our people remember that the Soviet Union helped us in our hardest times, and we would like our countries and our people to renew their old friendship." Video shows Lyubovtsev in the square, and interviewing Gjyzari.

Albanian Official Discusses Situation

LD2207185490 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 22 Jul 90

[Text] As we have reported the first group of Soviet television and radio journalists have visited Albania. It was received by Albania's general secretary of the Council of Ministers Niko Gjyzari. In that interview Niko Gjyzari described in detail the measures taken by the Albanian Government to improve the economic situation and raise living standards. He also commented on the internal political situation in Albania:

[Begin Gjyzari recording in vernacular with superimposed Russian translation] The internal political situation is healthy. We are in the process of democratization. Our population is deeply satisfied with that policy and with attempts to meet their needs and rising demands. We intend to develop those processes in the future. [end recording]

On the question of Albanian refugees, Niko Gjyzari remarked that this is an abnormal situation particularly at a time when the special decree has given all citizens a right to travel to any country of their choice. Eighty-five hundred foreign passports have already been issued, but some people—the dregs of Albanian society, in Niko Gjyzari's opinion—have no faith in the measures taken by the Albanian Labor Party [APL] and the Government and are seeking devious paths to exercise their right.

Concerning the reshuffles in his government, Niko Gjyzari explained they were not politically motivated but made necessary by the ageing of its members.

On Albania's foreign policy, Nilo Gjyzari said this:

[Begin Gjyzari recording] In the foreign policy the ninth and 10th plenary sessions of the APL's Central Committee pointed to some directions to be taken in the light of the changes in Europe. We have always made clear our support for positive processes on disarmament and human rights which are in keeping with our policies and our people's wishes and aspirations. We have taken some steps in that direction both theoretical and practical. We hope they will lead us to membership in the European Commission. We are also taking concrete steps towards normalizing our relations with the Soviet Union. We reached an understanding at a recent meeting between Albanian and Soviet experts. We hope that restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union is a matter of months, or even days. We naturally wish to develop our relations in politics, trade, culture, sports and so on. May those links further our friendship, cooperation and mutual understanding.

Speaking of inter-Balkan cooperation we would like to keep the atmosphere created by the meeting of our foreign economic, energy and other ministers so that the Balkans may be turned from a notorious powder keg into a region of peace, cooperation and understanding in all fields. [end recording]

West Europe

More on Visit by European Community's Delors

Meeting With Ryzhkov Examined

PM2107132190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS reports under general heading "Meetings in Moscow"]

[Text] A meeting was held in the Kremlin on 19 July between N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and J. Delors, president of the European Communities Commission, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet leadership.

The prospects of cooperation between the USSR and the European Communities were considered in the light of the conditions developing in the process of far-reaching transformations in the Soviet Union. Both sides expressed satisfaction that the long-term agreement on trade and commercial and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European Communities, signed at the end of 1989, has entered the stage of practical implementation. It was pointed out that the radical changes in the life of Soviet society make it possible to make fuller use of the existing potential of ties between the USSR and the EC in various spheres of the

economy, science, and technology with due regard for general development on the European continent and the deepening of West European integration. A mutual desire to make further efforts in this direction by developing and deepening constructive cooperation in every possible way was confirmed.

The sides gave a positive assessment of the results of the Dublin session of the Council of Europe and also the results of the meeting in Houston between the leaders of the seven leading Western states. They discussed the possibilities for the European Communities lending financial and economic assistance to perestroyka in the USSR. They noted the existence of a close mutual link between the large-scale changes in the USSR and the interests of Europe and the world as a whole.

N.I. Ryzhkov described the fundamental features of the package of social and economic reforms being implemented in the Soviet Union and set out the Soviet leadership's assessment of the future prospects of the all-around transformations, stressing that they are creating the conditions for the Soviet economy to become an integral part of world economic ties.

For his part, J. Delors gave information on the European Communities' progress in the direction of creating a single internal market and on measures planned with regard to forming an economic and currency union of "the group of 12."

A special place in the conversation was occupied by discussion of the problems connected with German unification. N.I. Ryzhkov stressed that the GDR's gradual inclusion in the European Communities' sphere of influence must not lead to a reduction in the level of our economic relations with the GDR or hamper possibilities to promote the export of Soviet goods to Germany.

Some questions of the development of relations between European integration groupings in the light of the prospects for forming a European economic space were also discussed.

Participating in the talks on the Soviet side were L.I. Abalkin and S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers; E.Ye. Obminskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister; and V.G. Shemyatenkov, USSR permanent representative to the EC in Brussels; from the European Communities Commission—F. Andriessen, deputy president of the Commission; Zh.-L. Kadyo, deputy leader [zamestitel rukovoditelya] of the Commission's general director of external relations; and other persons accompanying J. Delors.

USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze met with J. Delors.

It was emphasized during the talks that the profound positive changes on the European continent and, in particular, the solutions found with regard to external aspects of Germany's unification, which, in J. Delors' assessment, required courage and farsightedness, open up truly inexhaustible prospects for political and economic cooperation. At the same time J. Delors pointed out that the EC is talking not about giving aid to the Soviet Union but about ways to include its economy in the world economic system.

After exchanging opinions on the prospect for creating a single European economic space, the interlocutors emphasized the importance of taking into account those economic ties which have evolved historically between various countries.

Both sides expressed specific views on further steps to develop cooperation between the USSR and the EC on the basis of the framework agreement signed in December 1989.

On the same day J. Delors had a meeting at the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee. Questions connected with the prospects for deepening the integration processes within the EC framework and their correlation with progress toward an all-European economic space were touched on in the talks. Emphasis was placed on the expediency of arranging broad cooperation between the USSR and the communities with due regard for the perestroyka and the economic reforms under way in the Soviet Union and the formation of a regulated market economy on the basis of the new legislation being drawn up.

Economic Reforms Noted

LD2007143990 Moscow TASS in English 1422 GMT 20 Jul 90

[By TASS political news analyst Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow July 20 TASS—European Commission President Jacques Delors' visit to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet leadership has more than symbolic importance, as is evidenced by the results of his meetings and conversations with President Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders.

The EC president has serious intentions with regard to the implementation of the agreement on trade, commercial and economic cooperation, signed by the European Communities and the Soviet Union in December 1989.

The first team of EC experts is expected in Moscow next week to check on the state of and prospects for economic reform in the Soviet Union. More experts are due in the Soviet Union in August to study the more productive forms and areas of cooperation between the EC and the Soviet Union. As Delors told a news conference here today, he plans to present his recommendations on economic cooperation with the USSR to the European Council not later than October.

The EC president openly declares his desire to promote the success of Soviet perestroyka. Judging by Delors' statements, he believes that the Soviet Union will move towards the market economy more rapidly and easy if it

is actively integrated into the global economy. He said this integration did not mean EC aid to the Soviet Union, but mutually beneficial cooperation.

Of course, any relationship between the EC and the USSR would be impossible without perestroyka or the West's moves towards establishing cooperation with the USSR. There is no doubt that Delors' visit to Moscow, the first in the history of the EC, was prepared by a whole series of international meetings, including talks in the U.S. between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, the NATO summit in London, the G-7 meeting in Houston, contacts between representatives of the Soviet Union, United States, and West European countries on the German issue, etc.

These meetings prompted the West to rethink its positions viz-a-viz the Soviet Union, which opened the way to developing economic ties between the EC and the USSR.

It is significant that Delors views the EC-USSR agreement as a good basis for promoting the speedy integration of the Soviet Union into the world economy and expressed readiness to expand the agreement if the integration process requires it. The EC president thereby confirms the community's desire to adhere to the letter and spirit of the agreement on mutual recognition, which was signed exactly two years ago by the EC and the CMEA, on one side, and the EC and CMEA member countries on the other.

The steps by the EC and the Soviet Union towards each other, evidenced by the promising results of Delors talks in Moscow, testify to the powerful process of change that is leading to the building of a common European home.

Sitaryan, Delors Discuss Links

LD2007154490 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 20 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan, who represents the USSR at the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and European Commission President Jacques Delors met today in the CMEA building in Moscow.

They discussed the practical implementation of a long-term agreement on trade, commercial and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the EEC and the extension of Soviet-EEC cooperation to other fields in the context of the Soviet transition to a regulated market economy.

Delors, who is here on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government, and Sitaryan also discussed the forthcoming reorganisation of the CMEA and prospects and possible areas for its cooperation with the European Economic Community.

The discussion also involved Soviet Minister for External Economic Relations Konstantin Katushev, EC Deputy Chairman Frans Andriessen, CMEA Secretary Vyacheslav Sychev and other officials.

Delors Comments at News Conference

LD2007152690 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 20 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow July 20 TASS—"I believe that my visit to the USSR has lived up to expectations and has given a new political impetus to relations between the Soviet Union and the European Communities," Jacques Delors, president of the Commission of the European Communities, said at a news conference here today.

In addition to developing relations between the EC and the USSR, the visit aimed to establish personal contacts with Soviet leaders, to hear their assessment of the domestic situation, specifically, economic and organisational reforms, and their concept of Europe's future, he pointed out.

According to Delors, these problems are of special interest to the community, which is to play its own part in the process started by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). "We are returning to Brussels with a better understanding of the Soviet Union's domestic situation and with the realisation that organisational and economic reforms are possible," he stressed.

Responding to a question about some union republics' plans to introduce their own currencies, Delors said: "In any federation that I know, the problems of finance, security and the army are the prerogative of the Central Authority. It is difficult to imagine a federation, that does not have a single currency as a factor to guarantee the cohesion of the whole society. A single currency also provides an opportunity to operate more effectively in the internal arena".

He expressed surprise that the Ukraine and some other republics are raising the question of introducing their own currencies. In his opinion, in the present stage of the Soviet economic reform, this step could have destructive consequences.

Speaking about factors that could promote the integration of the Soviet economy into the world economic system, he pointed to the need for "ensuring its competitiveness and creating a banking and currency system that will guarantee foreign enterprises in the USSR the possibility to cooperate effectively with Soviet enterprises".

Speaking of prospects for expanding the community, Delors stressed that any European country, democratic and pluralistic politically, which has an open economy, may apply for the EC membership. However, he stressed that the community cannot increase its membership before 1992.

The EC should strengthen its inner cohesion before this year and seek to implement political economic and social aims which the community put before itself, Delors noted.

Asked about a chance to establish direct contacts and cooperation between individual Soviet republics and the EC, he said that the community respects sovereignty of other countries.

Delors said that President Gorbachev announced the reform of government offices, that is the introduction of a new form of distributing political, financial and economic power between the centre and repubics.

"We now know that there is only one partner—the Soviet Union,: he emphasized.

Turning to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Delors said that it is impossible to build a new Europe from scratch. One should take into account not only activities within the EC but also relations which existed between the Soviet Union and its CMEA partners over many decades.

Explaining the EC position on giving aid to the Soviet Union, Delors stressed that it would be determined after the Soviet government publishes its plans. "We discussed cooperation programmes with the Soviet leadership," he added.

The two sides examined the improvement of the Soviet economy to tally it with the world economy. According to Delors, this improvement can be based on an agreement between the USSR and the EC signed in December 1989.

This time the two sides discussed a cooperation programme in specific areas, including the power industry, transport and ecology. Late in October the Council of Europe will make a decision on giving short-term aid to the Soviet Union, Delors stressed.

More on News Conference, Talks

PM2107155390 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 22 Jul 90 p 3

[Report by A. Bushuyev: "Without Diktat"]

[Text] J. Delors, president of the EC Commission, gave a news conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. He met Soviet and foreign correspondents after his talks with M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, and E.A. Shevardnadze.

We have become more mercenary of late. We ask "How much?" rather than "What?" The answer is: "Not a kopeck!" Or rather not a cent, since we are taling about East-West relations. Not a cent as long as—in the view of the holders of the foreign currency purse—we remain as we are now.

With great skill, the president parried the question as to whether the prospect of granting aid to the Soviet Union depends on economic or political conditions. According to him, the word "aid" is not at all suitable in respect of the USSR since the subject of discussion is cooperation. It is true that, speaking about the possibility of Hungary joining the EC, he mentioned the organization's golden rule: The countries which are its members must be ruled by democratic regimes. Touching upon the possibility of concluding a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union right now, the President said that it is too early, since the "draftsmen have submitted only half the blueprint. They have six weeks to complete it." By draftsmen he means the Soviet Government, and by blueprint the plan for the transition to a market economy.

Can we meet the deadline? And is it worth hurrying just for this?

Justice Minister Heads Delegation on FRG Visit

LD1607214290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1330 GMT 16 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn, 16 Jul—A Soviet delegation headed by V.F. Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice, arrived here today on an official five-day visit at the invitation of Hans Engelhard, FRG minister of justice. The main aim of our visit, Yakovlev told the TASS correspondent, is to establish close practical contacts between the justice systems of the USSR and FRG. Now, in the period of perestroyka, we need foreign experience, both at the level of constitutional legislation, and at the level of legislation affecting economic, in particular market, relations. In particular, we are interested in the FRG federal state structure and the delineation of powers between the center and the lands.

During our visits around the country, the minister added, we will familiarize ourselves with the West German system of justice, including federal aspects of that system. I believe we will reach agreement on cooperation and the exchange of information and specialists, in particular on training Soviet lawyers in the FRG, and holding symposiums on these themes. Questions of mutual legal help to citizens of both states will also be dealt with. We have a corresponding agreement with the GDR, but we do not have one with the FRG. It is possible that the agreement with the GDR will prove useful in settling these matters with the Federal Republic.

Meets FRG's Genscher in Bonn

LD1907215990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1305 GMT 19 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn, 19 Jul (TASS)—FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher gave a positive assessment of the Soviet initiative aimed at creating a single European legal space within the framework of the European security and cooperation conference. Having pointed out that the

FRG fully supports this initiative, Genscher stressed that its implementation would make an important contribution to building a united Europe. This was stated by the leader of the Bonn foreign policy department when receiving USSR Justice Minister V.F. Yakovlev, who is in the FRG on an official visit.

In this connection, Genscher pointed to the role which has been played by the constitution of the Federal Republic in shaping the legal consciousness of its citizens. Also of great significance, he noted, is that in this constitution the main aim of the FRG's foreign policy has been formulated toward assisting the safeguarding of peace throughout the world and the creation of a united Europe. The minister also stressed the importance of the independence of jurisdiction for the development of the present-day legal system.

Previously, a conversation took place between V.F. Yakovlev and FRG Justice Minister H. Engelhard. The West German minister told his Soviet colleague of the organization and structure of justice, of constitutional legislation in his country, and of the peculiarities of the FRG's federal state system. The Soviet minister devoted a great deal of attention to West German legislation concerning economic and especially market relations. During the conversation, questions concerning mutually rendering legal assistance to citizens of both states were also discussed.

Bavarian, Moscow Police Agree To Cooperate

LD2007131890 Hamburg DPA in German 1229 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] Munich (DPA)—From 1 October Bavaria's police will cooperate closely with the police in Moscow. This was agreed in Munich today by Bavaria's Interior Minister Edmund Stoiber and the USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Bogdanov. Because internationally organized crime is exploiting the opening of borders, cross-border cooperation between police forces must be strengthened, Stoiber said.

The Bavarian Interior Ministry will allow Moscow police experts a visit of up to three weeks to specialized Bavarian police authorities. The visitors are to be informed above all about the fight against organized drugs-related and economic crime and about the training and use of special units for fighting particularly serious violent crime. Similarly, Bavarian officers are to exchange experiences in Moscow. Stoiber spoke of a pilot project which other federal lands and European states could imitate.

European Parliament Head Stresses Cooperation

LD1907193490 Moscow TASS in English 1910 GMT 19 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Kondratenko]

[Text] Leningrad July 19 TASS—Enrico Vinci, secretary-general of the European Parliament, favoured development of political and economic cooperation of the European Parliament with the USSR. He is staying in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the secretariat of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

At a meeting with deputies of the Leningrad city governing council, he described last year's agreement between the European Parliament and the USSR Supreme Soviet as the first step towards wider bilateral relations.

Vyacheslav Shcherbakov, deputy chairman of the Leningrad council, briefed the guest on new attitudes in the activity of the city council and its deputies.

Vinci told TASS that during the visit he will discuss preparation of an official visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation of the European Parliament, which is likely to take place this year.

He said the European Parliament would finally solve issues of cooperation with the Soviet Union at its session in September.

Attempt To Hijack Plane to Sweden Thwarted

LD2307103890 Moscow TASS in English 1029 GMT 23 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 23 TASS—Two young men staged an abortive attempt to hijack another Soviet airliner to Sweden today.

Soviet Deputy Civil Aviation Minister Mikhail Timofeyev told TASS that at 10:55 one of the 74 passengers on board a Tupolev-134, which was en route from the Latvian capital Riga to the northern city of Murmansk, demanded that the crew change course and fly to Stockholm or otherwise he would blow up the plane.

Following consultations with ground security services, the crew decided, however, to land at Petrozavodsk on Soviet territory.

After the airliner landed there at 12:55, security officers detained two young men. According to preliminary data, the hijack attempt was undertaken by 22-year old Govalenko, a vocational training school student, and 27-year-old bricklayer Kuznetsov.

28th CPSU Congress

Lithuania's Burokevicius Evaluates Congress

LD2007075190 Moscow TASS in English 0732 GMT 20 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius July 20 TASS—"The main result of the 28th Soviet Communist Party Congress was the victory of forces committed to perestroika, led by Mikhail Gorbachev," Lithuanian pro-Union Communist Party Chief Mikolas Burokevicius told TASS.

He emphasised that the communist parties of the Union republics gained the opportunity to be truly independent, adopt their own programme documents and statutory instruments, and act proceeding from a specific situation.

From Lithuania, only the pro-Union Communist Party, which has a membership of some 40,000 communists, was represented at the 28th CPSU Congress. The independent Lithuanian Communist Party, which builds its relations with the CPSU on the principles of parity, did not take part in the congress.

"The results of the 28th CPSU Congress reaffirmed our belief that the Lithuanian pro-Union Communist Party chose the correct path and this inspires optimism," Burokevicius said. He believes that none of the other Union republics' communist parties are expected to accomplish as complex tasks as those faced by the Lithuanian party.

"We should restore Soviet power on Lithuanian territory and the validity of the Constitutions of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and the USSR in entirety," Burokevicius said.

"The state-bureaucratic apparatus, hastily formed by Vytautas Landsbergis and his entourage, has to be dismantled and the Soviet state apparatus set up anew," he pointed out.

Burokevicius said that these principal tasks would be reflected in the new programme and status (rules) of the Lithuanian pro-Union Communist Party, which will be adopted at the 21st party congress. The congress' third stage is scheduled for July 21, 1990. It is also planned to complete the formation of the governing party bodies and elect more workers and peasants to these bodies at the congress.

In Burokevicius' opinion, the congress should concentrate on assessing the political situation in the republic and, first and foremost, on the moratorium on the act to restore "the independent Lithuanian state" of March 11, 1990, and the forthcoming talks.

"The moratorium is a forced measure, to which the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet had to agree because of growing discontent among the greater part of the republic's population with the incompetent and adventurist policy pursued by the republic's leadership and increasing isolation," Burokevicius said.

Dwelling on prospects for the forthcoming talks between Lithuania and the USSR, Burokevicius noted that "Landsbergis' associates are not at all interested in the talks producing specific results. Once they have received raw and other materials in full volume—solving in passing some other problems such as gaining the right to issue foreign travel visas and easing regulations on Lithuanian youths' service in the Soviet Army—they will try to suspend the talks under the first plausible excuse. In so doing, they will do their best to put the blame for thwarting the talks on the president and the USSR Government."

Burokevicius believes that in such conditions the Lithuanian pro-Union Communist Party should focus "on consoliding all progressive forces of the republic in order to stop the reactionaries' offensive."

Karimov on Merits, Defects of Congress

LD1807194690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0845 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Tashkent, July 18 (TASS)—TASS correspondent Vadim Gladilov reports:

The importance and complexity of the problems discussed and decisions adopted at the 28th CPSU Congress is unprecedented, stated Islam Karimov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee. He spoke today before party activists, local soviet workers, and representatives of primary party organisations.

Held in a situation which is extremely complex and critical not only for the party but also for the entire Soviet people, the congress made a clear-cut choice in favor of developing democratic transformation, and set out before the whole party the specific strategic task of advancing toward humane socialism. In Karimov's view, however much the congress may have been criticized by left and right, it has achieved its main goal: It has given the commission clear-cut guidelines for their activity in the next few years.

Among the serious miscalculations of the congress, the leader of the republican party organization listed "lack of a serious approach to interethnic problems"; this was evident, in his view, in the political report delivered by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Neither was this most serious subject appropriately developed during the congress debates. "One has gained the impression that the reporter and other speakers made a conscious effort to avoid thorny issues and tried to pass off the desirable as reality."

Islam Karimov also expressed his attitude toward the well-known moves of Boris Yeltsin and some other leaders of the "Democratic Platform" who have left the CPSU. In his view, "these moves have not received a broad response either at the congress itself or in the party organizations after it ended." The hope of certain forces that "the congress will become the party's funeral" has not come true.

Being renewed and democratized, and consolidating its progressive forces, the CPSU is able to fulfill the role of the vanguard of Soviet society—that is the conviction of the leader of the Uzbek communists and the republic's president.

Islam Karimov said that in the next few days a plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee is to be held. It will decide whether the 22d congress of the republican Communist Party which began in early June, is to continue, as originally planned.

Delgate's Approach to Radar Site Viewed

90US1123A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Jul 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent V. Drozd: "The Beginning—Brush Strokes in the Portrait of a Delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] Zakarpatskaya Oblast—*Lendel could not even contemplate such a "baptism." True, in his days as secretary of the party committee of the Mukachevo Instrument plant, Zoltan Zoltanovich more than once had to have a talk with workers about the construction of this "top secret facility." But if at first interest dampened when defense needs were mentioned, then when the walls of the "facility" became "visible a mile off," they no longer believed Lendel that a radar site was being developed. As they also did not believe that a nuclear reactor would not be "planted" there. Try to prove this to someone, when he, the secretary of the party committee, had not even set foot in the facility in question. In his position, he was not supposed to. That is why when he talked about what he and his colleagues were told in the gorkom [city party committee], the people apparently sensed hidden doubts in his voice. Which in itself added to the alarm and rumors. About that reactor.*

What was to be done? It more than once agitated the obkom [oblast party committee]: Tell the people the truth about the construction site, otherwise there could be trouble. And it could have broken out. Once, thousands of people came out to the "facility," they blocked all of the roads, they sat on the rails... It was later calculated that just this "day of insubordination" caused losses of almost R1 million. But Zoltan imagined what people went through when thugs, after penetrating into the shops, tore smocks off the female workers, forced the directors to kiss the blue and gold banner, and forcefully chucked them out at a rally. And what was it like for the sick who had to wait hours for an "ambulance"? Or what did the passengers experience in stopped international trains? Or those who for many hours could not bury their loved ones...

The people's concern about the presence of the radar site was evident in the question to the president of the USSR in the Supreme Soviet: "Was this problem not discussed in the United States? Perhaps after the oblast soviet "froze" the construction project with its decision, it would be possible "to lower the temperature." Although Zoltan understands: There are forces for whom it is advantageous that the "radar site problem" maintain the people's anxiety at a high level. And the intentions are understandable: To drive a wedge between the people and the party, and, afterwards, between party members and the apparatus, and, as the curtain falls, between people of different nationalities. And in the Transcarpathian region they are in almost every family...

As long as I have known Zoltan, I have not had occasion to see him ruffled. He is tall, well-built, firm in his movements and words, blue-eyed, swarthy, and has a slightly broad face. It seems that he is sculpted to show solidness and weightiness.

It seems that perhaps it is an ability to wait until anger and an incoherent monologue pour out that helped the first secretary of the Mukachevo Gorkom calm a mass of people in a rage at the gorkom building. Assuaging the city residents from the height of his porch, he observed not only the passionate agitated eyes that gazed at him, but also the malicious smiles of some teachers from the vocational training school whose "storm troopers" were buzzing around, and the leaders and activists who were keeping aloof and who, it was apparent from everything, did not even think of supporting him, a complete novice, in the role of "first."

He did not take offense, and he was not exasperated by their temporizing and curiosity: We will take a look, see what you are, and what to expect from you. Zoltan realized: For many in the agitated square who were awaiting the outcome of the duel on the side, he was still one of the culprits and, today, in their imagination, perhaps, he was the principal culprit of their distrust, hatred, and resentment. From the events of that day and the succeeding days, Lendel's conviction was confirmed: The "first" must be open with the people. Although for seven years as secretary of the party committee he was able to come out of a critical issue and the people sympathized with his holding back and eloquent pauses, and thereby seemed to be in agreement with him, that he also was not omnipotent; this allowance should not be expected in the role of "first." Henceforth, he is for the city residents part and parcel of the noticeable building in the center of the city where "authority" settled in—the gorkom and the city soviet, with all that is good and bad that has made an imprint on the people's minds. With that party gorkom which they can for no reason at all, just in passing, tar and feather, but which they immediately turn to when a pipe starts leaking or when the gas pump pings too much.

It could have been expected that after passions had almost quieted down, the party gorkom workers would not be able to be absent even "for coffee"; that is, to drink a cup of coffee. Lendel himself announced: There is nothing to be observed in the party gorkom on Saturdays. Indeed, in general, it is time to cope with matters during working hours, and the days off are for the family, rest, and books. He did not mention books accidentally. Not everyone in the party gorkom is keen on literature on management and psychology. Zoltan noted this earlier. Perhaps it is because he himself has a long and steady interest in it. Now he did not conceal his astonishment. Can a party worker do without such subtle managerial strings as ethics, psychology, and pedagogy? Can you touch the strings in another way—in a way that is not strumming, but that they respond with an arranged melody, if you do not know how to bring out these sounds?

Moreover, he noted for himself, words that were "most correct" have been listened to with a yawn. That is why it was planned in the party gorkom first of all to identify a kind of "intellectual bank" of specialists from among thousands of workers in the city. If someone is gifted by nature with organizational inclinations, let him go through training in a special center. The application will be found. Someone will come to the party gorkom, the communists will entrust someone to be the secretary of the party organization, someone will become a director and a leading specialist, and someone can be recommended for the soviet. Instead of a paper nomenklatura—a resource devoted to its work. Such people will even become apparatchiks without hesitation. They will do so out of conviction and confidence: "Just in case," they will be grabbed with both hands everywhere. If such "specialists" will be in the party gorkom, at the head of party organizations, and in the election activist organization—the city party organization does not have to worry about the future, because the future lies with capable people.

The next step... Every party element—from the primary to the party obkom and higher—must have "its own stratagem"; that is, its own concept about how to make life better. If the people value this, then this is also the basis for consolidation with other political forces, and the main thing is that it is solid ground for communists in their striving to be in the forefront.

However, Lendel has already been able to do something in the formation of a new party gorkom. I recall a heated conversation with him, when he was then still secretary of the plant's party committee on the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. At that time there was only talk about how to motivate party members. Consideration of candidates for delegates directly in the primary organizations was received as unprecedented audacity. But in the party committee of the Mukachevo Instrument Plant, Lendel and the activists were dreaming of more. Why not consider the staff of party organs right in the primary organizations—from the party gorkom to the CPSU Central Committee, why not consult with party members to discover who are fit to be party secretaries and department managers, and to be in party committee bureaus?

It turns out that the dream lives. Although, if you look into it, it is no longer entirely a dream. As he proposed, elections were made to the party gorkom bureau not according to position and not by the "posting" of one or two workers, but rather using the brightest minds of the city party organization. Lendel and like-minded persons obviously gained here. There is the "average statistical city resident" or the "rank and file party member" who sits at meetings, and who tries at rallies to sidestep hot issues and all of these arguments—how and where to elect a party gorkom, and who should be in the bureau—and to whom this still seems to be nothing more than "organizational games," and then there are the people "to whom it does matter," and who happily followed the leader.

Indeed, Zoltan himself did not conceal his concern. Everyone understands that according to yesterday's yardstick, the "first" was both a god and a czar, and honor and respect were his very due. But the situation has changed and today, you will agree, the situation is not to his advantage. You will see someone who puts his hands in his pockets in order not to shake hands, or who dashes to the other side of the street in an encounter. But then hundreds of eyes see the "first" everywhere, and each pair in its own way: What kind of a bird are you, and why did you have an eye on the chair at such a time?

He thought a lot about this before the party gorkom, and more than once he asked himself the troubling question—What is to be done?" or "Who is to blame?" He could not complacently bear the fact that the party gorkom is losing its prestige, that party members are turning in their cards more and more frequently. And he understood better than others that in these times the new post does not promise anything for him personally except an incredible burden. He understood that, having become the "first," he would much less frequently be able to tear away for the swimming pool, mess around with the vineyard at home (for he had a great desire to grow better varieties), and that less time would remain for the family and books. Never mind, he consoles himself, if there were the right variety and it was taken care of, the grapes would be juicy. And now when the chance presented itself to do what was thought about again and again in arguments with friends, is it possible not to take advantage of this chance? It leaves a rather bitter taste that this does not worry everyone...

How many copies were used up in proving that authority should be given to the primary organizations. But what is happening in the meantime? Essentially, the party gorkom nominated leaders. Why do the workers not hasten to take power? "They are being timid," they do not believe that it will be given to them to use. Or it is more a habit and convenient: You just go on criticizing, and let someone else pull the load.

Or it was reckoned in some primary organizations: If it is democracy, well then, it is also possible to do without meetings, and instructions will be executed somehow, and dues will be disposed of as thought appropriate—either keep them, or transfer them to some kind of fund, only not to the party treasury—why propagate and feed apparatchiks. It seems awkward to mention, but here it is: No party will last long without material support and, what is more, without an ability "to earn a living." And then look at those who yell louder than anyone about this. The "super radicals" themselves maintain a harsher discipline in their own ranks, and they are more diligent about paying for their own staff than for the party staff, and in a noisy campaign for the departure of communists from work collectives, they then and there build their own nests in them.

Though the party obkom recently "played up to" the same moods: It seemed to some that the primary party organizations could do without full time secretaries, and then the decision of the party obkom bureau followed. They would not first consult with these secretaries. But although there is a new leadership in the party obkom, the principle of "your hand rules" is alive as previously. Zoltan spoke sharply about this at the oblast party conference.

Perhaps Lendel's speech opened up something new for the delegates, for at the first organizational plenum they elected him to the staff of the bureau of the party obkom. And literally several days before this, from among five aspirants, the communists of the city entrusted Zoltan himself to be a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress.

One can easily doubt: Was not a bit too much dumped on one person—the first secretary of the city party committee, a member of the bureau of the party obkom, and a delegate to the congress?.. But one can think of it this way: Lendel was only given that which he earned long ago throughout his life. For the time being we leave Zoltan Lendel at the beginning of a new journey and on the threshold of a house that faces difficult trials. What kind of communist will come out of these trials, and what kind will he himself be, their "first?" But today, we will wish them success...

Leningrad Suggestions on CPSU Draft Rules

90UN2239A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jun 90 p 2

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Adopted at the United Party Conference": "Leningrad Input to the CPSU Rules"—first two paragraphs are LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Following yesterday's publication of the political declaration of Leningrad communists to the 28th CPSU Congress, today we present to the reader a second document of principle adopted by the united 29th Oblast and 27th City Conference of the Leningrad CPSU organization. The document is called "Basic Proposals on the CPSU Draft Rules" and is based on more than 20,000 suggestions, additions, and clarifications arriving at the party obkom [oblast committee] from party organizations, party committees, party bureaus, and individual communists, as well as those introduced by delegates during the course of discussion at the conference itself.

It is felt that these proposals, like the political declaration of Leningrad communists, will become a reliable point of support in the work of the Leningrad delegation at the 28th CPSU Congress, and will enable it to argue more precisely the positions coordinated at the conference.

1. On the Structure of the CPSU Draft Rules

1.1. Eliminate Section V: "Communists in the Soviets, in Social Organizations and Movements." Change the title of Section II, "Intra-Party Democracy," to "Foundations of Intra-Party Relationships," and record here the principles of activity of communists in the Soviets, and in social organizations and movements:

At congresses and sessions of the Soviets of People's Deputies, and in the elective organs of social organizations and movements, communists unite voluntarily into party groups (factions). Their tasks are to assist members of the groups (factions) in accomplishing the functions entrusted to them by the electorate, coordinate their activity, and carry out the pre-election programs and platforms of party organizations. Party groups are autonomous in matters of their internal life and current activity.

Party groups in nonparty organizations interact with appropriate CPSU committees, inform them regarding their work, receive assistance and support from party organizations.

Communists who are members of elective organs of youth organizations have the right of deliberative vote when matters of youth policy are under discussion in party committees at all levels.

1.2. Remove the chapter entitled "CPSU Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces" from Section III, "Organizational Structure of the Party," and make provision for the establishment of primary party organizations in military units, enterprises, institutions, and training establishments in the chapter entitled "Primary Party Organizations."

2. On Procedure for Forming Party Organs

2.1. Elect delegates to party conferences and congresses and members of party committees up to oblast level exclusively by direct, secret vote by party district.

2.2. Elect members of the CPSU Central Committee at oblast conferences or congresses of union republic communist parties according to quotas as determined by the numerical strength of organizations. Afford CPSU congress delegates the right of additionally electing a limited number of Central Committee members directly at the congress.

2.3. Elect bureau members and secretaries of elective party organs up to Central Committee exclusively at the appropriate conferences and congresses by direct vote, making them accountable to the plenums of the corresponding party committees. In the event a bureau member or secretary cannot fulfill his responsibilities, the party committee plenum may reelect someone to this position by a two-thirds majority of votes.

2.4. Provide for the possibility of early recall and replacement of any member of an elective organ, conference or congress delegate, by decision of a majority of communists of the party district in which he was elected. In this regard, a secretary or bureau member of a party committee elected by a conference or congress may not be recalled from the party committee by communists of the party district without the consent of the conference (congress) or the consent of at least two-thirds of the members of the party committee.

2.5. Conduct party meetings, conferences, and congresses for reports and elections at least once every three years. In primary party organizations, conduct reports and elections meetings at intervals established by the party meeting, but at least once every three years.

The authority of delegates of the appropriate conferences or congresses is retained over the accountability period in the case of their extraordinary convocation to decide the most fundamental questions of principle in the life of the party.

3. Determination of the Authority of Party Organs

3.1. Decisions of party meetings, conferences, and congresses are considered binding for party organizations. Decisions of executive organs, party committees, and their bureaus have recommendatory power.

4. On the Highest Party Organs

4.1. The first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee directs the work of the Bureau of the Central Committee. The CPSU Central Committee Bureau coordinates the activity of communist parties of the union republics and permanent commissions of the Central Committee, and organizes execution in the party of the decisions of plenums of the Central Committee (CPSU Congress).

4.2. Elect the editor in chief and deputy editor in chief of the PRAVDA newspaper at the party congress, with adoption of a resolution regarding his accountability during the period between congresses and conferences to the party Central Committee. Make the newspaper the central organ of the party.

5. On Protecting the Rights of the Minority

5.1. Guarantee the minority the right to openly publish its views in the party press. The central party mass media are obliged to publish statements, appeals, and platforms on the demand of the oblast, kray, or republic party organization or of a group of CPSU congress or conference delegates consisting of at least one-tenth of the total number, or a group of at least 4,000 communists; in the case of the local party press, a group of at least 300 communists or five percent of the party organization strength.

5.2. Afford a minority comprising at least one-third the composition of an organization or elective organ the right to present a minority report, to present proposals on the conduct of extraordinary plenums of party committees, meetings, conferences, and congresses, to demand conduct of a referendum on any issue whatsoever, and if necessary to take upon itself the function of preparatory committee in conducting it.

6. On the Organizational Structure of the Party

6.1. Primary party organizations are established when at least 10 CPSU members are present at a work place, area of military service, or place of residence.

7. On Procedure for Constituting and Spending Party Funds

7.1. Primary party organizations retain for their own disposal at least 50 percent of the accumulation of party dues, the remainder being allocated to the accounts of CPSU raykoms [rayon party committee], gorkoms [city party committee], and obkoms [oblast party committee], which spend these funds according to procedure established by the appropriate conferences. The CPSU Central Committee and Central Committees of union republic communist parties finance their activities through income received from publishing and other economic activities. The budgets of the party and Central Committee are approved at the CPSU congress.

7.2. Monthly membership dues from party members are established as follows:

for income of up to R70—10 kopeks; from R70 to 100—20 kopeks; from R101 to 150—30 kopeks; greater than R150—one percent.

Upon decision of the primary party organizations, individual communists on pension may be excused from paying party membership dues.

Working communists who receive a pension pay party dues based on their salary alone.

7.3. Party funds may be supplemented through voluntary payments by citizens, state and social organizations.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Chairs Session on Economic Reform

LD2007180590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] We have just received a report from the Kremlin. USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev today

chaired a joint session of the USSR Federation and Presidential Councils. Questions relating to organizational measures for implementing economic reform and the transition to market relations and to preparation of the Union treaty were examined.

Ryzhkov, chairman of ther USSR Council of Ministers, expounded the program's main principles of measures drawn up by the government for the country to move to a regulated market economy, starting in 1991. In order to urgently form the necessary legal conditions for the transition to a regulated market economy, the speaker advocated adopting a series of presidential decrees and legislative and administrative acts at the USSR Supreme Soviet and Government level, and also at the Union republics supreme soviets and governments level.

Those taking part in the session discussed in detail various aspects of the transition to a market economy.

Comrade Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities, delivered a report on drawing up a Union treaty which pointed out that the concept of a union of sovereign states gives a good basis for attaining mutually acceptable understandings, with the aim of democratizing relations between the center and the republics. A useful exchange of opinions took place on the concept of a Union treaty and the nature and timescale for work on this document.

Summing up the discussion, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that the transition to a regulated market and drawing up a new Union treaty are two sides of the same coin. In the very near future, it is necessary to work out the contours of a new Union treaty such as will guarantee the republics' sovereignty. At the same time, the unified economic organism must not be wrecked, but, on the contrary, we must together create and strengthen an all-Union market. The difficulties the country is experiencing dictate an accelerated progress toward a unified, mutually complementary market economy; while on the contrary, the tendency to separatism and the aspiration to bar oneself from one another serve only further to complicate the situation both for the republics and for the country as a whole. This demands not only development and strengthening of horizontal ties, which have an increasing role in the new conditions, but also voluntary handing-over of certain functions to the central authority, which operates in all the republics' common interests.

Members of the Presidential and Federation Councils, the USSR Government, and representatives of a number of Union and autonomous republics invited to the session took part in discussing the issues put forward. The press will carry this report in full.

Ryzhkov Meets Timber Industry Chiefs in Moscow

Discussions Begin

LD2107182190 Moscow TASS in English 1811 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 21 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov received in the Kremlin today general directors of territorial production amalgamations and enterprises of the timber industry. They discussed in detail the issues connected with its development.

The USSR, which has the world's largest timber resources, is experiencing tremendous difficulties with the supply of timber and pulp-and-paper products. The situation with the supply of the population with furniture, wallpaper, sawn timber, wooden building structures and wooden houses is extremely serious.

Participants in the meeting pointed out that a low level of the commercial use of forests and the poor technical equipment of the timber industry are among the main reasons for it.

The came to the unanimous conclusion that it is necessary to begin soon the construction of two or three plants for the production of pulp-and-paper goods and to speed up the implementation of the government programme of increasing the output of furniture and other goods.

Decree Issued

LD2107201790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Excerpts] Today Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received in the Kremlin the general directors of territorial production associations and enterprises in the timber industry. They had a thorough conversation on a broad range of questions on its development. [passage omitted]

The participants in the meeting came to the general conclusion that it is necessary in the very new future to begin building two or three factories for processing cellulose and paper products, and also to accelerate the implementation of the program developed by the government for increasing furniture and other consumer goods production.

The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree to the buro of the chemical and timber complex and the machine construction buro to prepare in the shortest possible time proposals on the issue discussed, including the transfer of the appropriate machine construction factories to the jurisdiction of the timber industry complex.

It was stressed that it is necessary to eliminate instances of individual asociations and enterprises acting from group interests and regionalist considerations and

allowing reductions in production and breaking agreements. There was an exchange of opinions on transferring enterprises and associations of the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry to hard currency self-capitalization.

Ryzhkov on Border Controls To Combat Smuggling

AU2107142690 Paris AFP in English 2024 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 20 (AFP)—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov announced Friday [20 July] that border controls with the West would be tightened to fight increasing smuggling of consumer goods and foodstuffs out of the country.

Speaking on television, Mr. Ryzhkov said he had given orders for a temporary return to the situation prior to September 1988 when border controls were eased for the first time in decades.

This would only be a "temporary" measure to last until border crossing posts were better equipped technically, he said. Observers here said the move implied much longer waits at border crossing points.

Smuggling was increasing because of the large differences in price between goods sold in the Soviet Union and goods sold abroad, and this was worsening already existing shortages at home, Mr. Ryzhkov said.

Citing the situation at a border crossing with Poland, at Mostiska, Mr. Ryzhkov said that during a recent 24-hour period, customs officers had seized 52 televisions, 144 washing machines, 12 refrigerators, 150 sewing machines, 3,000 litres of vodka, more than 600 kilos (1,320 pounds) of tomato sauce and 200 kilos (440 pounds) of chocolate.

All of these goods are in short supply at home and the government banned the export of most of them last year.

Mr. Ryzhkov also promised to raise wages for some seven million poorly-paid workers as of next January.

These would include some 2.7 million people working in education, 2.6 million in the health services and one million in the cultural sector, he said.

Yanayev Resigns as AUCCTU Chairman

LD2007182590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] An All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] plenum has been held in Moscow. This event is worthy of particular note, if only because the trade unions—albeit belatedly—have now drawn up an action program for their participation in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

[Correspondent S. Bestuzheva] In view of the fact that he has been elected a Politburo member and a CPSU Central Committee secretary, Gennadiy Ivanovich Yanayev asked the plenum to release him from his post as chairman and from membership of the AUCCTU Presidium. The plenum's participants met his request, but decided to postpone the election of a new chairman until the 19th Trade Union Congress, which is to be held in Moscow in three months. This time they limited themselves to electing a deputy chairman.

Following a very passionate discussion of the two candidates—Viktor Maksimovich Mishin and Vladimir Pavlovich Shcherbakov, both of whom had to answer numerous questions and to listen to a number of serious critical remarks—Vladimir Pavlovich Shcherbakov was elected AUCCTU deputy chairman by secret ballot.

The plenum also debated and adopted the draft of a very important and detailed program for trade union action on issues stemming from the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. One of the new moves is to establish an all-Union fund for trade union solidarity to help children who live in the areas affected by radioactive contamination and in other ecological disaster zones. [passage omitted]

Abalkin Says No Market Without Price Hikes

LD2007153890 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] [words indistinct] Leonid Abalkin has dismissed as a myth the notion that the Soviet economy can proceed toward a market without a price increase. This has been disclosed by INTERFAX.

Addressing economic experts in Moscow, Leonid Abalkin stressed that a transition to a market economy should be started with agriculture. In his opinion an attempt to introduce market prices in the countryside with the retention of the current prices on food will lead to a minimum 50 percent of subsidies raise.

Abalkin believes that no economy could endure this. He sees the main task of the government in compensation for the population's cash losses inevitable in a transition to a market.

Paper Reports Democratic Platform Statement

LD2007145490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0930 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Jul (TASS)—The coordinating council of the Democratic Platform for preparing a congress of new sovereign parties on a democratic platform has made a statement expounding the main principles and tasks of these parties, today's MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA reports.

In the political sphere, the statements says, "the dismantling of the totalitarian system of power and a transition to a parliamentary, multiparty legal state" as well as "the

elimination of CPSU monopoly on power as the basis of the antidemocratic regime that still exists" are envisaged. "The creation of worthy living conditions for the individual on the basis of an efficient market economy embracing all the forms of property, private property included" is the main goal of the economic policies set out in the statement.

The newspaper quotes the view of a group of members of the working section of communist reformers who regards the statement as the logical conclusion of the Democratic Platform leaders' policy aimed at separation from the CPSU.

They expressed regret at the fact that the statement on splitting from the CPSU, on the CPSU being not liable to reform and on the need to counteract the CPSU has been made on behalf of the whole Democratic Platform without taking into account the views of those of its supporters who see this movement as a way towards democratising the CPSU, and they number quite a few within the Democratic Platform.

In their view, the delimitation initiated by the coordinating council has weakened the reformer's positions which they have worked hard to gain.

The statement by a group of delegates at the 28th congress and the decision of the coordinating council of the Democratic Platform on breaking with the CPSU do not draw a line under the development of reform trends in the party at all. A hundred and one delegates—supporters of the Democratic Platform—appealed to their comrades in the party to continue actions aimed at further democratizing the CPSU while staying within its ranks. The section of communist reformers which sees its goal in coordinating the efforts of the party's democratic wing adopted a declaration recently on joint actions with the Marxist Platform in the CPSU, thus initiating the emergence of broad unification of those advocating change in the CPSU. A conference which is due to develop tactics of communist reformers is scheduled for this autumn.

Prokofyev Views CPSU, Threat Posed by Yeltsin

AU2207133890 Hamburg BILD in German 21 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with Yuriy Prokofyev, CPSU Politburo member and Moscow party chief, by Karl-Ludwig Guensche; place and date not given: "The CPSU Will Shrink by 20 or 30 Percent"]

[Text] [Guensche] Is the CPSU finished?

[Prokofyev] That depends on how you view things. It is no longer the party it was at the beginning of perestroyka. Formerly, it had all areas of the state and society under control. That is different now, and to that extent its position is weaker now.

[Guensche] But it has not withdrawn from the enterprises, the KGB, and the Army....

[Prokofyev] We are doing so. The prime minister, the KGB chief, and all government members are not in the Politburo anymore. That is a step toward separating the party and the state. Formerly, the Politburo decided all important political problems. Today that is being done by the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Soviet, and the Presidential Council. The Communist Party has also lost its power in the enterprises.

[Guensche] Will the resignation of Yeltsin and his followers split the party?

[Prokofyev] Yeltsin's resignation is not dangerous for our party. It will shrink by 20 or 30 percent without him. However, he could harm the Communist Party in a different way. As the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president, he could try to expropriate the party and its mass media. He could also impose a sort of vocational ban on communists. That is the danger that I see.

[Guensche] How much time will you need to get the economic crisis under control?

[Prokofyev] I am an optimist. Therefore, I think we will not need more than five years. In this time, we will be able to stabilize the economy and the nationalities problem which is closely connected with it.

[Guensche] Where do you see a certain danger emerge—on the right or on the left?

[Prokofyev] Formerly, I was afraid of extremists. However, following the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party Congresses, I see that the conservatives are dangerous. I do not believe that there will be a military putsch; there has never been a military putsch in our history. However, if the conservatives (the opponents of reform—editorial board) slow down and obstruct the process of perestroyka, an explosion might take place, as was the case in the other socialist states. In our multinational state, there would not just be demonstrations like in Wenceslas Square in Prague. There would be a big explosion, with very bad consequences not only for our country.

New Presidential Council Member on Aspirations

LD2207124790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 22 Jul 90

[Excerpts] As was reported, Albert Ernestovich Kauls, a well-known grain farmer from Latvia and chairman of the Adazi agricultural firm, has become a member of the Presidential Council. He is introduced to us by (Ninel Meshkun), a correspondent in Latvia.

[Begin recording] [Meshkun] There is a swimming pool and winter garden in the kindergarten of the collective farm in the centre of the Adazi settlement, where children learn to look after flowers and birds from early childhood. [passage omitted]

Albert Ernestovich Kauls, hero of socialist labor, has been the head of the farm for 16 years now. He is a very talented and enterprising person.

[Kauls] It is, of course, very difficult to cover everything. I hope that I will manage to prepare an heir for the agricultural union of the republic. We will also continue to improve the state of things in the Adazi agricultural firm, so that there will be more time left for work in the council. As for the work in the farm, my oldest son is engaged there, he is being assisted by my middle son, and, of course, the rest of my family. They are all involved in perestroyka, and they all have faith in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. And they think that if Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev considers it necessary for me to be included in the team, then it is necessary for me to do so. Some things must be sacrificed for the sake of society. I think that intensive work does no harm; one will not have time to grow old.

[Meshkun] What have you been dreaming about since you were young?

[Kauls] To become a good manager in my farm. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Frovlov Interviewed on Politburo Structure

PM2007083490 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 19 Jul 90 p 17

[Interview with CPSU Politburo member Ivan Frolov by Paolo Garimberti; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[passage omitted] [Garimberti] Ivan Timofeyevich, the Politburo seems to have lost some power. Its size has ben doubled, but all the principal ministers have left and the Armed Forces and the KGB are no longer represented in it. How much weight does this Politburo actually carry?

[Frolov] The Politburo's new structure reflects the role that the party must play in society after the abolition of article 6 of the constitution, which enshrined the CPSU's leading role, and the start—at least de facto—of a multiparty system. The party must be quite distinct from the state, so ministers and other state officials could no longer remain in the Politburo. The only exception is Gorbachev, but even the combination of the posts of general secretary and president of the USSR is temporary. Furthermore, with the entry of the first secretaries of all 15 republics, the CPSU leadership has been modeled on the way the Soviet state's federal structure should be.

[Garimberti] You say that the new structure reflects the different role that the CPSU must play in society. But people no longer seem to trust the party. On Sunday, Moscow responded at the end of the congress with a demonstration by tens of thousands of people, which was like a first-class funeral for the CPSU. Do you not believe that the party has been irredeemably discredited in society?

[Frolov] I would not say "irredeemably." Though it cannot be denied that in some sectors of society confidence in the party has been seriously damaged: All the faults and errors of past years are being blamed on the communists, and it is believed that other political forces are able to resolve the problems. Which forces? At Sunday's demonstration there were all kinds of banners and slogans—even monarchist and anarchist. There was an atmosphere of extreme anticommunism. They demanded that the CPSU be brought to trial like a criminal organization. They insulted Gorbachev. I wonder what the police forces were doing. I wonder why Interior Minister Bakatin's popularity is increasing proportionately to the increase in crime, including political crime. This climate could have very serious consequences. Shots were fired at the party headquarters in Magadan the other day.

[Garimberti] I can understand your outrage, but Sunday's demonstration seemed peaceful to me. What should the police have done? Beat the demonstrators because they were shouting slogans against the government and the party?

[Frolov] Listen, it is a political problem. It concerns our inability to respond to the radicals. In this country communists have been accustomed to responding to criticism with repression. Now they do not know what to do and are hiding. Moscow First Secretary Prokofyev was right when he said: Before it was useful to be a communist, now the opposite is true. And this situation helps people such as Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak.

[Garimberti] But communists did shout at the congress—and how. The fact is that they all seemed like conservatives: Their hero was Ligachev. How do you explain the fact that eventually the majority was reversed, Gorbachev won, and Ligachev was so clearly defeated?

[Frolov] True, the mood of the congress was very aggressive at the start. Ligachev is not as primitive as people tend to portray him: He has a strong personality, much experience, and even a certain charisma, I would say. But as the debate proceeded the congress realized that Gorbachev is indispensable, that only he can prevent the country from plunging into a critical and very dangerous confrontation. So the majority voted for him. But he had over 1,000 votes against him, which shows that the congress did not change completely at the end. For that matter, I too had 1,000 votes against me, as did many other representatives of the reform group. In fact we decided to found a club—club 1,000. But I am proud of the votes cast against me: I would have felt much worse if I had received only support at the congress.

[Garimberti] How do you explain the fact that the party grassroots—represented by the congress delegates—are still so entrenched in conservative stances? Are they afraid of losing their privileges?

[Frolov] Yes, partly that. But it is chiefly a problem of educational standards—and I do not mean only political

education. It is our great tragedy. For decades we congratulated ourselves over the masses' high level of education. Now we are realizing how low this level actually was. So a large proportion of communists do not realize what is going on around them, how much the situation has changed.

[Garimberti] Could Yeltsin's departure influence the membership? There is talk of an avalanche effect, of hundreds of thousands of membership cards being returned.

[Frolov] Of course it will have a negative effect. If I had been in his position, or that of the others who left, I would have stayed in the party and sought an agreement. But I believe I know them well: For them, personal ambition and the taste for power are more important than anything else. Now a difficult, very difficult situation has come about. As of now I would hesitate to define our perestroyka as revolutionary any more, because I am beginning to fear the upheavals that could result from this revolution. I fear bloodshed, I fear civil war. So educated people, politically well-informed people should display greater wisdom, less radicalism. I was consoled by the fact that none of them [radicals], except Yuriy Lyubimov, was on the stage at Sunday's demonstration. There were only second-rate politickers.

[Garimberti] Yeltsin's departure from the CPSU is part of a natural political process. You say that a multiparty system exists now, but you nevertheless want everyone to stay under the same banner. Is this not a contradiction?

[Frolov] Perhaps you are right: I admit that my reasoning could seem contradictory. But I am very worried by the danger inherent in these divisions. What do they want? Can they not see that the situation is explosive, that it would only take a match to blow everything sky high? Consider Sunday's demonstration. I am sure that most of them are decent people. But they are also people that can be easily manipulated by extremists. What are the alternatives? I defy anyone to deny that Gorbachev is indispensable now to the party and to the country. You cannot carry on just saying "no" to everything. A more constructive attitude is needed.

[Garimberti] Ivan Timofeyevich, you just described the country's situation as explosive. We heard representatives of the military speak at the congress. They were very hard on the party's policy. Is there a danger of a coup d'etat?

[Frolov] I do not believe so, because overall the Armed Forces are still controlled by the government. But their dissatisfaction could be exploited by extremists, and I wonder whether all these attacks on the Armed Forces are not part of a planned provocation. We have reached a stage where euphoria about democracy could become a danger. So I ask again: Where is the alternative to Gorbachev? Yeltsin made a theatrical gesture at the congress, but he was unable to put forward a specific program.

[Garimberti] But he is very popular, whereas the CPSU is unpopular. Do you not believe that if there were free elections tomorrow the party would meet the same fate as those of East Europe?

[Frolov] If I thought that, I would not have joined the Politburo. Nobody forced me to do so. I have my job, I like writing books. But the CPSU will only avoid meeting the same fate as the other eastern parties as long as it really renews itself. There are too many people still stroking their bellies full of years of power. Pardon me for being vulgar, but unfortunately that is how things are. Moreover there are two other factors that must be taken into account. The first it that, unlike East Europe, here the party is 70 years old; it was born with the Revolution and is deep-rooted in the country. The second is that we invented perestroyka and then exported it. We have already tried twice; the first time was with Khrushchev. Perhaps only in Czechoslovakia things would have gone differently for the communists if Brezhnev had not sent in the tanks in 1968 to kill their perestroyka.

[Garimberti] In Italy there is a great deal of discussion about the party's name. Here too some people have suggested that the CPSU change its name. Do you not believe that the word "communist" has now been discredited?

[Frolov] Let the Italian communists do whatever they consider most appropriate. I was in Bulgaria a while ago, and there too they told me: We must change name, we have no choice. I disagree. And, what is more, I still consider myself a Marxist. There are ideas of Marx' that still remain entirely valid. Of course it depends on how they are interpreted. If Marxism is confined to the dictatorship of the proletariat, well, in that case...

Former KGB General's 'Accusations' Viewed

PM2007155090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 29, 17-23 Jul 90 pp 27-29

[Lev Yelin article: "'The Kalugin Affair.' Why a former KGB General's Accusations Caused a Sensation"]

[Text] In the days when the famous spy thriller was once again broadcast over Soviet TV and viewers anxiously watched Soviet spy Colonel Isayev's dangerous duel with Nazis, his contemporary colleague, KGB General Oleg Kalugin was enagaged in dramatic sparring with his own commanders, or to be more precise, with his former commanders. Major General Kalugin of the KGB, bearer of the title "Honourary Chekist" and 22 government and KGB decorations, former chief of foreign counterintelligence (1973-79), former first deputy head of the Leningrad branch of the KGB (1980-87) retired from active service in February this year. On June 16, he appeared at the gathering of the democratic wing of the CPSU, and then in some central publications levelled sharp criticisms at the KGB. If Kalugin's service record does not secure him the fame of Colonel Isayev (alias Standartenfuehrer Schtirlitz) or a place in the gallery of ChK-OGPU-NKVD-KGB villains, his denunciations

produced an unprecedented situation. Earlier, similar criticisms and accusations could only be heard from KGB defectors (Kalugin claims there have been 20 of them since 1980. Replying to the questions at the CPSU congress, the Chairman of the KGB corrected: eight...). As for Kalugin, he has not defected, and does not intend to. It follows from the KGB statement that the KGB regards its former employee as a traitor, but the traitor himself is not trying to hide or escape, and his phone number in Moscow can be obtained easily. Such a situation has become possible only recently, and not due to successful hostile efforts to undermine the system, but due to the public's different view of the role the state in general and the KGB as one of its agencies should play in society. The alternative to fear and unconditional obedience is, in fact, necessary for better performance of the KGB itself, but it does not make life any easier for it. Simple solutions of problems a la Kalugin are no longer possible: opposing the KGB (or other state agencies like the Ministry of Defence or the Procurator's Office, for instance), one does not proclaim one's own sentence (or "chooses one's fate," as PRAVDA put it). If the state agency in question continues to react in the old way, such a reaction can cause a public outcry motivated by emotions rather than reason. This was the case with the "Gdlyan-Ivanov affair," but it looks like the Procurator's Office and the KGB failed to share their experience.

The decrees stripping Kalugin of his military rank and decorations were signed on June 30 "on presentation from the KGB," and the reason for them was defined as Kalugin's "activities defaming the KGB..." So far we do not have a law or decree defending the KGB from insults. As for slander, the fact of it must be proved in a court of law, which can punish Kalugin if it turns out that the general had simply been embittered by his dismissal and wanted to defame his former employers. However, the KGB confined itself to promises "to give a comprehensive assessment of Kalugin's allegations" and never mentioned the possibility of suing him, that is, to use democratic and legal procedures. Here is the gist of Kalugin's accusations levelled at what he called "the most closed organization in the country":

—recruitment of agents and informers inside the political opposition "from academicians to militiamen, from members of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church to athletes, from military top brass to musicians and literary critics," neutralization of opposition and its destruction as the final goal;

—eavesdropping, perlustration of correspondence, dossiers on Soviet citizens, illegal searches of dwellings. Kalugin said only the top "nomenklatura" party and state apparatchiks were guaranteed against such intrusions;

—possession of means and substances potentially harmful to human health, even life.

He also called the KGB "the right hand of the top leadership of the CPSU Central Committee" and said many KGB personnel "had recently moved to the right, becoming a support for conservative forces, primarily in the party apparatus. Kalugin said the KGB defended conservatives rather than real security of the state and its citizens ("where was the KGB when pogroms occurred in Sumgait, Dushanbe or Tbilisi?").

The former general called for the depolitization of the KGB and its subordination to Soviet power and parliament. He believes it is essential to reorganize the KGB, reduce its strength by half, forbid its functioning as a secret political police force and eliminate its network of paid informers. Naturally, Kalugin is not the first to speak about this. The principles of democratic reorganization of the KGB have already been discussed for some time, and the KGB's delays in their implementation only make possible other situations like the one involving Kalugin.

Kalugin's utterances were loaded with phraseology we habitually apply to the CIA, describing it as "the secret hand of the White House" possessing "a murder potential" and acting as "the organ for suppression of dissent." This only attests to the fact that secret services of the world are very similar and, in fact, related to each other. No secret service can claim to be exclusive referring to ideals and principles. It is also true that politically, secret services, be it the American CIA, the South Korean CIA or the Soviet KGB, are mostly right-leaning. Never in history has a secret service initiated a shift to the left or any democratic reforms. This should not be feared or protested against: this fact must only be taken for granted and considered by those who, as Kalugin maintains, receive firsthand KGB information.

Secret services suffer from similar maladies, too. Sometimes a former or even active officer makes some unpleasant revelations: this is always a nuisance for secret service chiefs. The culprit starts to be carefully watched, and his employers use various means to bring pressure to bear on him. (Recall, for instance, the story of CIA agent Philip Agee). There is one distinction, however, I have heard of no presidential or government decree issued to punish the offender. The decrees which appeared a fortnight after Kalugin's statement just on the eve of the 28th party congress are a serious signal which requires close attention and consideration.

Let us return to Kalugin's statements, however. Accusations like his would have caused no sensation had the signature under them been different. Kalugin, who served at Lubyanka (the KGB's headquarters in Moscow) until February of this year, did not tell anything new, or give any really sensational piece of information. Kalugin obviously refuses to go the whole hog and so far the KGB has had no reason to accuse him of divulging official secrecy. Meanwhile, real revelations are pouring out as if from Pandora's box: it turned out that the "fraternal" secret service of East Germany, was sheltering terrorists from the West German Red Army faction (RAF). Hungary provided sanctuary for international terrorist Carlos (Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez started

his comprehensive career at the Moscow-based Patrice Lumumba Peoples Friendship University)... Did the KGB know about RAF terrorists, peacefully receiving their salaries in the GDR? Or about Carlos? Here is a piece of "hot news" I would like to receive from official spokesmen for the KGB or at least from a "reliable source." General Kalugin has not been cooperative.

What are the KGB's counteraccusations against Kalugin? Let's start with "minor" matters first.

—Kalugin's role in the story with scientist K., of Russian descent, whom Kalugin influenced to emigrate from the United States to the USSR and who was then sentenced to seven years for "hard currency and antique speculations." Kalugin insists the scientist's case was, in fact, a KGB frame-up, designed to punish K. for "dissident sentiments." The KGB refers to Kalugin's "written statement as to the guilt of the scientist." Kalugin retaliates, saying K. is free now and can confirm his words.

—Kalugin's love of the sweet life, his habit of arranging drinking parties, abuse of office and the desire to obtain influential connections.

References to personal qualities is a sign of weakness, not strength. It appears strange that the KGB should have selected this particular method in its old arsenal out of possible ways (to ignore Kalugin's accusations altogether, to disavow them in passing by a couple of lines in the KGB's chairman's or one of his deputies' interview, or to sue the general). Besides, it must be borne in mind that the peak of Kalugin's career in the KGB coincided with the Brezhnev era, when such "habits" were considered the norm rather than a deviation at the top. In any case, Kalugin's personal qualities cannot be so important.

—Kalugin is responsible for the loss of "a most valuable source of information" working inside the American CIA.

The general's answer is simple: when he worked as chief of foreign counterintelligence, the KGB "operated no agents from among the CIA staff."

Dispute continued on July 9, when the KGB Chairman said at the party congress that Kalugin had had no right to make this statement. This is a divulgence of official secrecy. It turns out that the initial accusations by the KGB Public Relations Centre were groundless? Kalugin was not telling lies, he was disclosing secrets?

—Under Kalugin, the performance of foreign counterintelligence was poor. Shortly after his dismissal, dozens of agents from foreign secret services from among Soviet citizens "were unmasked and brought before trial."

Col. Mikhail Lyubimov (Ret.), former department head at the First Main Directorate of the KGB believes the KGB statement can satisfy "only simpletons." He said intelligence was not "a meatpacking plant" where a new manager can mend old ways by bringing new technology and workers and feed the whole country.

Besides this, a number of cases of "agents from among Soviet citizens" (be it those apprehended and sentenced before, under or after Kalugin) evoke the serious doubts of experts. For instance, the cases of Lubman or Kazachkov... Thus, better performance statistics do not necessarily mean real successes in our counterintelligence.

—Kalugin is also accused of illegal actions against 40 Leningrad party and Soviet apparatchiks charged with corruption and held under investigation.

Kalugin rebuffs these accusations saying that the performance of law-enforcement agences started to evoke displeasure when "evidence of high-level corruption at the Leningrad City Soviet Executive Committee and Regional Party Committee" appeared. The Leningrad Regional Party Committee ordered that the investigation be stopped.

As paradoxical as it might be, it is hints, not direct accusations, which Kalugin easily rebuffs, that sound most threatening in the KGB statement. "A not at all harmless leak of information," we do not mean to say that Kalugin had been involved in the cases of treason and defection, but it is a fact that he did nothing to prevent or reveal treason..." This makes Kalugin almost "an enemy of the people," or, in more modern terms, "a traitor to the Motherland." Or maybe the bad habit of reading between the lines is misleading?

We are seldom informed about KGB actions and detailed information is almost inaccessible. As a result, we cannot say how professionally such actions were planned and carried out. In this case, "the Kalugin operation" was presented in all the details and could not but cause sincere astonishment. Unprofessionals as we are, we could guess in advance every new step of the KGB! Years of experience told us that instead of a concrete arguement, the KGB would prefer to discredit Kalugin as person or to look for failures or transgressions in his service record. The predictability of the developments caused natural sympathy with Kalugin and questioned the KGB's preparedness to reshape its activities in conformity with new democratic requirements.

If the KGB does have serious evidence incriminating Kalugin, then why hasn't the investigation commenced? Why should the KGB confine itself to obscure hints and demands of sanctions against Kalugin easily surrendering the struggle for public opinion to the general-troublemaker? In general, the impression is that the desire "to teach Kalugin a lesson," so as somebody doesn't do it again, has crowded out the KGB's concern for its image which we have witnessed in the past two years.

Legislators on different levels demand an independent parliamentary inquiry into Kalugin's accusations. They want to know how much of the taxpayers' money goes to the KGB and how the KGB spends it. Some people are

already raising funds to help the general. Others are busy drawing posters and nominating him a candidate for yet another election. Everybody expects another blow to the "traitor." It will be a pity, though, if "the Kalugin affair" distracts the KGB's attention from urgent measures long demanded by the public and of which the KGB Public Relations Centre cannot be uninformed—to open archives of the Stalin era and to review a number of cases of the 1970s and early 1980s. Any of these measures will be much weightier a response to Kalugin's accusations than stripping him of his rank and decorations...

OGONEK To Cut Ties With Party

LD1907152190 Moscow TASS in English 1328 GMT 19 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow July 19—In connection with the western media claims that the popular Soviet weekly OGONEK is going to announce that it is "servering its ties with the Communist Party", the weekly's executive editor Aleksandr Shcherbakov had the following to say to TASS today:

"The next, 30th issue of OGONEK, which goes out on Friday, July 20, will carry a statement by the weekly's staff. However, it has nothing to do with our relations with the party.

"It is about constitutionalising the weekly today. The prime motive behind the statement was the need to comply with the law on the press."

The statement says that like all newspapers and magazines, OGONYOK is to register anew from August 1 and, in keeping with the law on the press, identify its founder.

Under the law's Article 7, founders can include local governing councils, other state bodies, political parties, social organizations, mass movements, unions of cultural workers, cooperatives, religious and other associations, worker collectives, and citizens over 18.

"Wishing to express the interests and opinions of the people at large, OGONEK does not want to serve as atribune for state agencies or any political, professional or other group or association," the statement says.

"This is why, reaffirming our support for the policy line of the weekly and its leadership, the OGONEK staff has decided to become the weekly's founder. We proceed from the interests of readers and our responsibility to them."

The decision, according to Shcherbakov, was passed by a general staff meeting on July 16.

IZVESTIYA on Bomb Explosion on Train

LD2107185490 Moscow TASS in English 1846 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 21 TASS—IZVESTIYA published today a report of Nikolay Lisovenko, its correspondent in Donetsk, carrying detailed information about a night explosion at the Moscow-Tskhaltubo passenger train, which claimed the lives of five people.

According to the newspaper, the explosion took place in the end of the corridor of the third railway carriage. The end of the corridor and three compartments in the neighbouring carriage were totally destroyed. The examination of the damaged carriages showed that the explosive device was in a strong metal casing. It might be a homemade very powerful bomb. Holes made by the bomb's fragments in the casing of the carriage are proof to it. Fortunately, the train did not get off the rails. It could have made the consequences of the explosion far more horrible, because several minutes later another train passed by the second railway tack in the reverse direction.

Ministers Warned on Explosives Safety

PM2007133590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Jul 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Ministers Warned"]

[Text] A regular session of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations under the chairmanship of V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, examined the question of measures to increase security during the production, shipment, storage, and use of explosives and articles made from them. The commission noted that the majority of targets defined by the USSR Council of Ministers 25 January 1989 resolution and other decisions of the USSR Government on this matter are being fulfilled unsatisfactorily by USSR ministries and departments. Labor and manufacturing discipline is not improving at enterprises and in organizations connected with the production, storage, loading, transportation, and use of explosive materials.

The USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, and the Agrokhim [Agrochemical] and Stroymaterialy [Construction Materials] associations are failing to ensure the fulfillment of targets to increase the production of the simplest industrial non-TNT and water-containing explosives. The Agrokhim association has failed to organize the delivery of the porous ammonium nitrate necessary for their production while the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry has failed to set up the production of the necessary number of charge-mixing [smesitelno-zaryadnyye] machines. All this is delaying the replacement, in the mining and other sectors of the national economy, of explosives with a TNT

content, which are dangerous during production, shipments, storage, and use. Instead of reducing the consumption of these explosives the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy and the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry are raising the question of increasing deliveries of these explosives to enterprises under their jurisdiction.

The USSR Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, citing the inadequate volume of metal deliveries, is disrupting the plan for the production of special armored cars for the shipment of explosives. To this day the USSR Ministry of Railroads has failed to create a system which meets modern requirements for keeping track of cars loaded with explosives.

The commission warned USSR Ministers Comrades B.M. Belousov, M.I. Shchadov, S.V. Kolpakov, and N.S. Konarev of their responsibility for the occurrence of emergency situations connected with the violation of existing safety requirements during work with explosive materials. The commission approved the comprehensive state program elaborated by the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry with the participation of ministries and departments involved for the period through 2000 for the development of the use, in blasting work, of the simplest non-TNT and water-containing explosives produced in the immediate vicinity of the consumer enterprises.

Specific measures have been outlined to resolve problems of safety in working with explosives.

The commission instructed the USSR ministries and departments concerned and the USSR State Committee for Standards to rework rules, standards, and other normative documents for the production, use, packaging, transportation, and storage of explosives with a view to bringing them into line with international norms.

Militia Colonel Provides Data on Crime

LD2007123990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0801 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] [Announcer] Today is Friday and that means that Colonel of the International Service Anatoliy Grigoryevich Anfertsev, a staff member of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and a regular consultant of ours, is taking part in our program. And so, what news of the past week's events are you going to give us today?

[Anfertsev] I would like to begin my answer to your question, Tatyana Nikolayevna, by saying that the results of the work of the internal affairs organs over the past six months were summed up at a press conference held on Monday at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. I will give just some of the more characteristic facts and figures.

During the first six months of this year our country's law enforcement bodies recorded more than 1,263,000 crimes, which is 160,000 more than during the corresponding period of last year. Of the total number of crimes, 731,000 involved property; 206,000 were serious; and 12,330 were of murder and attempted murder. During this period, 3,367 robberies with violence were carried out by criminals. Firearms were used in more than 3,000 crimes.

Crimes committed on the streets, squares, and parks are causing particular concern among the population today. The number of these has risen by 10 percent and amounted to 142,893. One in two of these was robbery without violence: one in three was robbery with violence; and almost one in nine a killing. In general, they are committed by individuals who have previous convictions and also by juveniles and young people. One in three cases of street crime is committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

During this half year 156,000 thefts of state or public property have been committed. Out of the 408,000 thefts of citizens' personal property, one in three was theft from apartments. As far as the economy is concerned, 152,000 crimes were carried out, of which more than 30,000 were cases of speculation and about 3,000 were of bribery. Proceedings under the criminal code have been taken against about 10,000 citizens for speculation: more than 2,000 of them for speculation involving large and particularly large amounts.

The average rate of growth in the crime rate for the country as a whole has fallen by 14.6 per cent. But this positive development is practically swallowed up by the great residue of crimes that have not been brought to light.

In the past few days more than 100 particularly dangerous crimes have been committed in different parts of the country. They include about 20 murders, 42 cases of robbery with violence committed in citizens' apartments and personal motor vehicles and more than 10 major thefts.

Computers with a total value of R100,000 have been stolen in Kazan and in Kalinin.

Fires have become more frequent and have led to the loss of property worth more than R1 million.

And there has been yet another attempt to hijack an aircraft.

The situation in the Osh oblast of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic has been aggravated: mass meetings and clashes and fighting between Uzbeks and Kirghizians is continuing: more than 100 people have been the victims of this. In this situation the only restraining force are the workers of the internal affairs bodies who have also suffered casualties.

But I would like to conclude my regular contribution by telling you briefly about some successful work by staff of the Moscow militia who discovered, arrested, and exposed some particularly dangerous criminals. At the

end of last year staff of the criminal investigation department of Moscow city established the existence of eight criminal groups that were structurally linked with each other and which were coordinating joint actions in committing serious crime. Experienced staff—Militia Major Mikhail Vasilyevich Karpenko and Militia Captain Yuriy Afanasyevich Laktenov—were included in the operations investigation group. Without regard to their own personal time and despite the danger and the threat of working with the category of criminal, they exposed and arrested the leader, the most active members of the leadership, and more than 70 members of the groups. Those arrested were unmasked as being responsible for carrying out 67 crimes, including three murders, 16 robberies with violence, 27 thefts, and three robberies without violence. Cash and valuables worth a total of more than R400,000 were confiscated from them, together with 12 motor cars, two of which were of foreign manufacture, five firearms and twelve other weapons, many cartridges and gas guns. The elimination of this organized criminal fraternity was possible thanks to the high level of professionalism, the initiative, and the persistence of Militia Major Karpenko and Militia Captain Laktenov.

Investigation of this criminal case, which runs into 46 volumes, has now been completed. Mikhail Vasilyevich and Yuriy Afanasyevich have been recommended for high awards—Orders for Personal Courage—for this selfless labor.

Resettlement of Ethnic Refugees Discussed

90UN2358B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 28, 14-20 Jul 90 pp 6-7

[Article by G. Valyuzhenich: "The Refugees Are Waiting"]

[Text] There are at present 600,000 refugees in the Soviet Union. This is the number of citizens "who have been forced to leave the places of their permanent residence" which has been officially registered by the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems], the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, and the Ministry of Defense.

Three stages may be discerned in the process of refugee migration. The first occurred in the winter of 1988-1989. Migrations mainly proceeded from Armenia to Azerbaijan and in the opposite direction. Altogether about 420,000 people migrated.

The second stage occurred in the summer of 1989. About 63,000 Meskhetian Turks left Uzbekistan; many of them settled in Azerbaijan. About 9,000 representatives of the peoples of North Caucasus left Kazakhstan.

The third stage occurred in January 1990, when about 100,000 people left Baku, including approximately 75,000 members of the Russian-speaking populace (48,000 of them were members of the families of servicemen).

Where were they put up? According to official data, about 236,000 of them are in Armenia, 191,000 in Azerbaijan, about 117,000 in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], 17,000 in the Ukraine, 2,700 in Kazakhstan, and 2,000 in Belorussia.

As of the time of registration, approximately 60,000 people were put up in Moscow, including 40,700 civilian population (or 17,500 families), the rest being families of servicemen. Out of these, 7,700 are Russian families (18,000 people), 6,900 are Armenian families (14,900 people), and 2,900 are mixed families (7,800 people). At present, 9,500 civilians remain.

At present, about 2,900 people live in so-called "health-maintenance" facilities in the vicinity of Moscow (recreation centers, sanatoriums, preventive treatment facilities, and pioneer camps). Food and services for them are provided free of charge, based on the quota of six rubles per day per person. The USSR Government has assumed responsibility for expenditures entailed by maintaining and feeding the refugees staying in Moscow and in the vicinity of Moscow.

About 300 refugees lived for almost half a year on the stairs and in the hallways of the office of the permanent representative of Armenia.

More than 2,000 refugees are accommodated in Moscow hotels, and the rest live in private apartments, with relatives and friends.

Is Everything Unequivocal?

Having visited one of the hotels, Vostok, I found out that people have been living here for a year now, and some even longer. They do not pay to stay in the hotel; their rooms have maid service.

I came to one of the rooms where a young couple with three children lives. How do they maintain themselves, and with what? It turned out that throughout this long period of time the head of the household has not worked or moonlighted anywhere. You would understand that aid provided by the state and the charity foundation, 50 rubles [R] per child, does not solve the problem... How can they be passive under the circumstances? Is this the infantile approach of the young? Is this the lasting state of confusion? However, there are three children in the family... I went to another room; the married couple there was older, but the situation was the same—they do not work anywhere... To be sure, some people explained that their relatives who stayed behind help; others, that in anticipation of the Baku events they had left ahead of time, having managed to sell some assets, cars, and having taken along their savings...

However, these explanations did not dispell doubts—at least my doubts—about the possibility of living for a year without working, all the more so because, as the management of the hotel told me, the enterprises and plants located nearby are offering work.

Some of the refugees work in cooperatives.

For many of these people, life has stopped... while justice is awaited. What way out of the existing situation do they see themselves?

Clustered resettlement in a large city with accustomed (or at least approximately the same) climatic conditions.

Meanwhile, remote northern, mainly rural, areas or small provincial cities are offered which are able to accept only a few families each. The people do not want to go there. Well, on the one hand, it is understandable.

However, on the other hand an extreme situation has developed which calls for some compromise solutions. It may be better to have temporary accommodations and jobs where they are offered rather than live on a staircase landing of the office of the permanent representative or in a hotel and have no job.

How Is the Problem Being Solved

Forty-six headquarters were set up at the USSR Council of Ministers and Union ministries and departments with a view to placing the refugees in jobs and putting them up, and 24 headquarters were created at the RSFSR Council of Ministers and republic departments.

As I was told at the Migration and Resettlement Administration, virtually all families have been offered places to live and work. Seven thousand people have accepted these offers.

Three thousand people have left Moscow for Armenia. According to the data of the USSR Goskomtrud Migration and Resettlement Administration, 20,000 went back to Azerbaijan, of whom 15,000 within a short period of time, without even receiving a grant in Moscow, and 5,000 Russian speakers recently.

On 7 April 1990, a Council of Ministers decree was issued obligating the Councils of Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as a number of state departments, to work out a government program to aid the refugees. For now, only general provisions have been worked out.

The payment of damages for dwellings and personal effects is envisaged (compensation for dwellings will be paid only if a written statement on giving up one's previous dwelling is submitted). It is expected that R210 will be paid for one square meter, up to 16 square meters per person in the state housing stock. As far as personally owned houses are concerned, no limit has been set. Compensation for household effects will be paid at the rate of R1,200 for single citizens, R2,000 for families of two, and R500 for every additional family member.

The total sum of payments for housing and assets should amount to no less than R7,000. However, as I have already said, these are general provisions. Perhaps procedures for accounting and payments should give citizens the right to prove that even greater amounts of compensation are in order.

In line with the fact that the departure of residents from the Armenian and Azeri republics was caused by unlawful acts committed in these republics, **compensation for losses inflicted on the citizens will be made from the budgets of these republics.** In conjunction with this, the USSR Ministry of Finance has been given the right to issue interest-free loans to these republics. For example, the government of Azerbaijan has calculated that it will need R2.5 billion in order to solve the problems of refugees who are present in the republic. (Approximate expenditures of the state for paying financial damages, one-time aid-grants, and maintenance and food service to the refugees free of charge will come to R1.063 million. Besides, R6.5 billion will be additionally required over the five-year plan for their resettlement—housing construction, creation of new jobs, and other measures).

At present, the feeling of uncertainty is the most frightening thing for the refugees. It is extremely important to officially adopt the status of refugees, the draft of which has been worked out by the USSR Goskomtrud and submitted to the government for consideration. The official status which the refugees anxiously await will make it possible to determine the mutual rights and responsibilities of both the refugees and the management organs.

We believe that, in anticipation of forced migrations from other republics (there are grounds for this: A tremendous stream of petitions from the residents of the Baltic republics and Tajikistan with requests to accept them is reaching the USSR Goskomtrud), it would be expedient to organize a Migration Service in our country, which would assume responsibility for setting up centers for accommodating the refugees temporarily and many other organizational issues.

Economic

Ryzhkov Gives Television Address 20 Jul

LD2007174890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Television address by Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in a program captioned "In the USSR Government"; time not given —live or recorded]

[Text] Good evening, esteemed comrades: Starting today television is introducing a new slot: "In the USSR Government." This will provide the opportunity, two or three times a week, to acquaint our television viewers, and to acquaint the whole of our people, with the government's work, to familiarize them with those questions under discussion by the USSR Government and with decisions being made accordingly. We also intend to acquaint you with the problems bothering us and on which we need to consult you.

In recent months the life of the country has been saturated, as you know, with very big political events, namely the Third USSR People's Deputies Congress, Union republics' supreme soviets congresses and sessions, the Communist Party of Russia constituent congress, and—as the culmination of political life—the 28th CPSU Congress.

In my view, the time has now come to get down to practical matters for implementing the decisions which were enunciated and adopted at those congresses. In the course of the acute debates now in full swing in the country and those which have been going on over recent months, a range of problems that concern us and bother our people has taken shape, and it is evidently possible now to draw conclusions about what matters require special attention.

To talk about the government, the government's work, I would say that there is a dual task here. The first task now confronting us is the question of preparing a government program for the development of economic reform and the transition to market relations. There is no need for me to talk about the government's concept—we put this forward for Supreme Soviet discussion. Neither is there a need for me to talk about the popular reaction to this concept.

Our present task is to examine very attentively all the proposals coming in, all the alternative proposals on one issue or another, in order that precisely those problems, and what is most important, their correct solution, should be reflected in the program that we have to submit to the Supreme Soviet in September. At the present time we are busy with this issue every day. We have involved all the Union republics in solving these problems. We are consulting them as far as possible, drawing them into this work. We are also drawing into this work representatives of our public economic organizations like the Cooperative Workers' Union, the Lease-Contractors Union, the Peasants' Alliance, and a number of other powerful organizations which are working out their own definite positions and naturally we have to know their views.

Each time we examine one problem or another in our future program we always come up against two issues. The first is how to find some kind of new efficient management methods which would improve the situation in the country's economy, and correspondingly, our people's well-being. And the second thing is that every time, when adopting or outlining the solution to one problem or another, we always think of how to protect the people, what we can do to ensure that there should be great social protection, especially for the low paid, students, pensioners, invalids, large families, and those toilers who have strictly fixed incomes.

The second part of government work takes account of the fact that the country is a living thing. It cannot stop for a single moment, not for a single instant. That is, every day even more new issues come up which must be resolved, and the government, of course, finds itself in the very thick of all these things.

Of all the problems that we are coming up against, that worry us, and to which I would like to draw special attention, in the first place today I would put the issue of agriculture. In my opinion, the most crucial moment has come in our country's life at the present time when we should concentrate every effort on gathering in the harvest. Today it is difficult to make definite forecasts as to what kind of harvest it will be, but it is quite obvious that it will not be a bad one. It will be better than the last few years and, therefore, the task is precisely that of gathering in that harvest and then, correspondingly, we shall create the relevant preconditions to provide our people with foodstuffs.

The government is keeping under scrutiny all matters connected with the harvesting. We realize that there are very many problems there, but we are making decisions. Recently a decision was even adopted to withold a proportion of oil exports in order to refine it and obtain fuel for our agriculture. We are sending in goods vehicles for the Defense Ministry to bring in the harvest. Additional decisions have also been adopted on directing equipment for use in agriculture. I would like to appeal to all enterprises, to industry, to the transport system, and to all townspeople. Our peasants need to be helped today. They are in the front line. The way in which the country is going to develop next year will in large measure depend on them. I am alarmed by one matter. The harvesting has now gotten under way. At the same time, grain procurement for state stocks is proceeding very slowly. To date, only about 10 percent has been brought in. State resources, above all, provide bread and grain products for the whole of our country's population. In addition, a large amount of compound feed is channelled from state resources to support stock-farming. Thus, if we bring in a sufficiently large quantity of grain, we can then tackle these matters. And I hope that a breakthrough will occur here and that we will be able to sort out this matter.

I would like to dwell on another burning issue, as I would call it, a burning problem, about which the Council of Ministers is receiving numerous complaints and letters. I refer to the situation on our western borders. The point is that in 1988 we established simplified border crossing procedures, and we believe this to be a positive phenomenon. We gave people an opportunity to have more contacts with one other. But alongside the positive factors, recently, particularly recently, strong negative phenomena have started to develop. The point is that speculation has become very widespread on the western borders. Taking advantage of the fact that there is a very great difference between prices in our country and the prices in adjacent states, dishonest people, speculators, and smugglers are taking out a very large number of goods, consumer goods. The markets are being stripped bare of goods. And you will know what the situation in the country is today with regard to the manufacture of consumer goods and the consumer market. And this is

making the situation worse and worse. I would like to mention just a few figures to enable you to properly assess the decisions I will tell you about in a moment.

Here I have received a report from the Main Customs Directorate. In a single 24-hour period alone at the Mostiska customs [on Ukrainian-Polish border], more than 6,000 electric domestic appliances, including 52 television sets, 144 washing machines, 12 refrigerators, over 300 sets of metal-worker's tools, and 150 sewing machines were impounded. In just 24 hours about 3,000 liters of vodka, over 600 kg of tomato paste, over 300 kg of halva, over 200 kg of chocolate, and almost half a tonne of washing powder were also impounded. That happened just at one customs post alone in a mere 24 hours.

Previously the government adopted a decision restricting the export of consumer goods but, regrettably, the desired effect has not been achieved. Therefore, yesterday I signed a Council of Ministers decision on temporarily suspending the validity of the Council of Ministers September 1988 decision so as to normalize the situation on the western borders. We believe that this measure will be temporary, but it is necesary because if we fail to adopt this decision now we may have to face an uncontrollable situation on the western border. Therefore, I would like to ask you to treat this issue with understanding so as to enable us over a certain period of time to properly organize our border crossings and to provide technical equipment, and to ensure normal contacts between people as envisaged by all the decisions we have adopted.

There is another problem on which I would also like to dwell on today. We are very seriously concerned about the question of wages of some categories of employees in the spheres of health care, social security, education, and culture. The fact is that for many years this category of people have been doing, I would say, a tremendous amount of essential work for this country. They are heroically devoted people, and they have turned out to be in a much worse material position than those who work in the material sphere of production. But culture workers alone, let us say, a certain category of culture workers, have a pay level at present which is 60 percent of that of the workers in the sphere of material production. We have carefully considered this issue and today I have signed a decision which envisages the introduction of new wage rates and salary scales for this category of workers from 1 January 1991—not 1992-1994 as previously envisaged in the appropriate decisions.

Our situation is complicated. Our country's economic and financial position is complicated but we consider that we must implement this step because we must provide social protection for these people. So that you can get an idea of who is affected by this, I would like to say that this decision will make it possible from 1 January 1991, to make improved material provision for about 7 million people, including 2.6 million health service workers, 1 million culture workers, and 2.7 million national education workers. Does this mean that everything has been done to improve the material position of those working in these spheres? I think not. This is just one step. I think that we will always be indebted to these people. And our task, as we gradually improve the economic position in our state, is always to remember this category of people.

Those are the main questions which I wished to dwell upon today. I hope that other government members will take part in future programs and that they will inform our people about decisions which are being made. I also hope that we will receive appropriate feedback, that we will be asked questions, that proposals will be made which we, of course, should examine very carefully; examine, discuss, and make decisions, or else see to it that they are reflected in our daily life.

Many thanks. All the best.

Gosbank Chairman Interviewed on Commercial Banks

PM2007142190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Gosbank Board Chairman V. Gerashchenko by L. Makarevich; place and date not given; under "Commercial Banks" rubric: "The Way To Improve the Health of the Ruble?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The perestroyka of the economic mechanism has affected the banking system too. What are the relations between the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] and the family of specialized and new commercial cooperative banks and their associations? What problems are they running up against? This is the theme of the conversation with USSR Gosbank Board Chairman V. Gerashchenko.

[Makarevich] Viktor Vladimirovich, I will start with a report that caused a sensation among bank workers: The credit bank of the "Butek" concern obtained from the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity [Vneshekonombank] a general license to carry out foreign economic activity. Is this not the first step toward reviewing the Vneshekonombank's monopoly?

[Gerashchenko] In our huge country, in conditions where foreign economic activity is being decentralized, the Vneshekonombank alone is simply unable to cover the entire system of international banking transactions. Other banks must also be involved in these operations. For instance, specialized banks were supposed to have done this a year or two ago now, especially in transactions within CEMA in transfer rubles.

The problem lies elsewhere. When the question of issuing a general license is being resolved, the fact that foreign banks have a limit on the funds that can be provided to their agents should be taken into consideration, including agents in the USSR. Since this agent in our country was always the Vneshekonombank, then its limit was always the limit on the state as a whole. So even

if more participants in international transactions emerge in our country, this limit will not increase. It will simply be divided into more parts.

Of course, our commercial banks' international links will expand. Additional opportunities will emerge to link up with new banks with which we worked insufficiently actively before. This is a far from simple process, but this work must be begun sooner or later, and as a first step "Butek" was granted the right to carry out these operations. Incidentally, the Vneshekonombank has already issued individual permits of this sort before, so this is not the only case.

[Makarevich] Why are these cases so rare?

[Gerashchenko] There are many reasons. Unfortunately, sometimes the managers of commercial banks embark on operations which are not only open speculation but also a violation of currency laws. In addition, they do not record these operations in their balance sheets which is regarded as a criminal offense in the West. Often mistakes are made through inexperience, insufficient skill, or excessive haste in starting up new operations.

Therefore we hope that in the future commercial banks will be more circumspect and more responsible.

[Makarevich] A number of commercial banks, for example the Interbank Association To Promote Scientific and Technical Progress, already have skilled cadres, a high level of automation of banking operations, and wide contacts abroad. What more must they do in order to get a general license? Must they obtain the agreement of Western bankers to establish an agent relationship?

[Gerashchenko] This is also an important condition. When foreign banks see that an attractive trade deal lies behind the wish to establish an agent relationship, they take such a step. Although in all cases they always ask both us and the Vneshekonombank what we think about the commercial bank in question and its managers.

Everything depends on experience. Opening an agent's account abroad and then conducting banking transactions are only the first stage, the litmus test that shows the foreign partner whether he can work with a commercial bank and how efficiently and skillfully it carries out the simplest operations.

[Makarevich] When will the USSR Gosbank take the place of the Vneshekonombank in issuing such licenses?

[Gerashchenko] When the new banking legislation comes into force—we hope this will be in the fall—we will begin this kind of work.

[Makarevich] What specifically methodological assistance is the Gosbank prepared to offer to general license holders?

[Gerashchenko] All-encompassing assistance. After all, our function is not just to monitor and deal out punches and canings right, left, and center. Like any central bank, we have an interest in ensuring that financiers' qualifications constantly improve. Various courses are now organized under the auspices of the Vneshekonombank. Foreign banks are also willing to take trainees from the USSR. Sometimes even free of charge. The problem lies elsewhere: To go abroad when you know nothing, not even the language, is simply a waste of time.

[Makarevich] The difficulties that commercial banks are running into are increasingly marked—their unequal position compared with specialized banks, and taxation of up to 70 to 80 percent which is one of the highest rates in the world. Is it not time to give equal rights to commercial and state banks? After all, whereas the latter receive guaranteed resources virtually for nothing, the former get them only in return for a sizable payment and without any privileges.

[Gerashchenko] Well, nobody gets money for nothing from us. Even the budget pays interest when it comes to borrowing, although of course the interest rates are extremely low. Owing to the lamentable state of a number of sectors of our economy, some of them are supported by state subsidies. It is simply ridiculous that the average interest rate on short-term credits is 2.5 percent and that on long-term credits is only 0.8 percent.

[Makarevich] But this credit dumping is often to the detriment of the whole economy! Is it not time for the state to increase the payment for the funds it provides so as to increase the responsibility of borrowers?

[Gerashchenko] Agreed. In the existing system of distributing financial funds and resources in our country, credit has never been credit.

[Makarevich] In other words it has been unlimited-duration free finance....

[Gerashchenko] Correct. Though to some extent the interest rate helped the bank to cover its expenses with a small differentiation depending on the form of credit and the financial status of the borrower. Before, interest policy could not be otherwise because each sector of the economy, including enterprises in a given sector, enjoyed completely different starting conditions. The point is not that there is something the banks do not understand, or that there are only bad enterprises, or the Ministry of Finance is so greedy. It all hinges on the general state of the national economy.

[Makarevich] There is a fixed "ceiling" on the interest levied by commercial banks, and they cannot take more than that. On venture (risk) enterprises and innovatory programs, this ceiling is quite low and does not compensate for the risk taken by the creditor in financing the project. Don't you think that more freedom should be given to those who are genuinely taking a risk?

[Gerashchenko] My short answer is—yes. But of course the rates are indicated approximately. The base interest rate cannot be rigidly fixed under commodity-money market relations. Only if a client has concluded an

agreement with a bank to take out credit for five years at a definite rate can the rate not be altered. The rest is the risk of the bank and its client. Because of this, central banks are sometimes forced to change their base rate almost every month. As yet we are not in the sort of economic shape for this need to arise overnight.

In my view, the upper limit of interest rates should scarcely be restricted. If someone is willing to pay the bank a higher rate it means that either he has a high level of efficiency or his need for credit is very strong. It is matter for the client and the creditor.

[Makarevich] Summing up, can it be said that the banking system that exists in our country now is capable of serving as a reliable source of support in the transition to the market economy?

[Gerashchenko] On the whole the current banking system in the USSR is appropriate to the level of its customers. The banks are capable of coping with the difficulties which arise. We have only to hold them less by the hand.

Aganbegyan Speaks on Market Relations Commission

LD2007203490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] Today a press conference was held in Moscow by the independent commission to assess alternative variants of the transition to a market economy. The commission, set up by the country's government in keeping with the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, is made up of well-known scientists, heads of large enterprises, and representatives of government bodies. Academician Aganbegyan, chairman of the commission, reported to journalists that in the next two weeks more than 20 proposals will be examined relating either to the transition to a market as a whole, or individual aspects of that extremely complicated process.

The results of this study will formulate the commission's report, which will be presented to the USSR Council of Ministers in the middle of August. But even now one can say, Academician Aganbegyan noted, that a somewhat different approach is taking place in the commission than in the government program toward solving such problems as a normalization of the consumer market, and of conducting a price formation reform. The commission intends to pay particular attention to such a complicated and painful issue as cooperation between the Union and the republic in a regulated market economy. The task of our commission, its chairman said in conclusion, is not to criticize the government program, but to work out the most rational and acceptable ways of making the transition to what are for us the new economic realities of a market economy.

Leaseholders Union Outlines Privatization Plan

LD2007220790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs of the USSR has put forward its first initiative. A press conference ended in Moscow today after giving a first reading to a draft law on leaseholding and buy-outs of state property in the Russian Federation. [passage omitted]

The first article of the law states that it is aimed at denationalization of the economy, that is, it is to promote a process without which it will be impossible to switch to a market economy. Here are three complementary points of view on one and the same issue:

[Begin recording] [P.G. Bunich, president of the Union of Leaseholders] We envisage not only buy-outs but direct denationalization and private property. We are now working on the principles of what can be handed over directly to people who have already earned it by 30 or 40 years of work. That's the main thing.

[A.V. Orlov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Commission on Economic Reform] I think it's possible to privatize 50 percent of state property in those industries and spheres that are now ready for it. But there are spheres—the retail sector, personal services and public catering, for instance—in which leaseholding might take a dominant position.

[Correspondent Khatayevich] How long would this take?

[Orlov] It has to be done as soon as possible.

[Bunich] I think it could be done over two years, and if it isn't done in two years we shall get nowhere at all.

[L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers] What we have to do now is to ensure that good Soviet entrepreneurs emerge who will develop their activities widely on the basis of the existing body of laws. We estimate that in perhaps five or eight years—it's hard to say now as we have no experience—state property in the country should account for around 40 percent and all other types of property should account for around 60 percent of the total value of production assets. [end recording]

New Association To Promote Economic Interests

LD2007170490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian in the "Vremya" newscast at 1430 GMT on 20 July carries a three-minute studio interview on the USSR's new taxation legislation with Candidate of Economic Science V.Balan who, together with USSR people's deputies Zhuravlev, Sulakshin, Samarin, and Volkov, has been elected co-chairmen of a new association to protect the economic interests of enterprises. Balan says this is

an independent organization functioning on a voluntary basis which aims to work closely with the legislature. He notes that the association will continue work on the problem of taxation and has already obtained permission from RSFSR Council of Ministers chairman Silayev to hold an international conference on the subject.

Balan says he was "surprised" by the stance of the Ministry of Finance and goes on: "Instead of getting down to serious work on this problem in accordance with the resolutions of Comrades Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, the Ministry of Finance is now taking steps which have nothing at all to do with seeking scientific truth; on the contrary, they are actions which...I can't even find the words to qualify them at the moment. They have responded quite differently from how the country's top leaders have asked them to."

Prokopyevsk Plant Becomes Joint-Stock Enterprise

PM2307080190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Report by N. Sokolova fromthe "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The Prokopyevsk automated mining equipment plant has become the first joint-stock enterprise in the Kuzbass.

[Sokolova] After working on the lease system for a year, the Prokopyevsk automated mining equipment plant increased its fixed capital by 4.5 million rubles [R]. But the lease represents only partial freedom and the plant collective used it as a springboard toward collective ownership. Today shares are being sold in the enterprise.

[G. Menovshchikova, leader of a team of lathe operators, identified by caption] I would buy R800 worth of shares. I think that this is a beneficial thing without risk of loss because it is profitable, and a worker effectively has a raise of the maximum six percent. For instance, during our present worktime, because all this money from the sale of shares—as I understood it—will be put into circulation, and we already make a profit now. [sentence as published]

[Sokolova] Nothing is left to chance here. The plant's director, USSR People's Deputy Viktor Mikhaylovich Ilin—has been working at the plant for 33 years now—he began as an apprentice electrical fitter. For a long time now he has been working out the details of the switch to collective ownership of the plant.

[Ilin] We will all obtain not R100, R200, or R500 each but R1,000 each, that's what we're expecting to get. And it is quite feasible that we may get R2,000 each. But it is also important for the plant to develop, and also as it develops, of course, to increase output as far as possible, which will ultimately make it possible to increase wages. Material incentives are important of course, at present probably most important of all, in my opinion without any doubt. Therefore since we lack funds for the development of the enterprise, we are issuing shares to the labor collective and collecting money from people, and putting it into circulation.

[Sokolova] A market economy begins with freedom for enterprises.

[Ilin] Today's government decision on a market economy, that is, the market which they have submitted for discussion by the Supreme Soviet, is in my opinion simply designed to pull wool over people's eyes, to cover the market economy with disgrace, and return once again to the command system.

Agricultural

Army Harvest Help Hampered by Driver Shortage

LD2107011990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1935 GMT on 19 July carries a 10-minute report by an unidentified correspondent on the use of Armed Forces personnel in this year's harvest. The correspondent, who is seen standing at a railway siding with a group of men most of whom are in military uniform, says: "Boundless ripening fields that promise an abundant harvest! There is only one concern now: to not lose the grain and to harvest it in good time. As ever, the Army has come to the aid of farm workers. The personnel of the virgin-lands battalions have already set up their camps and started work. Trainloads of equipment are arriving at the railway stations. Admittedly, the troops are annoyed that the railwaymen are failing to fulfill a government decision concerning the allocation of passenger cars. Personnel are transported in heated freight cars. There are a host of other problems.

"Let me introduce the participants in our discussion: Anatoliy Nikolayevich Kravchenko, deputy chairman of the Volgograd Oblast executive committee; Leutenant General Anton Konnovich Nadolskiy, chief of staff for the direction of virgin-land battalions of the Ministry of Defense; Colonel General Grigoriy Fedorovich Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; and Colonel General Vasiliy Fedorovich Popov, chief of the main motor vehicle directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

"The first question is to you Grigoriy Fedorovich. The latest trainload of vehicles has arrived for use in the harvest. What are the special features of the harvesting this year and the involvement of Armed Forces personnel in the harvest?"

Krivosheyev replies: "You know, there are what I would call special circumstances this year. It's not just that we've cut the Armed Forces, and the figure we have to date is already 3.9 million. But, it is also a fact that today the Armed Forces are to a large extent undermanned, particularly with regard to drivers. The Armed Forces are short of something on the order of 400,000 people.

So it is difficult to form the virgin-land battalions. We have 60 of them this year. The Soviet Government has decided to take the following course of action: first: to call up reservist drivers from the regions and oblasts where the virgin-land battalions are going to be working. I would say that this is something new. In past years we formed battalions in the actual military districts, and that is where people were called up. But, they went out to work in areas which of course had no connection with the oblasts from where we called them. But, I would say that drivers are responding to the call-up very, very unwillingly. One could cite a number of examples, including Volgograd oblast where we now are. They agreed to call up drivers. Incidentally, 10 battalions are coming to Volgograd oblast, which is something on the order of 5,000 vehicles, and we have to call up around 6,000 drivers in Volgograd Oblast, I think. And now they are intending mainly to supply drivers without a license, or whose licenses have been withdrawn, whose licenses were withdrawn for drinking or for some sort of road traffic contraventions. They will also be working poorly with us. A total of 4,500 drivers are in cars, and 50 percent of the vehicles can safely be parked, and the drivers sent to help with the harvest."

Kravchenko then says that even people without a license will do the job properly. Popov says the Army can't use people without a license. The discussion participants then talk about the importance of safety and good conditions for members of the battalions.

Gossnab Discusses Poor Preparation for Harvest

LD2007164490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] At the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab) there was a session today of the all-Union operational headquarters of material and technical provision of the harvesting campaign.

It was noted that the rates of the harvest and haymaking obviously are inadequate to bring in the harvest in good time and without losses.

Throughout the country as a whole, over 120,000 grain harvesters are not repaired and are not taking part in the work. There are particularly a great deal of them standing idle waiting for repairs in the Non-Chernozem Zone of the RSFSR, in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Estonia. Over 40,000 tractor choppers, many rakes, pickup balers, and forage combine harvesters are standing idle.

The lowest level of the state of readiness of machinery for the production of fodder is in the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The situation concerning the supply of new equipment and spare parts remains a cause for concern. Volgograd, Kharkov, and Pavlodar and other factories of the Ministries of Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Machine-Building owe the countryside thousands of tractors. That major sector of the national economy has not delivered to the countryside many motor vehicles and harvesting machines. It is sad to see the new combine harvesters the DON-1, 500, and NIVA unequipped with reaping machines. There are around 2,300 of the powerful and expensive machines in the agro-industrial complex now. Many workers in the defense industry and some collectives of metallurgical enterprises do not wish to meet halfway the requirements of the peasantry.

At the session of the all-Union headquarters, debtors from the Ministry of Timber Industry and other departments also were listed.

As before, alarm signals are arriving around the clock in the working groups of the USSR Gossnab on the shortage of gasoline and diesel fuel. Motor vehicles and combine harvesters transporting the harvest are refuelled, as the saying goes, "on the go". And that leads to equipment standing idle, and that means loss of output.

The headquarters are taking energetic measures in order to save the harvest in the situation which has evolved.

Imports Clog Ports as Farms Lack Transport

PM2007113790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jul 90 Morning Edition p

[Article by V. Gavrichkin under the rubric "Topical Subject": "Worse Than a Natural Disaster. We Are Losing the Harvest Through the Incompetence of Certain Officials and Whole Departments"]

[Text] The Kuban today is like a huge ship filled to the gunwales with grain. The harvest has been excellent: 200,000 tonnes of grain is arriving at reception centers every day. Many elevators are full. In such circumstances grain is usually taken to other places outside of the local area—in short, to where there is available storage capacity. Grain-carrying cars are needed to do this, but there is a catastrophic shortage of them. Where are they?

The comparison of the Kuban to a ship full of grain was no accident but an analogy with real ships. It turns out, as A. Dergachev, IZVESTIYA correspondent for Krasnodar Kray, reported, that at the precise time when the Kuban is being suffocated by its own grain, ships full of foreign corn are waiting to be unloaded one after another at the port of Novorossiysk. In order to avoid fines—and in foreign currency—300 to 350 railcars are used to unload the corn every 24 hours. This is half of the car fleet allocated to transport Kuban wheat! I recall that it was the same story last year as well.

"Yes, foreign grain is always shipped in in July—at the very height of the harvest," A. Ugryumov, chief of the Krasnodar Kray Grain Products Administration. "Yet in April and May we simply couldn't find this corn—which is needed for mixed feed—for love nor money. Who is organizing grain imports so ridiculously? I think

that it is 'Eksportkhleb,' not without the help of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Procurements."

Our correspondent has just visited Novokubanskiy Rayon where he saw rural airstrips and garages—stripped of their equipment—piled high with wheat. Anything was used provided it had a hard surface. Some people do not even have time for this: Alongside the overflowing threshing floors they mark out plots of land and just dump the amber grain on it. It is ironic that in the "Armavir corridor" region, notorious for its desiccating winds, 62 quintals per hectare of winter barley has been harvested and 50 quintals per hectare of winter wheat, while the fields of the "Voskhod" Stud Farm—which have been sown with new varieties—have produced 80 quintals on average. The rayon does not have its own elevator, so the grain is transported some 80 to 100 km to neighboring areas where it can only be received at night since by day the elevators serve only "their own" farms.

Such disruption is not only occurring in the Kuban. For instance, a warning has come from Moldavia where the harvest is also good but where winter barley and wheat have lodged in many fields: There are shortages of grain augers, variable-speed drives, cutterbars, and many other things that are vitally necessary at harvest time. Farms in Ryshkanskiy Rayon went short of 300 tonnes of gasoline and 90 tonnes of diesel oil for their stocks in the first half of the year. It is the same story in neighboring rayons. Storage facilities at many of the republic's bulk plants are empty.

Why are ships carrying imported grain arriving in our ports at the very height of the harvest, and why are there always enough railcars for that grain? Why is the fuel situation so difficult in fields everywhere? "Does it mean we value foreign harvests more than our own?" crop farmers are asking.

I do not know the answer to that question. Just as, incidentally, I do not know whether the valves in the pipelines pumping fuel for export have been closed, and if so how tightly. But I can understand the logic of the actions of the people making the decisions. Ordinary chartered vessels in our ports can incur a large foreign-currency fine. While the oil products flowing abroad earn foreign currency.

If this is indeed the case, it turns out that our crop farmers are right: We value foreign grain more in both the direct and figurative sense. Basic calculations show that we are suffering such losses in our own fields that no foreign exchange earned from oil sales will be able to make up what we lose in buying in products from abroad. What we are doing ought to be clear to everybody.

Yet many other departments apart from those already mentioned are, one way or another, responsible for the fate of the harvest, for instance the ministries of rail, road, river, and maritime transport; motor and agricultural machine building; the petroleum industry; petroleum supply; procurement workers; and processing workers—the list is endless. Each individual department undertakes something and if their efforts are assessed on the basis of overall results.... You get the impression that for us harvests are worse than a natural disaster.

...The Kuban continues to resemble a ship filled to the gunwales with grain. Let's hope we don't sink it.

Scientific

'Cosmos-2086' Earth Satellite Launched 21 Jul

LD2107084590 Moscow TASS in English 0842 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 21 TASS—The Soviet Union launched, using the Sovuz booster-rocket, the Cosmos-2086 earth satellite on Friday.

The satelite carries scientific equipment designed to continue space exploration.

The satellite was put into an orbit with the following parameters:

—initial period of revolution—88.7 minutes
—maximum distance from the earth's surface (apogee)—258 kilometers
—minimum distance from the earth's surface (perigee)—191 kilometers
—orbit inclination—82.3 degrees.

In addition to the scientific equipment, the satellite carries a radio system for high-precision measurements of orbit parameters and radio-telemetric equipment to transmit information about the functioning of on-board system.

The equipment installed on board the satellite is functioning normally.

The coordinating-and-computer centre processes all incoming information.

Cosmonauts Encounter Difficulties on Spacewalk

LD2007213390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] And now a reportage from the Flight Control Center.

[Correspondent Petr Orlov] As not infrequently happens, the unexpected occurs when everything seems to have reached a happy conclusion. You will recall that last night on "Vremya" we promised that the cosmonauts would be back in the station by 10 o'clock. But that's not the way it worked out.

Having secured parts of the heat insulation—in other words, having done what was required—Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin got ready to return, although they had overrun their allotted time. They fastened on the tools and set off. And then they seem to have gotten a little confused. Today they joke about it.

[Begin Balandin recording] There are lots of hawsers and rails. You need road signs out there! [end recording]

[Orlov] Back to pictures taken late yesterday evening. At the Flight Control Center, when everyone gathers around one control panel like this you know something is going on. And indeed something was going on. The cosmonauts got back to the station but were unable to shut the hatch behind them. Meanwhile, the oxygen in the spacesuits was running out. Were the crew's lives in danger? Yes, they were. Instead of the recommended six hours, they had spent seven in the spacesuits. They could not risk any longer, and had to go to another pressurized compartment. This has never happened before, and the station's hatch is still open. One of the Mir complex's compartments now has a space vacuum. But the station is like a sea-going ship with its bulkheads, behind which one can hide. Today it doesn't seem so terrible.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified speaker] What's it like having an open door, then? Are the seats flying around?

[Balandin, laughing] The seats are securely fastened down. For the time being we will regard it as an open garage. But nobody can get at it... [end recording] [video shows cosmonauts working outside station; concerned officials gathered around control panel; cosmonauts joking from space]

[Orlov] Today, after an analysis, the main danger seems to be somewhere else. The tools left in space can hamper future work. To all appearances, the time limits of the expedition will not be altered. But it seems that for the time being, the main docking unit of the station can perform only undocking. To improve the situation—if this is the case—yet another spacewalk is most likely for the crew. Now this question is being discussed in the Flight Control Center and a decision is possibly due in the next few days.

New 'Mir' Space Crew Expedition Set for 1 Aug

LD2107135490 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] On 26 July another space walk is to be taken by cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin, who have been conducting research and experiments for more than five months aboard the orbital station Mir. The spacemen are to fully close the hatch of the decompression chamber. The hatch was left open after they had worked for seven hours on the external surface of the orbital complex on Tuesday [17 July]. And more from our reporter:

There is no air now in the decompression chamber, but experts believe this is no danger to the cosmonauts, who are now busy with routine work, experiments in biology, medicine, and astrophysics. They are preparing new equipment for smelting semiconductors. The flight of Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin is drawing to a close, and a new crew is getting ready to replace them with a launch scheduled for 1 August.

The commander of the new crew is a 40-year old Lieutenant Colonel Gennadiy Manakov. He is a first class Air Force pilot and a first class test pilot; he has flown 40 different types of aircraft. Although this is the first space flight for Gennadiy Manakov he is already a standby for the skipper of the crew that is to be shortly replaced in orbit.

For the flight engineer Gennadiy Strekalov this will be his fourth space flight. One would-be flight he was going to take part in nearly ended tragically. The rocket that was to have placed into orbit a spaceship with Strekalov and his crewmate Vladimir Titov exploded during launching, but the two spacemen managed to survive.

The new crew is to make a large amount of observations and experiments on the Mir complex. They are to take two spacewalks. At the end of their expedition they will meet in orbit a Soviet-Japanese crew, who are to launched in December. The flight of Soviet and Japanese spacemen will last eight days.

And now further plans. Two more international crews are to fly in space next year. In May, a British spaceman is to be placed into orbit, and in November, that's next year, an Austrian cosmonaut will fly in space. In 1992 there will be three more international expeditions with a West German cosmonaut to fly in March, a French spaceman to stay at the orbital station Mir in August and a Spanish cosmonaut in December that year.

Meanwhile the current manned flight it about to end. The situation during this flight by Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin has produced many rumors. Some media have claimed that the two spacemen were trapped in orbit, the idea being there was no spaceship for the two men to return to earth in. Rumors have it that there are holes in the spaceship, that it's breaking at the seams, that the temperature inside the orbital station Mir is dropping and air is escaping.

And here is what our reporter was told by the flight leader [word indistinct] Solovyev: We can now say with sufficient confidence that the fault in the spaceship won't affect the landing of the crew in any way, said the flight leader. The landing is scheduled for 9 August.

New Nuclear Icebreaker To Begin Trials

LD2207134190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 22 Jul 90

[Text] A new nuclear icebreaker Vaygach has been built at the Baltiyskiy works in Leningrad. Today tugboats led

it out of the Neva Harbor. This is the second nuclear icebreaker after Taymyr that is to work on the shallow routes of the polar regions, including the estuaries of major rivers. Its multipurpose nature widens the geography of the Arctic voyages and improves the efficiency of the fleet use. After trials the icebreaker will go to the port of registration—Murmansk, from where it will escort vessels on the Northern Sea route.

Military

Moiseyev Says Military Threat Still Persists

PM2107172190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jul 90 First Edition p 1

[Correspondent Colonel O. Nikonov report: "Along the Tracks of Renewal. From the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Party Aktiv Meeting"]

[Excerpts] A businesslike and constructive discussion of the results of, and the priority tasks outlined by the 28th CPSU Congress was held at a party aktiv meeting of the General Staff. [passage omitted]

Having gathered at a difficult time for our country and party, the 28th CPSU Congress was expected to provide answers to many questions posed by life, Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, said in his report to the meeting (he had attended the party congress as a delegate, and was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee). [passage omitted]

Subjecting the state of the military-political situation and its development prospects to a comprehensive analysis, the congress declared that as long as there are no guarantees of the irreversibility of the positive changes, the military threat to the USSR persists. In these circumstances the fulfillment of constitutional duties concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland and the strengthening and maintenance of the country's defense capability and security at the level of reliable and reasonable sufficiency has been and remains one of the most important tasks of the party and the state. [passage omitted]

Army Gen. M. Moiseyev gave an analysis of the military-political situation in the world, and described the state of affairs concerning various aspects of the General Staff's foreign policy activity, linking these assessments with the immediate prospects for communists' work in directorates and departments.

Unquestionably, he said, political decisions and accords largely determine the course of events, but they do not relieve us of the responsibility for the present-day state of the country's defense. We are military men and we must display realism, a well-considered approach, and restraint in our assessments. After all, a realistic view of the development of events indicates that after the withdrawal of our troops from a united Germany (and this is a foregone conclusion) the strategic position of our Armed Forces will become more complex.

To all intents and purposes, the NATO border will run along the Oder River, which forces us right now to implement all measures concerning defense within the borders of the USSR. And while NATO leaders are assigning the main role in the European security system to their alliance, and while there is talk of maintaining and strengthening NATO as a military-political organization, in addition incorporating a united Germany, we cannot take the view that the military danger to the USSR has disappeared. This view received the backing of the party congress. [passage omitted]

Shlyaga Interviewed on His New Post

PM2307081590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jul 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, member of the CPSU Central Committee and new chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, by correspondent Captain First Rank V. Lukashevich; place, date not given: "Political Organs: Time for Radical Renewal"]

[Text] [Lukashevich] Comrade Colonel General! First of all, I would like to congratulate you on behalf of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers on your appointment to a new high post. You became chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate right after the 28th party congress, of which you were a delegate. What, in your view, are the chief results of the congress' work, and how do you rate them?

[Shlyaga] Thank you. The congress made a very deep impression on me. Much is still ringing in my ears. Great analytical work lies ahead. It is necessary, as it were, to digest everything and pigeonhole it: here theoretical problems, next political problems, then ideological and organizational problems. The chief thing that the congress succeeded in doing, in my view, was to find approaches to the consolidation of different platforms, trends, and views, while the elections of the leading party organs showed all sections of our society that the party has firmly set a course of renewal, democratization, and perestroyka. And it will not turn from this path. The CPSU's ideological, theoretical, and political aims outlined by the congress have been taken by Army and Navy communists, party organizations, and political organs as a guide in their practical work. They are also supported by Armed Forces personnel.

[Lukashevich] A representative group of delegates from the Armed Forces was elected to the congress—270 people. In your opinion, did they justify the hopes which Army and Navy communists pinned on them?

[Shlyaga] Undoubtedly. Many of them came to the congress with interesting ideas, thoughts, and constructive suggestions. These were reflected in the congress documents. What about the fact that the congress

adopted the special resolution "On the Basic Guidelines of Party Military Policy at the Contemporary Stage"? This is the creation of Army and Navy delegates from start to finish. It was only at the last stage that a large group of delegates from republic communist parties was involved in its preparation. I believe that the resolution on the party's military policy opens up promising areas in the sphere of defense building in the country, and its recommendations will be reflected in the concept of military reform in the USSR and will give a new boost to the work of Army and Navy communists in defending the socialist homeland. I will point out, incidentally, that military questions have not been examined in such a thorough way at party congresses since the 11th party congress. So this is a significant step forward. And it is associated with the activity of delegates in military uniform at the congress.

[Lukashevich] The congress came out unequivocally against the depoliticization of the Army. At the same time it is pointed out that the radical perestroyka of the whole system of party political work in the USSR Armed Forces is one of the main areas of military reform. Could you say in greater detail what the structural reform in military political organs, including the Main Political Directorate, will consist of?

[Shlyaga] As a political system, the Soviet Army's political organs most fully combine within themselves both party functions and political administrative functions, correspond precisely to the military organization, ensure the unity of political and military leadership of all Army and Navy components from bottom to top, and strengthen one-man command. I will emphasize: The very structure of the political organs enshrines Lenin's idea that all organizations in the Armed Forces in peacetime should correspond structurally to wartime.

But life advances. The party is being renewed, transferring administrative, economic, and other functions to organs of soviet power. The new CPSU Statutes clearly record that all party organs are elected. And this means that the functions of political organs must also be delimited—into military political organs right up to the Main Political Directorate on the one hand. They must have state status. And into party organs on the other hand: from the regimental party committee to the supreme party organ of the Armed Forces—the All-Army Party Conference, which will elect the party committee.

Now about some of our plans. They were approved in principle by the 28th CPSU Congress delegates. We must reorganize the former institution of political organs step by step in a most considered manner and without excessive haste (it is a question of the destinies of many, many people) and form new military political organs: departments and directorates headed by the Main Political Directorate, with their leaders being granted the rights of first deputy (or deputy) commander (or chief) for political affairs at all levels.

It is proposed to preserve the institution of deputy commanders (chiefs) for political affairs at the company-regiment level and in military educational institutions.

The existing system for training political staff cadres will be revised, and the training plans and programs of military political schools and the V.I. Lenin Military Political Academy will be amended in accordance with the new tasks.

There are other plans, too. We await assistance in all these matters from the troops, from our scientists, sociologists, and psychologists, and from local party organs.

The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate is today elaborating the concept of new military political organs. A working group has been set up. I will emphasize once again: We do not intend to drag out the process, but nor will we accelerate it unrestrainedly. On these questions there must be much consultation with commanders, political organs, communists, and Army and Navy personnel. The said document will reach the troops and the fleets by the middle of August. The reader will regularly receive information on the work's progress in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Lukashevich] A new organizational structure of party organizations in the Armed Forces is proposed, their vertical subordination. How, in this connection, will cooperation between political organs and party organizations be arranged?

[Shlyaga] At the regimental (ship) level it is proposed to retain primary party organizations headed by committees (bureaus).

In large units, large strategic formations, and arms and branches of the Armed Forces elected party committees with the rights of a rayon, city, and oblast committee respectively are to be elected. In military educational institutions, in scientific research establishments, and at a whole number of Defense Ministry enterprises and organizations committees will be elected with the rights of a CPSU rayon committee.

As I have said already, it is proposed to elect the All-Army party committee at the All-Army party conference to guide party work in the USSR Armed Forces. Party control commissions operating on the basis of the corresponding regulation and the CPSU Statutes will be formed from the large unit upward at corresponding party conferences.

By analogy with the structure of party organs it would also be possible to transform the structure of the organs of Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations.

Great changes will occur in trade union work—a unified Army and Navy trade union center is being set up.

[Lukashevich] I understand that, together with the structural reorganization, the functional duties of political organs and party organizations in the Army and Navy

are to be defined more precisely. What do you see as the main areas of political work in the Armed Forces in accordance with the new tasks and the conditions for fulfilling them?

[Shlyaga] The renewed political organs—and the fundamental difference between them and the previous ones must be that they will drop the duties of leading party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations—must, in our view, preserve and develop the functions of political education, ideological work, culture, the strengthening of military discipline, political and military information both inside and outside the Army, leadership of the military press, and the organization of the work of the sociological and psychological services.

In a broad context we see as our priority the task of new political organs as organs for the social protection of servicemen and their family members, as well as officers, ensigns, those on extended military service, and those transferred to the reserve or into retirement.

The future political organs will work in close cooperation with people's soviets at the center and in the provinces and on parity principles with party and other sociopolitical organizations. The people must acquire more rights and opportunities to exercise control through their elected representatives over the way their sons serve, what they need, and how they can be helped.

In our view, the future party structure of the Armed Forces must infuse a new living spirit into the substance of party work in the Army and the Navy. The Army party organization is one of the largest combat detachments of our party, with more than 1.1 million communists in its ranks. We are counting in the future on the further development of the initiative and creativity of the party masses, the strengthening of primary party organizations, and the democratization of party life in every possible way.

Army and Navy party organizations will continue to act as generators of new ideas in developing Lenin's theory of war and the Army and will ensure, through communists, their influence on all the tremendous organizational work which has to be fulfilled in order to make our Armed Forces stronger, more reliable, and more modern.

[Lukashevich] Nikolay Ivanovich, what specifically does the switch to a multiparty system mean for the political leadership of the Armed Forces?

[Shlyaga] The possibility that exists of forming a multiparty system is today a visible sign of the democratization of Soviet society. However, the switch itself to it is not an act of a single moment but a process, and quite a lengthy one, too.

A multiparty system will not lead to the Army's depoliticization, meaning the abolition of political-ideological institutions. Their presence in our Army, as in other armies, including the NATO armies, is conditioned by the need to conduct political educational work with personnel and to shape their high morale. And as long as this task exists, the institutions designed to resolve it will exist in the Army.

As regards the functioning of party organizations in the Armed Forces under conditions of a multiparty system, different viewpoints on this exist. Some believe that only the ruling party must have the right to create its own organizations in the Army. Others delegate this right to all parties. Yet others champion the thesis of a nonparty Army. Time will show which of these viewpoints is closer to the truth. The majority of Army and Navy communists share the first viewpoint.

There is not yet a law on parties in the USSR. The Communist Party remains the only real political force, the most mass, organized force, and one which, moreover, enjoys absolute authority in the Army. The party stratum in the Armed Forces stands at more than 25 percent. The problem today consists in enhancing the work efficiency of its cells. The realization of the multiparty principle in the Army will hardly benefit its combat ability, organization, or discipline. A multiparty system means political rivalry. In the Army, whether we would like this or not, it means disorder and ideological instability.

[Lukashevich] And my last question, on a personal plane, so to speak. In our complex times did you make up your mind at once to take up this responsible post? How is your relationship with the Defense Ministry leadership and the directorate apparatus organized? In short, how do you feel in your new post?

[Shlyaga] The times really are complex. They are leaving their mark on the development not only of society but also of the Armed Forces. And all this is organically woven into the fabric of the process which people everywhere denote by the term "perestroyka." It has now reached the point where truly fundamental tasks are being resolved both in the sphere of politics and, in particular, in the sphere of economics. Profound transformations here are proceeding in a complex and contradictory way. And it probably cannot be otherwise, for the way to the stars, as is known, is a thorny one.

Therefore the realization of new approaches elicits an ambivalent reaction both in society and in the Army. But still, without running the risk of exaggeration, I can say confidently that our entire Army, from soldier to marshal, is convinced that there is no going back to the past. Progress is possible only by assimilating new forms in all spheres of social life. Changing together with society, the Army is being drawn deeper and deeper into the maelstrom of perestroyka processes. In the final analysis, its reformation must shape the Armed Forces' aspect adequate to the character and nature of humane, democratic socialism. This is seen as one of the chief aims of the military reform which we are implementing. And it is for this sake that we want to work well.

I greeted the offer of the post of chief of the Main Political Directorate with an anxious sense of the very great responsibility that now lies like a heavy burden on my shoulders.

V.I. Lenin once said of the Bolsheviks: "They did not repeat words learned by heart but took an attentive look at the new historic conditions, pondered why life had gone this way and not differently, worked with their head and not just their tongue...." And this, I believe, is precisely what commanders, political workers, all communists, and Army and Navy personnel expect from me. People await specific actions and deeds.

As for my relationship with the Defense Ministry leadership, it is taking shape, as it should, on a businesslike, comradely basis. The ancients used to say: You too will be measured by the yardstick you use. I will remember my duty, my obligations, and my responsibility.

[Lukashevich] Thank you, Nikolay Ivanovich, for the interview.

Baltic Republics

Prunskiene on Talks With USSR Leadership

LD2207141390 Moscow TASS in English 1358 GMT 22 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscilla]

[Text] Vilnius July 22 TASS—Commenting on the talks between a Lithuanian delegation and the Soviet leadershp that start next week, Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene said in a televised address on Saturday night: "I believe that it would be advantageous to us to begin and finish talks on securing the relation between the independent Lithuanian state and the Soviet Union before other republics start talks with the country's leadership about concrete types of their participation in the future Union treaty".

The head of the Lithuanian government told the public about the Friday session of the Presidential Council and the USSR Council of the Federation, which she had attended. She said that the draft Union treaty discussed at the session "is based on the principle of a differentiated approach to the competence with the Union and delegating competence from below, from republics to the Union". Prunskiene believes that "the signing of the Union treaty should not be forced. Each sovereign state, each republic can make a free choice and decide whether to sign the Union treaty or not".

Recalling her conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev after the session of the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation, Prunskiene said that the president spoke in favour of speeding up the forthcoming talks.

Talks May Start in August

AU2107161490 Paris AFP in English 1406 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 21 (AFP)—Negotiations with Moscow on Lithuania's bid for independence could start in early August, the Baltic republic's deputy parliamentary president Bronius Kuzmiskas told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE Saturday [21 July].

Conditions for the negotiations were discussed at a meeting Friday evening in Moscow between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Lithuanian Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene and himself, Mr. Kuzmiskas said in a telephone interview from Vilnius. Both sides expressed readiness to enter into negotiations, though the Lithuanian side still had much preparatory work to do, he added.

The meeting with Mr. Gorbachev followed a joint session of the Presidential Council and of the Council of the Federation—two presidential advisory bodies—which Mr. Kuzmiskas and Mrs. Prunskiene attended "as observers".

Lithuania, which declared unilateral independence from the Soviet Union on March 11, has since agreed to a 100-day moratorium on its independence declaration as of when negotiations begin with Moscow.

The joint session of the presidential councils was held to discuss transition to a market economy and reform of the country's treaty of Union. A number of "options" were discussed for reforming the Union, including conservative suggestions for "a strong centre and strong republics" and more radical plans for a union of "sovereign republics", Mr. Kuzmiskas said.

Moscow has expressed the wish to achieve a new Union treaty as soon as possible and has asked the Union's 15 republics to contribute with suggestions, he said. A number of autonomous republics were however now also asking to be included in the talks and demanding that they too should be party to any new treaty, he added.

Prunskiene on Moscow Meeting

LD2007215990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1900 GMT on 20 July carries an eight-minute telephone interview with Lithuanian Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene, speaking from Moscow, by an unidentified Vilnius radio correspondent on her "important meetings" in Moscow.

Prunskiene shares her impressions of her Moscow meetings noting: "A long meeting of the Presidential, as well as, the Federal Councils, took place." She notes the presence at the meeting of many "invited individuals." She added that she and Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Bronius Kuzmickas were at the discussion of many important topics, including that of the USSR's transition to a market economy and also, that of market relations among the republics. "We came to the conclusion that our market concept and our reform approaches may be even more realistic and more detached from the former USSR economic model."

She noted a new Union agreement and its possibilities were discussed during the second part of the meeting. The most important principles of such an agreement "would preclude pushing those republics" to delegate to the Union.

She explained that it became clear that the RSFSR does not intend to secede from the Union, but only wishes to augment its authority and the limits of its independence. She added that the Ukraine is also finishing its declaration, and it will become the basis for signing a Union agreement.

Prunskiene noted that interesting statements were made by Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and others. She added that Shevardnadze maintained an especially favorable stance. "He will now understand that breaking off relations with Lithuania—the blockade, was [word indistinct] not clever and that he is pleased that the matter is

proceeding toward dialogue. An agreement is necessary and negotiations should be started."

She stated that a break in the proceedings provided an opportunity to confer with Silayev regarding a meeting next week. "We will have to make a special trip to come to a meeting and they also have promised to come see us."

Prunskiene made reference to an "especially important encounter, namely, that between myself and Bronius Kuzmickas, after the conclusion of the meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev." She noted that he frequently interrupted her with many questions. She remarked: "He probably wished to use this means to clarify my position before the participants."

Answering the correspondent's questions on what was discussed with Gorbachev, she replied: "Well, you know, Lukyanov, that is, as you know, the Council of Nationalities chairman, began his report on the agreement by stating that several republics had not made a decision regarding the agreement and he named Lithuania as being among them. So, when I started to talk, I immediately began with the statement that Lukyanov is truly mistaken, since Lithuania has made its decision, they [words indistinct] their state independence and are now talking not about participating in an agreement with the Soviet Union. We will also enter into agreements with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, and finally, even with our actual economic partners within the Russian Federation." She added that Gorbachev asked her and Kuzmickas about the negotiation preparations, when they were planning to arrive, and he urged them to start as soon as possible. He gave them to understand that negotiations with other republics will also begin now. She said he told them not to wait, and to begin negotiations a soon as they are ready. She offered a very favorable evaluation of both meetings with Gorbachev and added that she and Kuzmickas were given to understand that there would not be any problems if some republics decided not to sign the agreement but to secede. She remarked: "Thus, we are talking about Lithuania's agreement with the Soviet Union and not a Soviet agreement regarding Lithuania."

Burokevicius on Lithuania's Political History

PM2007160790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with M.M. Burokevicius, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, by correspondent A. Petrushov; place and date not given: "The Path Toward Consensus"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Mikolas Martinovich Burokevicius has been a member of the CPSU since 1946, is one of the most senior historians in Lithuania, and headed the republic party organization at a difficult time, when the Lithuanian Communist Party split into two. M.M. Burokevicius entered the CPSU Central Committee at the 28th Congress and was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. What does he think of the forum that has just taken place? What do the decisions adopted by the congress mean for the Lithuanian communists? How will they influence the political situation in the republic? Our conversation began with Mikolas Martinovich answering these questions.

[Burokevicius] First of all, I am very glad that I was able to participate in the work of a truly historic CPSU congress. In the opinion of all our delegation, this was a forum of really realistically minded people, and a step toward the swift renewal of the party and its profound democratization and ideological and organizational unity. The strategy of the CPSU's activity was outlined and its tactics for the near future were worked out. The congress was able to consolidate the basic political forces that stand for humane and democratic socialism.

Of course, we still have to think about many things, unemotionally, and weigh up everything that happened in a sober way. We must interpret the congress results seriously. But my first impressions are actually optimistic and reassuring. This is what all the participants in the congress from the Lithuanian Communist Party believe.

You know that the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform today numbers around 40,000 communists. The section that left the CPSU consists of only 33,000 communists. Before the 28th congress, there were around 100,000 communists who were unable to specify which Communist Party they would be in. Many of them were waiting for the 28th congress to finish, to see what decisions it adopted. Today, dozens of communists from Shevchenskiy Rayon and a number of other rayons have taken party membership cards, saying that the decisions of the congress made a positive impression on them and that they want to be in the Lithuanian Communist Party, that is a component part of the CPSU. Moreover, they want to work actively in realizing the 28th congress decisions.

To be honest, I had no doubt that this would happen. After all, the fate of the Lithuanian people has long been closely linked with the Soviet Union. Lithuanian workers struggled together with Russian workers and peasants against czarist autocracy, the capitalist yoke, national inequality, and spiritual enslavement. They participated actively in three revolutions in Russia. Great October had an enormous influence on the fate of all the peoples of Russia, including the Lithuanian people. At the end of 1918, Soviet power came to Lithuania. It became an independent Soviet republic. But soon, Soviet power in Lithuania fell as a result of the attacks made by the counterrvolutionary forces of the Lithuanian bourgeoisie and foreign states, and a bourgeois state was formed. The Lithuanian Communist Party was persecuted for many years.

The coup d'etat effected by the Tautininkas [neonationalists] headed by A. Smetona and the Christian Democrats backing them dealt another heavy blow to the Lithuanian Communist Party in 1926. Its leaders K. Pozhela, Yu. Greyfenbergeris, K. Gedris, and Lenin Communist Youth League leader R. Chernas were shot. But the authoritarian Smetona regime did not manage to destroy the party. Together with the workers it selflessly withstood the bourgeois dictatorship. This struggle was concluded by revolutionary means in 1940 with the restoration of Soviet power in Lithuania.

[Petrushov] Mikolas Martinovich, on 21 July of this year, it was half a century since Soviet power was restored in Lithuania. PRAVDA receives many letters whose authors ask to be told about this event.

[Burokevicius] It happened in 1940 on a sunny summer's day. The Lithuanian People's Seimas then adopted quite exceptionally important declarations which went down in history. One of them declared Soviet power in Lithuania, and the other concerned the Lithuanian SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republic] entering the Soviet Union. On 3 August the USSR Supreme Soviet examined this declaration made by the Lithuanian People's Seimas and adopted the relevant law.

And the revolutionary situation in bourgeois Lithuania started developing in 1935.

[Petrushov] Many articles devoted to the events of 1940 have been published in the Lithuanian and foreign press, which draw conclusions denying that a revolutionary situation was achieved, and instead associate the replacement of the bourgeois system solely with the Red Army. One of the arguments states that apparently even the newspapers did not write about a revolutionary situation during those days, much less about a revolution. What is your opinion?

[Burokevicius] Yes, many articles like this have appeared. Particularly in bourgeois emigre literature. What can I say about this?

The revolutionary situation in Lithuania at the end of the 1930's was determined by a combination of objective and subjective factors. During the last years of the bourgeois dictatorship in Lithuania, particularly after the Hitlerites' seizure of Klaipeda and the beginning of World War II, the country's economy suffered shocks. Exploitation of the workers grew. Let me just cite some figures.

Between 1930 and 1939 the workers' earnings decreased by 34.3 percent. From the end of 1939, workers' pay norms increased by five-15 percent, but, as A. Povilaytis, director of the State Security Department of bourgeois Lithuania, wrote 11 March 1940, "in reality workers' earnings decreased during this period, because many enterprises and factories, decreasing output because of a shortage of raw materials, reduced the number of working days. Some factories even laid off some workers... The earnings of independent craftsmen were also reduced, since there were fewer orders." The prices of manufactured goods and agricultural products increased between September 1939 and February 1940 by an average of 39.5 percent. The army of unemployed grew to 70,000. A. Povilaytis admits right away that "the workers' economic situation worsened considerably"; second, that this was "increasing workers' dissatisfaction with the existing social system"; and third, that the Communist Party "knows how to exploit the workers' dissatisfaction for its own propaganda" and was winning their support. That is how an official of the Smetona regime describes the situation.

The working peasantry's position worsened. In 1939, the peasants' debts made up 405 million litai, that is, 60 times more than in 1925. Over 40,000 peasant farms were sold by auction. The situation was also exacerbated by emigration. Between 1923 and 1939 alone over 80,000 people emigrated from Lithuania.

These facts testify to the deepening of social conflicts, which was expressed in the exacerbation of the class struggle. The forms of struggle of the proletariat and of the working peasantry were different. In bourgeois Lithuania, particularly from 1927 onward, progressive forces were subjected to persecution. This caused dissatisfaction and opposition. General S. Rashtikis, former commander of the bourgeois Lithuanian forces, wrote:

"Most people did not agree with Smetona's political line, particularly with his domestic policy. As the Smetona regime lost its moral prestige, the ruling class, wishing to remain in power, increasingly resorted to police-state measures, the regime slid into a police-state form of administration, and this was bound to lead to some kind of revolution sooner or later."

This outline of the historical phase given by a bourgeois figure shows that a national crisis was developing in Lithuania which led to revolution.

[Petrushov] So did the newspapers write about the development of a revolutionary situation in Lithuania during those days, or not?

[Burokevicius] The Lithuanian bourgeois press avoided articles about revolution. This is understandable. Although the bourgeoisie understood very well that a revolutionary situation, which could grow into a socialist revolution, was taking shape. The above-mentioned A. Povilaytis demanded that "any grass-roots consolidation must be prevented," and the Tautininkas stated in the Seimas in 1939 that a revolution like the one that overthrew Kerenskiy's power in Russia in 1917 could take place.

The revolutionary situation in Lithuania was manifest not only in the objective and subjective preconditions known to us. Its specific feature was the antinational policy of the Lithuanian bourgeoisie as a ruling class. Conflicts also developed here. When the events connected with Poland's ultimatum in 1938 alarmed the

whole of Lithuanian society, politicians from the Christian Democrats, the Lyaudininkases [Populists], and the Social Democrats publicly stated that the Tautininkas government was unpatriotic. The loss of the Klaipeda region, which Hitler's Germany seized, shook Lithuanian society. In March-April 1939 the Lithuanian Communist Party put forward the idea of organizing committees everywhere for the protection of independence. A patriotic front was created because the progressive public was worried about Lithuania's future.

After the loss of Klaipeda district the process of weakening the position of the bourgeois system was clear and irrepressible. This process was deepened by attempts on the part of reactionary forces to seek assistance from Hitler's Germany (A. Povilaytis' visit to Germany in February 1940, the proposal to take Lithuania under German protection, and so on).

The social base for the developing socialist revolution in Lithuania at the beginning of 1940 was made up of: the industrial and agricultural proletarians and semiproletarians of the city and the country, mostly poor small peasants and peasants of average means, working intellectuals, craftsmen, and small traders. The consciousness of the working class, the working peasantry, and the progressive intellectuals was becoming revolutionized. The Lithuanian Communist Party, the Lithuanian Communist Youth League, the People's Union for Assistance to Lithuania, and the progressive intelligentsia, which in September 1939 created a committee for the protection of the people's rights in Kaunas on the basis of the Lithuanian antifascist people's front and in November started publishing the newspaper UZH LYAUDES TYAYSYAS, all fought actively for social progress in Lithuania.

So what was written about the revolution in Lithuania all the same? Let us take the Lithuanian newspaper VILNYAUS BALSAS, which was previously published as a weekly for national and state ideas. On 21 June 1940 it carried the article "A Revolution Has Taken Place." It says:

"The Lithuania of violence, torture, oppression, and exploitation has collapsed. A new and young Lithuania of working people has arisen. The heavy fetters that bound the body, mind, thought, and spirit of the working man have fallen away. A revolution has taken place.

"A peaceful revolution, without barricades and without bloodshed, but a genuine revolution. It took place peacefully, but it took place all the same. One day, the Lithuanian people would have risen up anyway...

"We should be grateful to our great neighbor—whose Red Army, almost as soon as it arrived in Lithuania, scared away the buzzards of reaction—for the fact that the people did not have to spill blood and that we had no carnage. The nest of plutocrats has been destroyed. A new government has been formed, headed by the people's president Yu. Paletskis. It only took a few days, but the state apparatus has almost been purged of the stooge Smetona. However, this was only the beginning of the work, the first steps. And what a lot has been done, what a gigantic revolution has taken place in the hearts and feelings of the people... This is only the beginning of the revolution."

[Petrushov] Some people deny the Lithuanian intelligentsia's participation in the struggle against the reactionary regime. Is that true?

[Burokevicius] The views of the progressive intelligentsia were expressed by the writer V. Mikolaytis-Putinas, who wrote in LITERATUROS NAUYENOS (1 February 1935) that the danger was coming not from the East, but from the West and that Germanization had done a great deal of harm to the Lithuanian people. "It is enough to look at the map of East Prussia. Today the most immediate task of Germanization is to swallow us altogether."

Rank and file members of the Social Democratic Party, the Populists, socialist Jews, and Catholic organizations were drawn into the common struggle against the regime. As early as 1937 the Lithuanian Communist Party stated that "our party organizations must support every movement of democratic groups directed against fascism, for the benefit of the people, regardless of whether communists participate in them or not."

Thus the Lithuanian Communist Party was not a sectarian organization; it worked with all working people, consolidated their efforts in the struggle against the bourgeois dictatorship, and prepared them for revolution. The underground communist press—TIESA, PROPAGANDISTAS, VOZZVANIYE, and others—played a significant role in this. The line toward socialist revolution that the Communist Party took in 1939 was in line with the interests of the broad masses of Lithuania's peoples.

On 10 October 1939 Lithuania and the USSR signed an act on the transfer of Vilnius and Vilnius district to the Lithuanian Republic, and the treaty on Lithuanian-Soviet mutual assistance. The USSR, which always defended Lithuania's national interests, strengthened its prestige among the Lithuanian people's masses still further. On 11 October mass antifascist demonstrations started in Lithuania, during which the working people thanked the USSR for restoring Vilnius and Vilnius district. In the first half of 1940 the dissatisfaction of peasants in Alitus, Birzhay, Kaunas, Raseynyay, Trakay, Utena, Rokishkis, Seynayskiy, and other districts acquired organized forms, combining with strikes and workers' demonstrations in Kaunas, Vilnius, Panevezhis, Rokishkis, and Alitus.

[Petrushov] Mikolas Martinovich, what was the nature of the 1940 revolution in Lithuania?

[Burokevicius] The revolutionary situation in Lithuania came to a head in the first half of 1940 in complex international conditions, when the war was still going on

in Europe. The development of the revolutionary situation into a socialist revolution was further promoted by the confusion among Lithuania's ruling elite, after demands were made by the Soviet government on 14 June 1940 that the treaty of 10 October 1939 be observed and after the president of the Lithuanian republic, A. Smetona, fled to Hitler's Germany on the night of 15-16 June. Stripped of its support by the troops (the troops, led by General V. Vitkauskas, had gone over to the people's side), the Lithuanian bourgeoisie was unable to put up resistance to the revolution.

The People's Government of Lithuania was formed on 17 June 1940 on the basis of the existing constitution. Certainly, its formation was a complex phenomenon. The bourgeoisie nominated its representatives, while the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee—supported by social forces—proposed Yu. Paletskis, a member of the progressive intelligentsia, for the post of head of government. The choice was influenced by the popular masses' actions. Yu. Paletskis became head of state and government. This political revolution began peacefully. It was socialist in nature and, at the same time, antifascist, anti-Hitlerite, and, in form, a revolution of the people.

Meeting the demands of the republic's working people, the elected People's Seimas proclaimed Lithuania a Soviet Socialist Republic on 21 July 1940. The fact that it was a socialist revolution is evidenced by the socialist transformations begun in 1940 in the economy, the political structure, and culture.

We should not regard prewar and postwar historical conditions as being the same. In May 1940 Hitler said that "all the Baltic states must be incorporated into the Reich." Hitler violated treaties and invaded states. That was what happened to Czechoslovakia. Having discussed the situation, the Lithuanian People's Seimas adopted a declaration on incorporating Lithuania into the USSR, and this declaration was signed by L. Adomauskas, M. Gedvilas, I. Grigalavichyus, A. Ventslova, and P. Tsvirka. V. Vitkauskas was quite right when he said: "What would have happened, however, if, in the vortex of war, Lithuania had been on its own and had not been a member of the powerful Soviet Union? Falling (albeit against its will) into German hands before June 1940 and forced to fight in the war for Hitler's Germany, Lithuania could have been totally destroyed...."

There is no doubt that, joining the Soviet Union on 3 August 1940, Lithuania came into conflict with Stalin's personality cult. Its negative influence deformed the building of socialism in Lithuania and the unlawful repressions caused outrage. However, as history has shown, as a sovereign union republic of the Soviet Union, Lithuania became a region of great socialist civilization.

[Petrushov] From what you have said one can deduce that Lithuania became a member of the USSR legally. As I understand, that was the wish of the people, who had overthrown the old regime: a regime of oppression, lawlessness, and exploitation of man by his fellow man. Could you explain once more, please, what is the main basis for this claim?

[Burokevicius] As a historian, I cannot understand why only the documents of capitalist states and bourgeois figures are accepted as sources for present-day assessments of the true situation in Lithuania at the end of the thirties. Scientific truth demands that all documents be used in research of the events of 1940. Soviet documents, documents written by progressive figures, and Lithuanian Communist Party documents. The main one is the "Declaration on Incorporating Lithuania into the USSR," adopted on 21 July 1940 by the Lithuanian SSR People's Seimas.

A great deal is being written in the unofficial press about some sort of special role played by the Red Army in Lithuania's internal affairs. The Red Army units deployed in Lithuania did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Lithuanian state. It is another matter that the deployment of the Red Army in the republic inspired the working people with confidence in their own strength and prevented interference by imperialist states in Lithuania's internal affairs.

Certain circles are now circulating the flagrant lie that the Communists concealed their aims from the people concerning Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR and that apparently only this deception made it possible for them to secure the historic decision by the People's Seimas. Here are a few facts for you: Long before the elections, on 26 June, in fact, the newspaper TIESA published an appeal by the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee which openly contained the slogan "Long live Soviet Lithuania—the 13th Soviet Socialist Republic!" This same appeal was issued in a separate edition by the editorial board of the newspaper LYAUDES BALSAS. On 9 July 1940 the newspaper LETUVOS ZHINES reported that a rally of Lithuanian People's Army personnel held on 8 July in a Kaunas sports hall had supported the Communists' slogan on incorporating the republic into the Soviet Union. On 20 July TIESA reported that a 19 July meeting of workers at the Kaunas Tobacco Factory had said: "Our dream is to be part of the family of Soviet republics!" That same day, more than 300 peasants and workers met at the Plokshchyays Primary School (Shakyayskiy district) and unanimously adopted a resolution to establish the Soviet system in Lithuania and incorporate Lithuania into the USSR. On 20 July the newspaper LETUVOS ZHINES published the following information: "On 19 July this year, the people's fighters of the Kaunas Garrison and commanders of goodwill adopted a resolution which stated that everyone present at the meeting demanded the proclamation of Lithuania as a Socialist Soviet Republic and its incorporation into the Soviet Union...."

As documents show, the Lithuanian working people played an active part in the elections to the Lithuanian People's Seimas, which were conducted on the basis of

the electoral law. Criticism that elections were held in Lithuania at a time when Red Army units were deployed there under treaty sounds strange. After all, elections since the war have been held in similar conditions and, indeed, still are now: Elections are held in the FRG while the forces of three great powers, the United States, Britain, and France, are stationed on its territory, and elections have been held in Italy, Greece, and other capitalist states with U.S. military bases. But we do not say that the elections in those countries are invalid. So why such a negative attitude to the elections to the Lithuanian People's Seimas in 1940?

Documents attest that the elections to the Lithuanian people's parliament were legal. Therefore the People's Seimas declarations of 21, 22, and 23 July 1940 have legal force. You can accept or not accept these acts of state, but the revolutionary events of 1940 cannot be struck out of history. As a Soviet republic, Lithuania became part of the USSR as a federative state. The Lithuanian SSR Constitution states that Lithuania is a sovereign socialist state within this federation. The 21 July 1940 Declaration of the Lithuanian SSR People's Seimas on incorporating Lithuania into the USSR and the 3 August 1940 Law of the Seventh USSR Supreme Soviet Session on accepting the Lithuanian SSR into the Soviet Union with the rights of an equal, union, Soviet Socialist Republic did not violate the 12 July 1920 treaty between Lithuania and Soviet Russia, as Soviet Russia made no territorial demands on the Lithuanian state.

The territory of the Lithuanian socialist state in comparison to the territory it had at the end of 1939 is increased considerably (with the transfer of Druskininkay and other settlements to Lithuania). Soviet power has fulfilled the historical aspirations and wishes of the Lithuanian people: The ancient capital of Vilnius, the industrial and cultural center of Kaunas, and the sea port city of Klaypeda have been united within the framework of this state. As a federation uniting union republic-states, the USSR is the best form of state structure and one which creates possibilities for Lithuanian development. But these possibilities must, first, be broadened so that every union republic becomes a sovereign socialist state in the full sense of the word; and, second, these possibilities must be comprehensively used to turn the Lithuanian SSR into a real sovereign socialist state that is part of the USSR's federative state structure.

The 28th CPSU Congress Program Statement "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism" confirms the policy of strengthening the union republics' sovereignty. The Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) also works on the basis of recognizing nations' right to self-determination, including secession. But we must not confuse the right to secede from the USSR with the advisability of that secession. Lithuanian interests, I am sure, can be fully realized only within the framework of the renewed USSR. Lithuanian Communists will do everything possible to ensure that the principles of proclaimed social justice are realized in practice.

Baltic Internal Affairs Ministers Meet in Riga

LD2007123890 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0700 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Excerpts] Delegations of internal affairs workers of Lithuania and Estonia arrived this morning for a meeting in Riga with their Latvian colleagues. Internal affairs ministers and their deputies of both republics are in the delegations. We were just now informed over the telephone about the aim of the meeting by Major General of Militia Zenons Indrikovs, first deputy minister of internal afairs of Latvia.

[Begin Indrikovs recording] The first official talks between Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian internal affairs ministries to draw up principles of joint activity—I shall put it like that—is our principal aim, and the principles for future cooperation. [passage omitted] We will tackle the same subject in talks with Russia, with Belorussia, and with other republics, where we will conclude such cooperation. And this is only a beginning of such talks in order that in future agreements can be concluded on cooperation concerning specific questions. [end recording]

Poll Shows Estonian Russians Plan To Emigrate

LD2007224190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2100 GMT 20 Jul 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] A public survey has been completed in the town of Tartu in Estonia. Most Russians here are planning to leave for Canada in the very near future.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Interviewed on Economic Situation

AU2207170490 Vienna KURIER in German 22 Jul 90 p 5

["Exclusive" interview with RSFSR Chairman Boris Yeltsin by KURIER reporters Werner Kraeutler and Alexander Cheparukhin during a recent 10-hour ride from Moscow to Riga: "I Want The Revival of Russia"]

[Text] [KURIER] You are now the first man in Russia, the largest and richest republic within the Soviet Union. What are you going to do?

[Yeltsin] It is my task to initiate the economic, social, cultural, and spiritual revival of Russia.

We must begin with resolving the difficult economic situation to improve the people's living conditions. That is my main goal, and I think it will keep me busy to the end of my political career.

[KURIER] How will things continue following the 28th party congress at which you and others resigned from the party?

[Yeltsin] The Communist Party has become too fat. It has developed an "iron structure." The resignation of Sobchak and Popov (mayors of Leningrad and Moscow—editorial board) will have consequences. I think that several million people will leave the party.

[KURIER] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] as a Union republic has also declared its "sovereignty."

[Yeltsin] Viewed from outside, Gorbachev's reaction to the RSFSR's declaration of sovereignty, as decided by the First Congress of People's Deputies, has been calm. It shows that he may have learned from his mistakes following Lithuania's declaration of independence. Now he must also consider that the Ukraine will declare its sovereignty.

[KURIER] The West wants to support perestroyka, but does not find any partners to do so.

[Yeltsin] One thing is clear. The power and authority of the central government and the political leadership is declining. In this case, there is no address for aid measures; thus it is unrealistic to grant aid.

Okay. Now the West German chancellor has done something. However, he is the only one. In the current situation, I would say that realistically it is only possible to grant guaranteed credits to the RSFSR leadership. It guarantees a democratic revival of the country and really radical reforms.

It must be taken into account that Russia is a huge country with 150 million inhabitants, with huge stocks of natural resources, and a huge human and intellectual potential.

Following our declaration of sovereignty and the decentralization connected with it of functions of the central government and the Russian government, we have now been pursuing our own domestic and foreign policies. We are ready to conclude treaties and agreements with every foreign country.

[KURIER] Your program on the reconstruction of the Russian economy is more or less unknown in the West.

[Yeltsin] First of all, we must restore the people's sense of self-worth. That holds also true for all types of free entrepreneurs and for the local decision-making bodies. We must give the people security and at the same time create a basis for the market economy.

At the first session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, we adopted a number of basic laws. The most important one certainly is the law on the purchase of property in the RSFSR. In September, we will pass a real estate law and tax laws. These laws will considerably differ from the Union's half-hearted reform laws.

Another step will be the reform of the banking and finance system. The fact that the Russian state bank has already been separated from the Union state bank is part of this financial reform. The Russian state bank is no longer assigned to the ministries but is directly assigned to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Currently, we are founding an independent Russian foreign trade bank which will handle all transactions involving convertible currencies. This bank, too, will not be assigned to the official USSR trade organizations either. It will only be controlled by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

[KURIER] What is left to the central government?

[Yeltsin] We only leave to the central government problems related to defense, railroads, communications such as post and telecommunications, energy matters including nuclear energy, and civil aviation including Aeroflot.

All the other roughly 70 Union ministries will have no business on the territory of the RSFSR. We thank them for their offers, but we do not need them. However, we do not want to "feed" them from the Russian budget. We will stop giving the Union R70 billion, as we did before, to spend them somewhere on something in the Union. Now we are going to calculate carefully. If we decide that we will not take part in a given project because we consider it useless, such as the space travel program, we will not pay a single ruble. The same holds true for the military budget. But at the same time, we will call for a real reduction in military spending.

Our military people are highly concerned about one thing: Almost the entire arms industry is on Russian territory. Thus it will depend on Russia what and, above all, how many weapons will be produced.

[KURIER] Who will decide on the allocation of funds?

[Yeltsin] We will not abolish the ministerial bureaucracy to replace it with our "own" bureaucracy. In other words, we will not found a "coal ministry" to replace the existing Union Coal Ministry. We will give a number of enterprises the greatest possible freedom to carry out this work independently.

Thus one of the first steps will be to abolish the so-called command system. I think a better term would be "command distribution system," which gets and distributes all products. It is this function of distribution which is the basis of its power. It is this power which we will take away from bureaucracy.

[KURIER] Who will get this power?

[Yeltsin] We will give these rights to the enterprises which will certainly draw some economic benefit from them, but will also ensure the functioning of production and distribution. We will also give them the right to trade freely with products that they can sell themselves. Or they can cooperate with trade organizations.

An important point in the economic reconstruction of the country is establishing "real ownership" for every individual.

Discussion at Moscow City Party Conference

90UN2195A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jun 90 pp 2-7

[Discussions at 28th Conference of Moscow City CPSU Organization]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] **V.N. Shostakovskiy, Rector of the Moscow Higher Party School:**

It seems to me that we are gathering speed. The movement toward a social catastrophe or an authoritarian regime is accelerating. The potential for a social explosion in our society is growing. Against this background all of our discussion—within the party and between parties—loses meaning. We must seek civil accord. Civil accord, which could radically and significantly insure political stability and guarantee the irreversibility of democratic transformations. How? On what basis could this occur?

It seems to me that we have not learned the lesson of the truth which was discussed at the 27th congress. We have not learned it and we are operating very frequently, almost always, on the basis of an untruth, an untruth that is consciously or unconsciously linked to delusions: We are acting with dogmas and we are solving large, strategic problems, and small, tactical ones.

We are running up against a contradiction that is fundamental, essentially global, and human. It is a contradiction between the forces that would like social progress and are prepared to be bearers and movers of social progress, and the forces which for a number of reasons do not wish to participate in this race—and it is a hard race, with competition.

We must connect these interests and find a formula which would help the forces of social progress manifest themselves as much as possible and protect those who cannot participate in it, those who are not prepared from the standpoint of their qualifications, their life plans, and their interests. This is where the point of application of party policy should be, the policy of a radically transformed party.

Yet this cannot be done unless we draw the lessons of truth. We are speaking about the socialist option. But, comrades, let us say honestly that we have not had this socialist option. Incidentally, Lenin spoke about how the Bolsheviks insinuated socialism into the life of our people. We are speaking about communism. Some people are insisting very passionately that this word be included in party documents. Let us stop these discussions of "isms." Let us think about what must be done in order for us to establish a normal rule-of-law state, an effective economy, and a democratic civil society. Let us work on this. Leave it for future generations to figure out the "isms." What is truth and what is not truth, what is so and what is not.

We must get rid of ideology right now. This is not the time simply to be looking for precise definitions. And this would not do much good anyway. We must rely on common human values and mechanisms that have been well tested throughout the history of mankind. Yet the new political thinking is not working in our country. It is not working because in the party environment we have built "barricades" on the path to appropriating this political thinking; we have erected intellectual barriers out of those same ideologemes, the same dogmas to which we are so devoted.

Democratic centralism and its Leninist meaning have been discussed here. Let us not try to be clever. Trotskiy in defending democratic centralism said that it made it possible to have discussion in the party, to have platforms, and to have temporary factions. The party and the Central Committee had the opportunity to derive from these discussions everything valuable and attractive. Both the moral and the political authority of the Central Committee relied on the intellectual arsenal. And Trotskiy said further: "...and this gave the Central Committee the possibility of ordering." Ordering. There is the rub. We cannot allow this any longer, comrades.

The Central Committee and any other elective organ is called upon to carry out the will of the party masses, the will which passes through representative democracy or through its indirect forms, and not order. When we speak of factions we are again fooling ourselves. We have had factions in the party for decades. Is the Politburo really not a kind of faction in our party, a faction with its own internal structure and discipline and its own approach to various matters. I am not even talking about the fact that points 6 and 7 of the well-known Resolution X of the party congress temporarily put a stop to factions. But if we had normal factions—I do not agree with the idea that under the conditions of a multiparty system they are not necessary—if we had a peasant faction in the party, a faction of the artistic intelligentsia, scientific and technical personnel, or workers. Why are we so afraid of having the party be a flexible, elastic organism which is linked to the life of the people?

I can in no way accept the question of classical interests as a basis for discussion. In general whose interests does the party express? Three weeks ago we conducted a public opinion poll in Moscow. It showed, in particular, that in the opinion of 5.6 percent of those questioned, the party reflects the interests of all the workers. One percent said that the party reflects the interests of the working class, 1.6 percent think that the party reflects the interests of the intelligentsia, 29 percent think that the party does not reflect anybody's interests, and 43.5 percent think that the party reflects the interests of the management level. I think that this is the way it is.

Comrades, we cannot have any class interest now because we have destroyed all the class-forming mechanisms, we have destroyed the system of economic coercion, the system which alienated man from property and from power. We have a segmented working class, and here it has been correctly stated that there are significant differences in the interests of various groups of the working class. The same thing has happened with our intelligentsia. We must take an unfettered look at the social structure of our society, and if the party seriously intends to become the party of social progress and reform, as Comrade Prokofyev has said here, we must publicly interpret the social structure of our society. We must find out which social segments are prepared to act resolutely in the interests of social progress, unchain them, and free up space for activity and enterprise. And the social segments and groups that are not ready for this are in need of effective social protection.

I should like to discuss my attitude toward the Russian Communist Party. I am in favor of creating the Russian Communist Party, but this can by no means be forced; it can by no means be done without consulting with the party organizations and the rank-and-file communists in the Russian party organizations. We could cause harm, we could even incite interethnic conflicts in the Russian Federation, and, as you can well understand, these we do not need. Why this haste, why do we want to create any structures before the 28th congress? After all, we have not yet figured out our type of party, our program documents, or our rules, and we already want to select some kind of structure in Russia and in essence force this on the Russian party organizations. It is not simply two stages but two stages between which there will be fundamental work to prepare for the creation of the Russian Communist Party, including, possibly, through referendum. Regarding what our party should be like, we are proposing a package of documents on behalf of the Democratic Platform. We shall discuss them the day after tomorrow and on Sunday at the All-Union Conference and in the Russian section and we shall bring them up at the Russian Conference. [passage omitted]

V.A. Stupnikov, Laboratory Chief at Polyus Scientific Research Institute

On instructions from a number of deputies at our conference I wish to read you a general political resolution from the Moscow conference of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU held on 26-27 May of this year in Moscow. We think this resolution will be useful in forming the position of the Moscow City Party Organization, will contribute to the consolidation of healthy forces in the party, and will contribute to the achievement of civic harmony in the society.

"Having discussed the situation in the country and the party, participants in the conference note that the political situation has changed radically in recent months. The polarization of political forces and social tension are increasing. The disintegration of the economy is deepening.

New political parties, including parties whose direction is close to that of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU (Social-Democratic Association, Social-Democratic Party of Russia, Democratic Party of the Russian Federation...) are being formed or have already been created.

At the same time right-wing conservative forces are consolidating both in the society and in the party (the Russian Communist Party on the platform of the United Workers Front). There is a growing threat of a right-wing putsch and a return to a totalitarian regime.

Under these conditions the ineptitude and lack of desire on the party of the party nomenklatura, including the higher party leadership, to proceed toward radical structural reforms of the CPSU is becoming increasingly apparent. The party apparatus has revealed a readiness to adopt any democratic ideas with the exception of those that bring its power into question.

An analysis of the alignment of forces in the party and the lack of possibilities for its democratic wing to achieve proportional representation in the delegate corps shows that the forthcoming party forums, including the 28th congress, will not produce any radical decisions for renewal. One can expect both stormy discussions and fairly solid voting for conservation of the archaic principles and party organs.

The ambiguity and contradictoriness of the situation condition the various evaluations and tactical approaches of the proponents of the Democratic Platforms. Some of them call for an immediate withdrawal from the CPSU and the creation of a new party and others consider it possible to remain in the Communist Party even if the 28th congress ends with a victory for the conservative forces.

While respecting their opinions, the conference states that the majority of proponents of the Democratic Platform in Moscow and Moscow Oblast consider the 28th CPSU Congress itself to be the point which should decide whether the democrats should continue to be in the CPSU with their package of alternative documents (platform, program statement, rules, political co-report, regulations, and so forth) which contain the idea of a truly democratic party of a parliamentary type.

As a possible basis for a compromise at the congress the conference is considering the following basic points:

1.1. Rejection of communism as the goal of the CPSU (and the corresponding change of the party's name) and proclamation of the party's goal as movement toward democratic socialism based on principles of freedom, justice, and solidarity.

1.2. Rejection of the monopoly of a single ideology in the party. The works of Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Gramsha, and other Marxists should be regarded as one of the sources of the party's theoretical basis along with the entire wealth of socialist humanist thought.

1.3. Recognition of the party's responsibility for the entire path that has been traveled and the incommensurability of the price that was paid with the results of "developed socialism."

1.4. Recognition of the erroneousness of the economic model constructed on the basis of dominance of state property.

1.5. The party's rejection of a monopoly on power, complete separation of party and state structures, and depoliticization of all law enforcement organs and the Armed Forces.

1.6. Orientation toward union and dialogue with new democratic movements that have a constructive direction (Interregional Group of Deputies, the Democratic Russia blocs in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, the Moscow Soviet, the Leningrad Soviet, and democratic forces of other soviets, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, the Confederation of Labor, and others).

1.7. Dismantling of the organizational foundations and structures of the totalitarian type of party and replacement of these with the organizational bases of a parliamentary type of party.

1.7.1. Replacement of democratic centralism with general democratic principles.

1.7.2. Elimination of the official status of the party committees at enterprises and other organizations and the monopoly of the territorial-production principle for structuring the party.

1.7.3. A changeover from a unitary to a federative principle of party construction.

1.7.4. Elimination of the nomenklatura system and privileges for the party apparatus.

1.8. Complete replacement of discredited party leaders at the congress and, in the local areas, after the congress on the basis of a democratic election procedure.

1.9. Reregistration of party members after the congress according to platforms with the right to free withdrawal from the party.

II. In the event that the majority of the congress refuses to conduct a radical structural reform of the CPSU the conference considers it necessary for proponents of the Democratic Platform to withdraw collectively from the ranks of the Communist Party.

The conference thinks that no later than September 1990 it is necessary to hold a congress of proponents of the Democratic Platform and other democratic forces at which, depending on the results of the 28th CPSU Congress, it will determine the capacity in which the Democratic Platform will exist in the future.

III. The conference welcomes the creation of the Social Democratic and Democratic parties of the Russian Federation, considering them to be the closest allies of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, and does not rule out the possibility of merging with them in the future.

IV. The conference confirms its desire for cooperation with the proponents of the Marxist Platform in the CPSU and other horizontal structures which hold democratic positions.

V. The conference is in favor of close cooperation between the Democratic Platform and the new Moscow Soviet and, in particular, takes the initiative in creating a joint commission (of deputies of the Moscow Soviet and delegates of the city party conference) for studying problems of party property in Moscow.

VI. The conference takes as a basis for discussion the draft of the program declaration of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. It entrusts the editorial commission with its further development, devoting special attention to the need for significant reworking on the basis of suggestions that have been made regarding Section I (ideological platform) and Section III (economic platform).

VII. The conference resolutely condemns the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee "For Consolidation on the Basis of Principles" and considers it the duty of the Democratic Platform to protect its proponents from persecution and attacks because of ideological considerations.

VIII. The conference confirms its negative attitude toward the so-called congress for creating a Russian Communist Party which was held in Leningrad.

The creation of a Russian Communist Party is possible only on the basis of the expression of the will of Russian communists on democratic principles.

[Passage omitted]

V.A. Afanasyev, First Secretary of the Pervomayskiy CPSU Raykom [rayon party committee]

Barely two weeks are left before the 28th Party Congress. Therefore in the first stage of our conference I wish to concentrate attention on issues that are bothering communists and non-party members as it approaches. Concern for the fate of the party and for existence is expressed by many communists who have selflessly and honestly served its ideals, sparing neither health nor life, and have striven for the main goal—strengthening our state and improving the people's standard of living. I draw attention to the fact that millions of communists and their sympathizers have worked this way. Everything has changed during the past two years. A wave of anticommunism is openly gathering strength in the country. Today many people are even afraid to admit they are in the party. Withdrawals are increasing and

admissions are decreasing. In the elections certain candidate deputies have modestly forgotten to indicate their membership in the CPSU.

One of Lenin's principles says: "Decisions must be collegial but responsibility must be personal." Everything is the other way around for us today. Decisions on behalf of the party continue to be made by a narrow group of individuals, and the people perceive any program, including those issuing from the government, as a party program. And this is understandable. But let us straighten things out within the party itself anyway. Who is responsible for the fact that in five years of perestroyka the situation in the country and the party has reached the point of catastrophe? In this situation any minor initiative coming from above without the support of the people could lead the government into a crisis and aggravate the crisis in the party.

At the February plenum of the party Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev expressed in his speech a desire for communists working in the government to find a form of consultation with the party. But these words were not heard. The party did not gain authority as a result of Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov's speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet although it was just as much of a revelation for communists as it was for the rest of the Soviet people.

"The market is the last chance for perestroyka," said Comrade Abalkin. Allow me to clarify. It is the last chance for the perestroyka begun and headed by our party. In the event of an unfavorable outcome to the process of changing over to the market, this economic experiment will be the last on a list of experiments undertaken by the government up to this point. Largely unsuccessful experiments undertaken, I emphasize, by the government of communists. In this case the inevitable social after shocks will sweep both the government and the communists from the political arena.

With the current state of things the bold statement, "There is no alternative to the market," is clearly inadequate for forming public opinion. Nationwide discussion? Yes. But the variants of the changeover to the market differ. The achievement of national accord on this basis—including and, perhaps, above all concerning the character of the socioeconomic formation—this is the path to which there really are no alternatives, and it is precisely this position, it seems to me, that communists should hold. In other words, perhaps there is no alternative to the market. But there is an alternative within the market. We must figure things out for ourselves, explain things to the people, and ask their opinion. If this approach is taken I suggest reflecting this in the corresponding decree.

It would seem that the time has come to call things by their real names and in principle separate the crisis of party leadership from the crisis of the party itself. The inconsistency, the unpreparedness, and the tardy actions of the party leadership organs, and their separation from the masses, in our opinion, have significantly deepened the crisis in the society. Many communists are convinced that during the past five years the CPSU Central Committee has been working unsatisfactorily. And in our rayon party organization we have formed the common opinion that it is necessary for the Central Committee and the members of the Politburo to report on the work they have done to carry out the decisions of the 28th party congress and the 19th all-Union party conference and there should be a fundamental evaluation of the results of this work and the individuals who are responsible for the mistakes. And here I should like to support the suggestion from Comrade Melnikov to create a special commission consisting of delegates to the 28th congress for studying this problem.

We think it necessary to essentially renew the party management organs and we must put an end to the practice of half-baked decisionmaking, half-baked democracy, and half-baked glasnost. At a time when communists are demanding reports from members of the Central Committee Politburo to the party they have stopped giving us even the scanty information about Politburo meetings which we had previously.

Central Committee leaders and its ideological workers simply do not have the right to remain silent when there are fierce attacks on the party, when there are direct persecutions of communists, and when doubt is being cast on the achievements of socialism, and even the October Revolution itself is being called a fatal mistake. Yes, the country needs a scientifically substantiated program of reforms intended for success both today and in the future and in all spheres of the material and spiritual life of the society, but it will be possible to carry out even the best programs only when the CPSU, renewed, strengthened, and wielding authority, acts as a consolidating force of the society. For this there must be radical measures for restructuring within the party.

I wish to note with satisfaction that the draft of the Position we have in our hands and proposals for the Rules include the majority of the suggestions from the positions of the rayon party organizations, including ours. But it seems necessary to classify the modern Soviet society extremely clearly and to have a clear idea of the economic system toward which we are striving and to determine the logical succession of steps that are being undertaken.

But so far both in the draft of the Central Committee and in the draft of the Moscow organization there are no essential characteristics of humane democratic socialism.

Recent dictionaries give the following definition of democratic socialism (I quote): "The concept of democratic socialism proceeds from two main assumptions: the recognition of the unshakability of the bourgeois system and its economic basis, private ownership of the means of production, and from a denial of the socialist system in the Soviet Union." Therefore to declare such a goal as

humane democratic socialism is at least threatening, and the explanation of Comrade Medvedev, secretary of the Central Committee, that the dictionaries are outdated seems, at least, strange. And here I should like to request that the esteemed Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Shostakovskiy not refrain from theoretical developments about various "isms" but to concentrate the entire scholarly potential of the Moscow Higher Party School on the development of a theoretical model of the society toward which we are moving.

I think it should be pointed out with extreme clarity in party documents: The CPSU is still a party of workers and will defend the interests and legitimate rights of the workers of hired physical and mental labor, underprivileged and socially unprotected groups of the population, and military servicemen.

In the draft of the Position it is undoubtedly correctly established that the CPSU should be a truly democratic party that rests on the authority of the party masses, conscious discipline, and party association. It should operate on the basis of democratic principles but with obligatory subordination of the minority to the majority and fulfillment of decisions of the party congresses and conferences. I am convinced that the last, so-called disciplinary aspects will evoke fierce objections, not to mention the term "democratic centralism." All of us should probably be extremely honest, at least with ourselves. All politicized associations not to mention the parties that have arisen in the USSR recently boldly apply the instruments of democratic centralism in their daily practice.

As concerns a number of declarations that the very term is not accepted by communists, I can say frankly: The results of the study of the opinions of communists conducted in the Pervomayskiy Rayon party organization showed that the majority of communists correctly understand the essence of the issue and support the main points of the principle of democratic centralism, while recognizing the need for its improvement.

Communists of the rayon had long discussions in the conference and in the local party organizations and have come to this conclusion: We shall not support the proposal expressed in the draft Rules concerning introducing the status of party chairman, considering this an undemocratic return to the concentration of all power in one individual, since they consider it more expedient to introduce the position of chairman of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. [passage omitted]

A.M. Bryachikhin, First Secretary of the Sevastopolskiy CPSU Raykom

The CPSU Central Committee, the Politburo, and the secretaries of the Central Committee are largely to blame for the situation in which the party and the country find themselves today—and this is obvious. This fact is just as indisputable as the fact of their slowness in considering our position and those of others which have already been formulated and brought up for discussion previously, their nonintervention, and, apparently, their fear to take responsibility and, the main thing, actually to carry out even one decision to the end.

But let us speak honestly: To no small degree we communists and party organizations not only in Moscow are to blame for the situation that has been created. The majority of us have not taken a position either, and if we have it has been a critically observing position. Naturally, what we have been very successful at is direct criticism of the CPSU Central Committee (frequently even justifiably), its leadership, and our government. This, of course, is easier than to look for the newest forms and methods of party work and provide examples of a more rapid turn in the direction of replacing the administrative-command system, which had previously functioned inefficiently everywhere (including in the party itself), with a new, economic one.

Here again nobody is keeping the capital party organization from developing and defending its own position, if one many call it that, on questions of the destiny and position of the party in the life of our state. Here, in these problems, the city party organization, its bureau, and the leadership and apparatus of the party gorkom [city committee], who, incidentally, are actively leaving, could, like one of our party's little streams, contribute to it fresh, creative, and new forces and changes. And the CPSU Central Committee would have to reckon with them, these weighty words and deeds.

But in reality there are none of these radical changes or examples yet. Nor were any of them heard in the report. Anything new that has appeared recently in the gorkom or in the city party organizations is not to be found in the report or in the work of the gorkom either. What new things have appeared recently and what deserves attention today? And yet this is very important today both for the party as a whole and for its 28th congress. For we have already been worn out by the game of politics and being tossed between events, press conferences, speeches, criticism, and discussions, but so far, unfortunately, we are painfully lacking in practical actions and positive results. Based on the practical, although perhaps not in all cases successful, steps of our Sevastopolskiy Rayon party organization, I shall risk making a number of suggestions which, in our view, could be expediently included in the Position of the Moscow city party conference as issues to be discussed. The implementation of these suggestions could appreciably affect the change in the forms and methods of party work, improve the administration of party work, and increase the authority of the city party organization and the party as a whole.

I shall make four of these suggestions. First of all, a direction generated by perestroyka which is quite apparent in party work with communist deputies under the conditions of the earmarked multi-party system and the beginning of the turnover of power to the local soviets. Party organizations today are handling this work unenthusiastically and fearfully. How else can one

explain this fact, for example. Among the deputies of the Moscow Soviet today there are 271 CPSU members, but the deputy group of the Moscow Soviet adhering to the position of the Moscow Gorkom of the CPSU numbers only about 90. And what is the position of the gorkom in the work with the communist deputies who are included in this group? And among them there are, incidentally, also first secretaries of party raykoms. What are the results here? To be honest, there are practically no results except for the already beginning exodus of communists from the Moscow Group into other deputy groups. The CPSU Central Committee should also ask these questions concerning its work with communists who are people's deputies of Russia and the country.

Here is another proposal for discussion. Under the new conditions the communist deputies have passed through a double filter before working in today's soviets: both as communists and as candidate deputies, on whom—it is no secret—higher demands have been placed. Today they really are the party vanguard in the organs of power being formed, and it is extremely difficult for them to work in the soviets. For it is something altogether new and unprecedented for them to work under conditions of regular attacks on the party and even the first bans of communists from various professions.

Under these conditions it is quite obvious that the party organs must work with all of their representatives in the soviets, they must work with them, and help the communist deputies to implement party pre-election and other programs.

But here again neither the party gorkom nor the CPSU Central Committee has been extremely successful and they have taken a timid position of nonintervention, the position of an outside observer. We must stop and put a halt to the continuing release without a struggle of positions that truly belong to the party, if only in the soviets. This is another of the issues on which the position of the city party organization should be clear.

The next suggestion. Today we are taking many steps blindly since we are taking them for the first time and gaining our knowledge empirically. The large number of workers in party and social science are still either remaining silent or vigorously criticizing their own party instead of developing practical proposals concerning the role, position, and type of party we should have, at least in the present stage.

In its report the party city committee could express a position or, relying on Moscow's immense scientific potential, suggest something to the CPSU Central Committee in this area. Without party and social science we shall again have to feel our way along and display our voluntarism and incompetence.

Further. The position with respect to the creation of the Russian Communist Party. In my opinion, everyone has long understood that the party should and will be created. But here is the question: When and what kind will it be? It seems to me that for the first time we have a real chance to create without hurrying a new type of party that is appropriate for the multiparty system and the market relations that are taking form. It should and, the main thing, it can be a party that is qualitatively new in its structure and functions, one that is oriented precisely toward political work methods, one which is capable of self-renewal and of working under the conditions of the multi-party system and parliamentary activity. And here, although only several days are left before the Russian conference, neither communists nor their delegates have discussed this and they do not know what type of party this new one will be or what about it will distinguish it from the existing conservative party structures. Is such a position of the party gorkom and the CPSU Central Committee an example that contributes to increasing our authority and developing democratization and glasnost and one that deserves approval? The answer is simple: No, it is not.

Regarding party organizations in the Armed Forces, KGB, and so forth: We do not think this issue should be considered today. Why? We think the approach should be the same both throughout the country and throughout the party. Regarding other parties, we think that this issue should be resolved by the Supreme Soviet with the adoption of a Law on Political Parties. We would consider it expedient to appeal through the communist deputies, on behalf of the conference, to the Supreme Soviet asking for acceleration of the development and adoption of this law. Otherwise everything the 28th CPSU Congress might adopt with respect to changing the Rules and Program could turn out to be illegal within a couple of months.

A lot has already been said about changing over to the market. I would like to note just one aspect. I am extremely bothered by the fact that we are not creating a party base in the new economic formations. In the cooperatives, small enterprises, commercial banks, associations, consortiums, and joint enterprises today we have neither a base nor influence. And yet these are the rudiments of the new economic structure and its future. Our attitude toward these issues must be revised right to the point of having party organizations and communists initiate the creation of new economic structures, the more so since we ourselves at one time proclaimed a changeover to new economic relations.

Concerning party economic activity. I categorically disagree with the suggestion to remove Article 38 from the draft rules. Moreover, I think it should be extended to the rayon and local party organizations. If we do not have the means, including through autonomously financed activity with a reduction in party dues, then all our political work is doomed to failure. In this connection it is necessary to clarify the sentence: "Property and monetary funds of the CPSU are party property." The meaning of the last two words is not clear. We had national property before. I am convinced that each piece of property should have its own subject. Either the local organization or the rayon party organization or the

gorkom or the Central Committee. And there is no reason for us to cloud this issue.

A.V. Buzgalin, Doctor of Economic Sciences

Concerning the "Marxist Platform" of the CPSU, in spite of the fact that it was created only two months ago the most incredible rumors have already begun to circulate. One British journal wrote that Ye.K. Ligachev was the leader of the "Marxist Platform" in the CPSU and that it is being created with Bakatin's money. In fact the "biggest" apparatchiks in our platform are the instructors of the raykoms and gorkoms who come to us to hear what we are talking about and see what we are doing. The platform was created as a democratic movement of communists who think that socialism and the communist option are also a path to democracy.

More concretely: We proceed from the fact that there is now a crisis in the party, and this is not fancy words nor frightening people because it is fashionable; this is the point of departure for evaluating today's situation in the party and for our positive program. Why? Because anti-Soviets are shouting at us from the mass media. They are shouting because we have led the party and the country into this situation. Under the aegis of the party, under the sign of the party an antipopular policy has been followed and a totalitarian-bureaucratic system has developed. Is this true or not?

Under the guise of the party, unfortunately, its leadership and its Central Committee have for decades lied to the people's faces. Read the newspapers from Brezhnev's times. For five years the course shifted from the right to the left and from the left to the right. The government's economic program almost coincides with the program of our liberal democratic pro-bourgeois circles and this again is under the guise of the Communist Party. What kind of course is this? What is the outcome? It was precisely to solve problems like this that the "Marxist Platform" was formed. We understand that there are various forces in the party, there are social democratic tendencies, and a considerable number of communists are sympathetic to them.

There are neo-Stalinist tendencies and there are those whom we call honest communists, but there is an immense swamp which is prepared to support any leader and, for instance, in Eastern Europe it was glad to support anticommunists and those who turn in their party cards. This is also the truth. Let us look the truth in the face.

So what should we do, where is the positive side? Perhaps this sounds like an eloquent theoretical phrase: "Socialism, movement toward communism, is the living creativity of the people." Only we can organize and consolidate ourselves and solve our problems.

What follows from this conclusion? Let us take a closer look. In the economic area we are always being offered programs that go upward, in the interests and under the aegis of the old bureaucracy. In literally a couple of months a new variant will appear—a democratically regulated market. Actually it is a program in the interests of the technocracy, a new class of businessmen. But can there perhaps still be a reform from below, in the interests of the workers? You say: But what does that mean? Our platform suggests some first steps, the more so since there were theoretical developments.

Above all, it seems to me that the people are capable of taking under their own control the solutions to the most vital problems. For instance, coordinating prices of the card system with the supply system. Could the lower-level organizations do something here? They can—there is international experience, there is the experience of consumer unions which have controlled prices, which have controlled quality and the products list, and which may have provided cards but they were democratic ones applicable to the entire territorial system and not based on arbitrary departmental decisions.

Are any alternatives to unemployment and the labor market being suggested? They are. For instance, we received support at the congress from independent worker movements in Novokuznetsk when they said: Sweden has experience. We have had our own experience when the independent trade unions created a system of flexible regulation of employment. They do not produce unemployment, they provide the possibility of living and retraining under the conditions of structural changes.

Is there experience in any kind of transfer of certain economic functions to the worker or the labor collective and not to the director, such as leasing or some other form? There is. This is self-management, which the government is actually attacking today and which would also actually be supported by any labor organization with which we have had contact.

What about social security—how do we traditionally provide this? We place our funds in the hands of the social security department, in the safekeeping of those who are in the tightest position. And yet there is an alternative. Every organization that represents the interests of those who are deprived receives the funds itself and it decides how to spend them. If it does not work, they do not do it, the wrong ones have been chosen, so things must be done differently.

There are rough outlines of how to conduct an economic reform from below in the interests of the workers.

I have very little time and therefore I will be succinct.

In politics, we think that today we must provide for releasing the power into the hands of the democratic block of social mass organizations of the socialist option. Unfortunately, many professional politicians are appearing who side with either pure parliamentarianism, which will proclaim a democracy but will actually lead to power of the politicians, or else they side with the old bureaucratic system. But where is the alternative? What will happen if we give the power to this block? Anarchy

and disorder, which we have already encountered many times. It seems to us that there is a model of socialist democracy that is based on self-management from below, whereby the local soviets rely on local self-management organs—on the councils of labor collectives, those same consumer clubs, and so forth. We have experience in extensive participation of the masses and mass movements of workers, consumers, ecologists, and so forth in management at the national economic level. When decisions are being developed by the Supreme Soviet without the assistance of the apparatus of the Council of Ministers, when "the fox is allowed into the hen house," and with the help of these mass democratic movements. The simplest, most elementary first example, the diversion of the Siberian rivers, showed that these apparent dilettantes could do more than the professionals from the ministries and departments. They could protect the interests of the workers. And anyone can participate in these movements, everyone can work in them, and they contain the smallest number of politicians.

Finally, about the party. We are told a lot about privileges, and this has become a political slogan. I do not want to repeat this. But the problem has not been solved yet. But up to this point they have been giving the impression that this problem is secondary. But let us be honest: Even we are living high on the hog. We have no caviar, but the most luxurious items are being sold at state prices that do not exist in the country, even at this conference. And what is happening above us? People know this. People will not believe us until we stop doing this, unfortunately. Do you understand?

The second thing. And this is about party property. We have gotten used to saying that this comes from party dues. But how much have we taken from our labor collectives when all the party committees were putting in their bit? I think it has long been time to figure out where the pluses and minuses for the party are. The people know about this and will not believe us until we do this. And we must do this under the supervision of mass organizations of workers, and not in hiding, behind closed doors—even if it is done by conference delegates and not a commission.

And the main thing our party should do is understand that today the people do not need simply slogans about the vanguard role or parliamentarianism. We must prove that with the help of communists, the working class, the intelligentsia, and the peasantry can organize themselves so that they can solve their own problems and not always rely on professionals. If the party is able to work in democratic movements, is able to persuade the labor confederation to follow it, and is able to lead the strike committees—we will win. If not, we are doomed to failure and to the same thing that happened in Eastern Europe. [passage omitted]

A.Ya. Kostin, Chief of the Political Administration of the Moscow Air Defense District

Comrades! Allow me to discuss two problems that are bothering Armenian communists. Here is the first. When evaluating the political situation in society, Armenian communists ask themselves the question: Who are we? Defenders of the socialist homeland of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or occupation troops? Apologists for conservatism and opponents of national self-awareness? Under conditions where, unfortunately, the union-wide law is not enforced, and the laws of a number of republics contradict it, military servicemen and members of their families have ended up essentially defenseless. You can imagine how this affects the moral condition of the personnel and above all officers and warrant officers.

Tell me, please, in what civilized state are military servicemen forced to resort to demonstrations, to use picket lines, and to write appeals defending their rights? You will not find such a state. You understand that the question is not a departmental one, for the situation today is becoming more and more uncertain and is out of the control of state organs. And the general position of Armenian communists is this.

Today only resolute actions, only the fulfillment of the law and our Constitution can consolidate the society. If we do not do this ourselves, apparently, somebody else will do it for us.

Second: problems of political struggle within the Army. The comrade delegates have asked questions here. The Armed Forces have ended up in the center of the political struggle for power and they are increasingly experiencing moral and psychological pressure. The assessment here is changing today. Certain forces are now trying to switch from direct defamation of the Army to spreading their influence within it and to make it their ally. The tactics are also changing. Two arguments have been placed in the foreground today: The current Army leaders are not capable of conducting a military reform, and the second is depoliticization of the Army.

As concerns the former, not only do the mass media have an opinion but one can also hear about this at meetings of the Supreme Soviet where they are calling to reduce and cut back the armed forces since they are spending the people's money without restraint.

We are not militant hawks and we welcome the relaxation of tensions. But we are in favor of a careful prognosis of the military and political situation and balanced, adequate measures taking into account the lessons and mistakes of the past.

Yes, the Armed Forces are on the threshold of reform. Its concept is presented in the article by the defense minister in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. We are in favor of extensively enlisting our personnel and our community in it. Much is being said today about a professional army. And we are even in favor of this. But those who advocate a

professional army immediately are obviously not aware of the experiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with hiring military servicemen for R300 per month—this is the average wage of officer personnel. The result was nil.

Unfortunately, these and other arguments have not been presented to public opinion and there is persistent promotion of the idea that the current leaders are not capable of conducting a reform and must be replaced. But by whom and in whose interests? It is not difficult to see that this is an attempt to separate the Army and drive a wedge in between various categories of our officer personnel.

And regarding depoliticization of the Army, there is a lot of speculation about this today. They say the political organs are offshoots of Stalinism, that the armies of civilized countries do not have such things today, that the party political apparatus is robbing the tax payers. But let me assure you, Comrades, that this is complete disinformation of the people.

The party political apparatus today amounts to about two percent of the personnel, including military journalists and instructors. And expenditures on them are one-fourth the amount spent at the Pentagon.

Historical experience teaches us that the Army cannot be outside of politics. Not a single army in the world can get along without a political institution; they are called different things but essentially they are the same.

Today they are speaking about eliminating party membership. But when a person turns in his party card does this really mean that he is abandoning his positions and views? Even V.I. Lenin, in his day, said that an army cannot be, never has been, and never will be neutral. And further: Anyone who does not involve the Army in politics transforms the Russian soldiers into servants of the "Black Hundred."

As the experience of the East European countries shows, if the communists leave the Army they will immediately be replaced by other political forces. Who stands to gain from this today? Only those who want destabilization.

Thus the position of the majority of Army communists is this: There should be political organs, but within the framework of the reform their functions, tasks, and work methods should be changed.

Comrades! The logic of history convinces us that in any society the army, performing its political function, serves as a guarantee of stability and national harmony. Therefore let us correctly evaluate the political struggle that is being waged around the Army. In this struggle, in our view, the CPSU cannot and does not have the right to end up at a disadvantage.

S.B. Stankevich, Deputy Chairman of the Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies

I am afraid that my speech may go beyond my allotted five minutes but if what I have to say is not interesting you may stop me. This way I will assure myself against spending too much time.

In my speech I should like to touch upon three basic aspects, cursorily, to be sure, because of time constraints: the situation in the country, the situation in Moscow, and my personal assessment of what is happening in the party.

As concerns the situation in the country, in my view we are experiencing a turning point, a period of transition. In the near future we will have to change from the attempts to modernize the existing regime, which have exhausted themselves, to a really radical reorganization, a reorganization that affects the economic, political, and ideological foundations of our society.

At this point I would not want to engage in the polemic surrounding the government program for changing over to a market economy; from my viewpoint it is much closer to the truth with respect to its proclaimed ideals than the program of economic stabilization that was advanced at the end of last year, but nonetheless it is insufficient and inadequate in terms of funds.

At the same time, since the goal of a fairly rapid and energetic changeover to the market has been pro[illegible] I would like at this time to single out a positive [illegible]. For the first time an opportunity is opening u[illegible] a strategic alliance of all forces, from moderate to radical, that are in favor of authentic reform. It is this that makes it possible to actually move on to the stage of a resolute transformation of our society.

Moscow's position in this situation is especially difficult. Moscow is a gigantic city where one can see a superconcentration of problems that are inherent in the country, which could not be seen behind the facade and which are now being revealed and go far beyond our previous ideas. It will be necessary to prepare for difficulties and it will be necessary to prepare for rapid and effective utilization of power and at the same time to open up and expand the field for free political and economic activity.

To a considerable degree Moscow is a city of pensioners, there are more than 2 million of them, every fourth person—as you can understand, this is a socially vulnerable category.

Moscow is to a considerable degree a city of bureaucrats, city employees, and only about 40 percent of the population is employed in the sphere of so-called material production which, incidentally, produces little for the consumer market. All the rest are employees. With an actual changeover to the market at least the two categories I mentioned would suffer. We can see on the streets

hundreds of thousands of people looking for work and wishing to go through the professional retraining system which we do not yet have.

We must also protect the rapidly growing category of people who are coming to Moscow from around the country, living here for months with the intention of receiving government assistance, rather rarely receiving it, and constantly appealing to the Moscow leaders. This is a heavy burden on the city but we do not have the right to reject it. And we do not have the right to leave people without assistance. I cannot rule out the possibility that with the changeover to the market this burden will even increase.

The city budget is extremely limited. We must look for possibilities of mass attraction of nonbudget funds. The city must become a real entrepreneur and earn money. In this case when speaking of the city I have in mind above all the system of Moscow soviets.

Taking advantage of the fact that in the hall today are leaders of Moscow enterprises and leaders of many institutions and departments, I would like to draw your attention to all these circumstances and call for immediate cooperation with the Soviet authorities in Moscow so that we will be as prepared as possible for the inevitable difficulties. The first commodity exchange was opened in Moscow a couple of weeks ago. Its members enter into direct economic relations and have been given the right to exchange wholesale batches of goods and contract prices.

This, of course, is a modest step but it is a real step toward the market, and I think that each real step toward this market now is worth perhaps a dozen programs.

I think Moscow can stay ahead of the process. Moscow can be a unique testing ground, a field for demonstrating the possibilities of the market. And if the government indeed suggests a package of radical economic reforms, it can always say that we can believe in this package of reforms because these methods are already working in Moscow, they are already working in Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and certain other large cities.

Our next step is not so pleasant as opening up a commodity exchange but it is quite necessary. It will be a kind of likeness of a commodity exchange. It will be a system of professional retraining of personnel for Moscow. This is not because we are headed for unemployment deliberately and not simply because we do not want it to catch us unawares. We want to be ready for this so that later we will not have to throw something together in a hurry. Therefore the enterprises that would like to determine their priorities in professional retraining of personnel ahead of time, when changing over to various kinds of products or when completing various operations for conversion, can act immediately in cooperation with the Moscow Soviet. We can anticipate the corresponding needs of Moscow enterprises for a system of professional retraining of personnel.

We intend to make real enterprise possible in Moscow and, if this receives support from the Moscow Soviet and the rayon soviets, we will begin with trade and the sphere of services.

Moreover, as we open up possibilities of new forms of economic activity, independent of the state, it is extremely important not to forget to give equal opportunities to existing forms of activity—I have in mind state enterprises, which are in an extremely difficult position. If the government withdraws its orders and if the government changes the system of material and technical supply, large state enterprises will immediately feel the shock. We are prepared to meet with representatives of large Moscow enterprises in order to develop a joint program for changing these enterprises over to the new form of management. Some of these enterprises can be reprofiled and some of them can be changed over to leasing and joint stock forms.

We are prepared to support the enterprises in each concrete case. Some of them can become municipal enterprises and conclude the corresponding agreements with the Moscow City Soviet.

I hope that the Council of Ministers, which according to law should determine the list of property and the list of enterprises that can be turned over to municipal property, will not delay in taking this very important step.

Before the end of the summer we intend to open up in Moscow the Moscow Joint Stock Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This bank will be based on joint stock ownership and the Moscow Soviet will have the controlling share. We are prepared to offer the rest of the share to Moscow enterprises, cooperatives, joint enterprises, and all who have proposed conditions that are very significant and very advantageous for the city and for Muscovites. Everything will be done extremely openly and on a competitive basis.

Land and buildings in the city are a big problem. They are the only capital Moscow and Muscovites have. We resolutely oppose having our only fixed capital degraded or turned over to anybody except for the Moscow authorities. Neither buildings nor land will be turned over to anybody for possession or for long-term leasing without the direct participation of the Moscow Soviet or Soviet authorities at other levels. The Moscow Soviet will have to be a partner in all enterprises created on the land of Moscow, basically on a joint stock basis.

In this connection we cannot but be alarmed—and I would like to consult with representatives of the Moscow party organization—by the fact that a considerable share of the buildings and property that now belongs to the Moscow party organization on the territory of Moscow is being compulsorily turned over to joint enterprises and foreign firms. And, according to our information, under conditions that are fairly disadvantageous for the city as a whole. That is, they are becoming sources for deriving profit without producing a significant return for the city. We are prepared to submit the corresponding data and

they will provide food for thought. I would not like to get into this now, but this problem exists and we should consult about it. It will take joint efforts to focus on this situation in a political light.

I am coming to what is perhaps the main thing with which I would like to address the esteemed conference delegates today. If we determine our priorities, the priorities in our political position, and ask ourselves what we are ready for—are we ready to fight or are we ready to work—I would answer decisively that we are ready to work. This is a time of crisis, a time of extreme crisis, a time of great difficulties which, as I have said, have ended up as special difficulties for Moscow. This is not the best time to satisfy political ambitions. This is not the best time, to put it mildly, to play on political passions. Therefore I call upon everyone who has made the choice for reform, who has made a choice in favor of a normal effective economy, in favor of common sense, in favor of the interests of the city and Muscovites to consolidate and work together.

In order to do this it is apparently necessary to overcome the ideological, political, organizational, and moral crisis which continues to exist within the party.

I cannot discuss this subject in detail but I must say this: The main thing we must do today is to stop lying to ourselves and stop numbing ourselves with ideological narcotics. We must stop spouting empty phrases that have no real content. It is a tragedy when a person goes up to the podium—gray at the temples, melancholy eyes—and he continues to pronounce the same old ideological formulas, and he continues the same old ritual ideological dance. But from his appearance one can see that he has understood everything, he has already understood everything, he already knows everything that is going on, and still he is compelled to continue, out of inertia or because of many years of habit or because of a fear of lying to himself. All this is inadmissible. And I would not want this to happen at the conference. Thus we can work together and we must work together, in spite of the fact that we still have ideological and political differences with the trade unions and we have many bones of contention with the trade unions, but when a serious commodity crisis arose in Moscow we took measures in conjunction with the Moscow trade unions to protect the Moscow market and the Moscow consumers, above all the most socially vulnerable strata. This does not abolish our differences but it gives us the opportunity to work together, and let us take advantage of this example in the future.

And so the time has come for a decisive choice and for resolute actions, and let us stay on top of the demands of this extremely serious moment in history. [passage omitted]

'Political Dialogue' Program Views Miner's Strike

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[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1130 GMT on 21 July carries a 50-minute "Political Dialogue" program entitled "The Miners' Hot Summer."

The program is presented in Moscow by journalist Tamara Karyakina; reports from Vorkuta are presented by Yevgeniy Zubarev, Gostelradio's (State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting) own correspondent in Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Zubarev begins by reminding viewers of Vorkuta's prison camp past and the very bad living conditions there. He then presents film clips of the mass demonstrations of 11 July, including clips of Koshkov, chairman of the Vorkuta town workers' strike committee, interviewed at the rally, in which he says:

"We consider that the workers' main demands should be the depolitization of the Army, the Navy, the KGB, the Interior Ministry, the Procuracy, education and medicine, the departure of party committees from the territories of the mines—there is nothing for the party committees to do where workers are at work, we shall sort things out ourselves—the resignation, the categorical resignation of the government of the USSR. Let the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet give some thought to the sort of policy that is now being conducted and what it is leading to, let them look at these rostrums and before taking any decisions, let them give thought: the people have yet to have their say, they have not had their say yet."

In another clip of an interview, miner Vladimir Maslov complains about the actions taken by the government just before the strike in an attempt to turn other groups of workers against the miners. In a third interview, Vladimir Kolchuganov, chairman of the trade union committee of the Yun-Yaga mine, complains that the government's decision No. 608 turned out to be a myth.

Karyakina and Zubarev then discuss the Vorkuta miners' demands:

Zubarev states: I shall tell you once again the bitter truth: the absolute majority of Vorkuta miners are acutely, fervently, and vehemently opposed to the CPSU.

Karyakina asks: Who are they in favor of, what is the alternative to this? Whom do they trust?

Zubarev answers: The alternative is the power of the soviets. The Vorkuta miners are greatly attracted to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

Karyakina asks: He had a meeting with them, didn't he?

Zubarev answers: Not very long ago, at the end of June, on 26 June, representatives of the Vorkuta miners had a

meeting with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin here in Moscow. (video shows Zubarev searching his brief case) I have something here.

Karyakina asks: Do you have a letter? (Zubarev pulls a newspaper cutting from his briefcase)

Zubarev answers: No, the results of the meeting are already known throughout the republic, in Vorkuta and in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Here I have the ZAPOLYARYE newspaper. We need a credit of trust, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, stated at the meeting with the Vorkuta miners.

Karyakina asks: Is he handing out credits?

Zubarev comments: There is an enormous amount of material here.

Karyakina asks: He is handing out credit. What is he promising?

Zubarev answers: This is what he says in particular. The Union government is losing trust catastrophically before our eyes, especially in connection with its latest proposal on prices. That is altogether nightmarish. The Union government has already lost its credit of trust even abroad. Comrade Yeltsin goes on to tell the Vorkuta miners: After the end of the congress—the 28th party congress, that is—I intend to visit a number of areas, including your own area of Vorkuta, in order to discuss your problems with people on the spot. It is now necessary to take a look at what is indeed being done with this Union decision. As I see it, they have given it up. In addition, the newspaper report says that in the conversation, the Vorkuta miners proposed: It is necessary, Boris Nikolayevich, to create a committee on the workers' movement. Yeltsin replied: Let us ponder well how this can best be done, whether in the form of a subcommittee, a separate commission, or something else. The idea itself is very interesting. We have not had such a committee.

Karyakina asks: What will happen next, in your opinion, after this strike? People have started working. They have, as it were, proclaimed their requirements. Will they have sufficient patience for all the requests of the new Russian government to be carried out?

Zubarev states: I asked them and they say: Let us see. If there are no changes, the situation will remain in force. The 11 July strike was a warning strike and a political one.

Zubarev goes on to point out that the Vorkuta party organization enjoys fine modern buildings while local educational and cultural facilities are in a terrible state. The strike committee is housed in dilapidated premises once occupied by the first Vorkuta town party committee.

Karyakina then recalls that "two events at the start of July were the focus of attention for the country. On 2 July, the 28th CPSU Congress opened in Moscow, and a little earlier, the Confederation of Labor announced a political strike. For half a month, these two focuses of attention grew steadfastly closer together. Right at the start, the congress delegates adopted an appeal to the miners calling on them to observe prudence and not to strike a blow at the country's economy. Then they returned to their own affairs. Only occasionally were there flashes of lightning of the approaching thunderstorm at brief press conference in the foyer of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses."

The video then shows Ryzhkov being interviewed by an unidentified correspondent in the foyer:

The correspondent states: The miners want you to resign. What are your thoughts on this? What is your reaction?

Ryzhkov answers: I am aware that the miners want the government to resign.

The correspondent comments: Yes, and you are its chairman.

Ryzhkov states: Yes, I am the chairman of the government.

The correspondent asks: What is your reaction then to this matter?

Ryzhkov answers: Well, I cannot say that I am indifferent in my reaction. My attitude to this matter is, of course, very serious. I think that the miners are still reflecting on whether or not they require at present a change of government.

The program then moves to a different location. A screen caption indicates this is Kemerovo on 10 July. Recorded interviews are broadcast in which various inhabitants express their views for and against the strike. Journalist Aleksandr Kolpakov states: "The call for the party committees and the party organizations to withdraw from enterprises and state institutions put forward by the soviet of workers' committees was first supported by the oblast soviet of peoples deputies and soon began to be implemented."

Kolpakov then interviews V.A.Glushenko who has gone back to work as a miner because the post of full-time official has been abolished, although the party organization continues to function there.

A miner in working clothes standing in front of a group of his colleagues is shown saying: "Please, engage in propaganda work, but do not do it in such a way as to turn the enterprise into a political club. I have said once again: This is a coal mining enterprise and it should be engaged only in its production activity. And everything else should be outside the walls. And third, why is depolitization needed? As long as the members of the Interior Ministry, the members of the government and so

on, in education, are members of your party, you will continue to influence and put the brake on this. Why? Because there is the concept of party discipline. You cannot deny that. That is all."

The video then cuts to show an interview with Ryzhkov in the corridor.

Ryzhkov states: If we were to go for a sharp demarcation it would be impermissible for the party, and may very well end badly. We have to find—to take steps toward one another and, of course, within limits, find compromises that are...

An unidentified correspondent asks: So you think there will be no split in the party?

Ryzhkov answers: I think that if we take a very flexible stance and are not instransigent toward one another we can find a common solution, and I am very much against any split—although clearly people will have differing views, and it is no longer realistic, of course, to hope that there will always be nothing but unanimity in any party, and in ours above all. But I think that if a specific section of communists have their own angle on various issues, it will make it possible to conduct a debate and come up with definite solutions. It will be, I would say, a sort of motivation for the party to keep constantly on the move and find ways.

The video then shows a workers' assembly while the following commentary is heard: "One year ago the demands here were only economic; moreover the miners then shied away from people who came to them with political promptings. But the past year has shown that by making economic demands alone we have achieved nothing—a phrase taken from the statement by the Kuzbass Council of Workers' Committees on the eve of the strike." An unidentified man then states that workers' assemblies voted unanimously for the removal of all party organizations from their places of work.

The commentary then continues: "The workers' movement in the country has entered a new phase. It is already shaping up into a solid political tendency with strongly pronounced anti-communist feelings." The camera meanwhile pans across posters on a wall readings: "We demand fulfillment of the decision to hand over CPSU premises to children"; "Depoliticization of the entire state apparatus, the Armed Forces, the KGB, the MVD, and judicial bodies"; "The Ryzhkov government must resign"; "Our support for Russian sovereignty!"; "Intelligence, honor, and conscience are incompatible with the party of communists"; "Palaces for children, shacks for demolition!"; "On leaving the CPSU help your comrade to do the same"; "No to the communists!"; "The Central Committee must answer!"

Video then shows Gorbachev being interviewed by reporters on a street.

Gorbachev states: Well, you know what position I took when that situation emerged at about the same time last year. After all, at the same time I took, generally speaking, a position of support for the justly formulated demands of the miners, as what Comrade Slynkov and others, who had visited there and had made a tour of all the mining towns, reported to me about the degree of acuteness of the situation showed that, no doubt, the miners' stance reflected not some irresponsibility on their part, but apparently that the situation required them to take extreme measures. We said then that it meant that they had no other option, and at the time I sided with the miners. Similarly, the government sided with the miners and joint work started then, under difficult conditions. Frankly speaking, other sectors of the economy adopted a critical view, as the situation in other areas is not simple. There was even criticism leveled at the center and the government for allegedly making concessions under pressure from the miners. But we had to do that. I am convinced that that was not a mistake, that was the right thing to do, because we had to meet the miners halfway to alleviate the situation. The decision is at the stage of being implemented. Disputes are under way here, and criticism regarding the progress of implementations is being voiced.

Unidentified correspondent interrupts: Especially as at the time there were economic demands, whereas now there are demands of a political nature.

Gorbachev comments: I think that, perhaps, the dissatisfaction with the course of the implementation of social and economic provisions of the decision is evolving and acquiring the following nature now: If that is how things are, let us raise directly the issue of the government. You know, I would address the miners with the following appeal: We are not deaf, after all, not deaf. Everybody here in the center and the congress, as you can see, reacts to the miners' position. I think we will all deal with this together with the miners so as not to upset mutual understanding or, at least, to restore it where it has been upset. And through you—it is good that you are here at hand—I want to address all our miners, those from Kuzbass, Donetsk, Vorkuta, all our coalminers, so that they heed our appeal: We need concord very much now, concord with the miners, as after all they are the guards of labor. I think they will understand.

The video goes on to show a row of miners sitting on the ground. The commentary notes that "a year ago the miners went out into the squares with the slogans of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: 'Economic independence for enterprises'; 'Power to the soviets'; 'The economy for the good of the people.' A year later they sent him their greetings in an envelope marked: political strike. Thousands of workers sent in their party cards. And that may be the saddest result of 11 July." A miner returning for work the next day says in an interview: "I think nothing will come of it."

The video returns to the Gorbachev interview. The unidentified correspondent asks: Mikhail Sergeyevich, one last question. The people of the Kuzbass are

expecting you in person. Do you plan to be... Gorbachev interrupts, saying "I have a duty to the Kuzbass."

The caption then reads: "After the Strike. Donetsk 12 July 1990." The commentator says: "The miners went to work again. They went back in an organized and well-disciplined fashion. That is to the credit of the workers' committees and strike committees. So what really happened ten days ago on 11 July? Was it a sort of tribute to an anniversary of their own making—the anniversary of last year's strike? No, evidently not. We might recall that last year's strike was not preceded by anything. It came like a bolt from the blue. This year's strike was preceded by the first congress of the country's miners, which analyzed the progress in the implementation of Resolution 608 and came to the conclusion that the government had cheated the miners." A group of miners are interviewed on what their thoughts are as they go down in the cage: "To get to the bottom as quickly as possible, and to get out again as quickly as possible."

The commentary continues: "They are in no mood for confidences. This is apparently because they have realized that even the most sincere statements do not change anything." Over a video of miners working underground, the commentary says: "Here underground they have got more money. Has anything changed on the surface as a result? No, nothing. Deficit, inflation—these have eroded the increment, and in practice there has been no gain. Another thing has not changed on the surface. There has been no change in the official reaction to the miners' actions: People are seeing and hearing in their actions what they want to see and hear, and not what really exists. Last year there was talk of exclusively economic demands. This year the official line is that someone is behind the miners' actions. Perhaps more than any other job, the mining profession has been surrounded by whole decades of deliberate, extreme lies. We used to train ourselves to follow a sort of conditioned reflex: if the first word was miner, the second had to be record. The miners were not people who risked their lives deep underground and breathed in the dust there. Miners have been people who set records. These lies stand behind the miners, and they are sick and tired of them."

Miners are then shown complaining about conditions in the pits, as the commentary remarks: "The accident rate and the statistics that have just come to light turn out to be simply blood-curdling: six miners' lives for each million tonnes of coal extracted." The miners invite the film crew to the coal face to see what things are really like. However, it is explained, this is not permitted because of technical safety regulations. The commentator then says: "The miners are willing to work harder for a better life. But if one shift after another brings them not a step nearer to a normal human existence, patience runs out. As for work for work's sake, or for the sake of records, there can be no return to that ideology."

The video then shifts to the entrance of Skochinskiy Mine, where miners criticize living conditions. The commentator says: "Petr Kropotkin once said that destitution and despair lead a people to rebellion, whereas the hope for an improved life leads to revolution. The miners have such hopes today, and perestroyka has no right to betray them. You remember the famous definition of a revolutionary situation—as one in which those below do not want to, and those above cannot, live in the old way. I think that there is no doubt that those below do not want to; but what about those above? The lads above work in greater comfort than the lads below. What they still need to realize is that one cannot carry on working in the old way. None of the old principles or slogans are suitable if life itself has brought forward new ones. They must genuinely see and hear the people rather than look for some imaginary figures behind them." At this point the camera shows an empty office corridor, and then looks from a window at a demonstration in support of Donetsk miners in the square below.

There follows an interview with Nikolay Volynko, cochairman of the Donetsk Workers' Strike Committee, recorded on the day after the strike. He comments: "They tried to split us, they tried to disinform people by saying that there would be no strike. In our leaders' speeches on television and in the press many are saying that there is somebody pushing the miners. But what is pushing us is our own destitution, the ruin of our country. That is what is pushing us. And we are fed up with it, simply fed up. We want to live a normal life." The people should have a voice in governmental appointments, claims Volynko, arguing that the minister of the coal industry should resign, having sat through two miners' strikes. The workers are fulfilling their obligations, but life is not improving, says Volynko. The government has increased pay without ensuring goods to back it up. Volynko remarks: "They should resign as they are incapable of solving the country's crisis." Volynko then reads out a letter of support from fishermen in the Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet. Pointing to a pile of telegrams on his desk, he says that most of them express solidarity.

The program concludes with an interview with Anatoliy Motspan, a technical college lecturer, who supports the strike committee as "it is the only hope for people who want elementary order in our country." The main thing is that they be honest in their intentions. He states that "we must be grateful to the miners for rousing us properly for our just cause. Just think—five years ago the government, the country's leadership, told us that there were 18 million administrative staff in the country, and that the number would be cut. Fine, but three or four years have passed, and it is reported that the number has increased by 120 or 140,000. How can you mess around with the people like that? No other country in the world has such a high ratio between the number of workers and the number of people just hanging around, as Lenin himself said."

The commentator concludes, saying: "It is not only in the Donetsk strike committee that they think this way. Every day dozens and hundreds of people come here

with requests, complaints, and ideas. They come here because they think the same way. But apart from people, there are telegrams coming in, and if one must know who is behind the miners it is whole collectives of letter writers. It looks as if the people are behind the miners, and this is what gives them faith." The video shows Volynko reading out names of cities from a pile of telegrams.

Western Republics

Acceptance of Ivashko's Resignation Viewed

PM2007113590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Sergey Tsikora under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Almost Silent Parting"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet accepted S. Ivashko's resignation as head of the republic without expressing words of gratitude or reproach.

This attitude on the part of the parliament toward the former leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and subsequent chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet conveys the contradictory feelings evoked by V. Ivashko's departure. Emotions were further fueled by his absence from parliament when his resignation was being discussed and the fact—which subsequently became known—that during a recent visit to Kiev he gave a television interview but did not deem it necessary to call on the Supreme Soviet. Vladimir Antonovich may have his own reasons, but his decision to leave the republic has produced a very negative reaction among the people.

When the question of nominations for the post of head of the republic was put to the Supreme Soviet, deputies lined up to speak. The presidium recorded 27 contenders' names. At least two weeks will be needed to discuss them.

But the surprises of 18 July in the Ukrainian parliament did not end there. It was announced from its lofty rostrum that the USSR president had invited representatives of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to the next sitting of the Council of the Federation, which will examine questions concerned with switching to a market economy and concluding a union treaty. The invitation was accepted and representatives chosen, but the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium did not vest them with the authority to make any statement to the sitting on the republic's behalf or to sign official documents.

Miners' Housing, Health Program Established

LD2107160990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] A program for the social and economic development of mining towns and settlements in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1991-95 has been worked out by the government of the Ukraine and the oblast executive committees of the republic's coal regions jointly with the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry and other ministries and departments and with the participation of miners' labor collectives. The program has been approved by the country Council of Minsters.

In accordance with it, an increase in building and commissioning of residential housing, hospitals, polyclinics, schools, children's pre-school establishments and municipal facilities is envisaged. The record of miners' health will have great importance. It must be drawn up by the USSR Ministry of Health by 1 September and introduced in the treatment and preventive establishments of the coal regions, moreover not in the Ukraine alone. The program gives a lot of attention to improvizing the ecological situation. In particular, from 1 July 1990, the government of the country closed chemical works in Gorlovka, the poisonous waste from which caused the poisoning and death of miners. The construction of housing and other facilities envisaged by the program will be provided by a considerable expansion of the construction industry base.

More on Removal of Lenin, Marx Monuments

PM2107191590 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 22 Jul 90 p 2

[Report by V. Shcherban under the "Reporting Details" rubric: "Ternopol: Minus Lenin and Marx Monuments?"]

[Text] A session of Ternopol City Soviet adopted a decision without precedent in the country's history: The Lenin and Marx monuments are to be dismantled by 21 September, the 450th anniversary of the city.

We telephoned Ye. Sosnitskaya, Ternopol party gorkom [city party committee] secretary for ideology.

[Shcherban] Yelena Nikolayevna, the decision of the local deputy corps is bound to shock. Be that as it may, it has been adopted. As a deputy, you were present at this session. Tell us what were the servants of the people guided by in addopting this decision?

[Sosnitskaya] What were they guided by?... In our soviet most deputies are behind the so-called democratic bloc. Of 85 deputies present at the session—this is the quorum—21 abstained, and 64 voted "in favor."

[Shcherban] And what was the reaction of the local inhabitants to this decision?

[Sosnitskaya] The older generation is intimidated and outraged, the attitude of certain members of the democratic bloc is ambivalent too, but many of them nonetheless support the decision on the basis of articles which have criticized the activities of the Bolsheviks during the first postrevolution years.

[Shcherban] Does this mean that only the dismantling of the monuments was discussed at the session? No alternative proposals as to their future fate were submitted?

[Sosnitskaya] It was proposed to "transfer" the Lenin monument from the central square to a different location and to replace it with a monument to Taras Shevchenko. But unfortunately the view prevailed that it should be dismantled and sold to interested organizations.

[Shcherban] And such clients do exist?

[Sosnitskaya] Yes.

[Shcherban] How much will it cost to dismantle?

[Sosnitskaya] Around R300,000. But we are still hoping that this will not happen. There is no law on local self-management as yet. And the law on the protection of cultural monuments is still in force, I hope. Furthermore, Lenin monuments were built by decision of the Council of Ministers. But at present, during this transitional stage between laws, no laws are functioning. It's chaos. At that historic session, as you described it, I told them: "You are suffering from a Bolshevism syndrome! It is possible to reject what went before, it is possible to make every effort to prevent it from ever repeating itself, but if we set about breaking up and lashing out at everything again—how will it all end?"

[Shcherban] And what is to replace the Lenin and the Karl Marx monuments?

[Sosnitskaya] Deputies raised the question of erecting monuments to Franko, Shevchenko, Krushelnitskaya... To people who did a great deal for our national rebirth. To our great shame and regret we only have monuments to these two leaders at present, while Gorkiy and Shevchenko... I believe that this discrepancy was a big mistake which also contributed to some extent to the adoption of the latest decision.

[Shcherban] And what was the gorkom's reaction?

[Sosnitskaya] The bureau met immediately. We backed the deputies' decision to erect monuments to those who have real ties with our region and its rebirth. But we regard the dismantling of the monuments as an act of vandalism and barbarism. We must get to understand that democracy ends where diktat begins.

Belorussia Adopts New Version of Article 6

LD2007155290 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 0515 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] Our republic has finally made a stride toward genuine democracy. This happened yesterday, at the morning session of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, when the people's deputies adopted Articles 6 and 49 of the republic's constitution in a new edition.

True, Article 7 still remains as it was. Although a majority of the deputies voted for changing its content, the votes cast were short of the required number required to make a constitutional change.

Rumored Sale of Moldavian Party Building Denied

PM2307091190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent A. Pasechnik "Rejoinder": "'Canard' About 35 Million"]

[Text] When they opened the most recent issue of the Moldova trade unions' weekly GOLOS NARODA, readers in the republic at once noticed an article conspicuously placed on the front page under the intriguing title "$35 Million." The article begins no less intriguingly: "This is how much, according to a preliminary agreement, the UN international center 'Management in Ecology and the Economy' is willing to pay for the building housing the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and Kishinev City Committee [Gorkom]..."

What a piece of news! For an explanation I hurried to see G. Kushnir, administrator of affairs of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee: What is all this, is this the way it has been decided to supplement the party budget? This is really a deal of the century, no doubt about it... But it turned out that the Central Committee itself had learned of the "deal of the century" from the newspaper.

"It is the first time I have heard of this figure, and even of the idea of selling our building, let alone of a 'preliminary agreement.' Who has agreed with whom? The facts are different. We handed over the Kishinev Gorkom [city party committee] building to a children's art school back in the fall. Recently we squeezed together to make room again and took in the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee in order to provide more accommodation for the republic Supreme Soviet. Similar changes are taking place in the rayons. But at the same time, we are firmly sticking to the position confirmed by the 28th party congress: The sale, transfer, and other forms of alienation of CPSU property are possible only with due regard for the opinion of communists and according to the procedure laid down by the CPSU Statutes and the law."

The situation regarding the 35 million was not cleared up in Kishinev Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] either. City Mayor V. Dobrya also spread his hands in bewilderment.

"The article says that the idea has the full support of the republic and city leadership. True, but what idea? That of opening a branch of the said international center in Kishinev. But there is nothing about the Central Committee building, nor about millions."

...You suddenly find out that someone is intending to auction off your own house. But then it becomes clear that it is an elementary "canard." That is the matter in a

nutshell, and that could be an end to the matter. But one worrying circumstance prevents this. "Canards" like this, which are now appearing in considerable numbers in Moldova, are increasingly served up topped with the piquant sauce of intensified attacks on the party, the falsification of its past and its present, the formation of a sharply negative attitude to communists, and direct insults and threats. The further escalation of this dangerous tactic may still further exacerbate the already extremely complex sociopolitical situation in the republic.

Caucasus

Latest 'Bandit Operations' in Armenia Reported

PM2207132790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedev under the "Direct Line" rubric: "From the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center. Bandit Attacks"]

[Text] The situation in Armenia remains tense. Groups of extremists continue to mount attacks on rayon internal affairs departments and GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspection Administration] posts, mainly for the purpose of seizing weapons.

Of late they have been mounting similar bandit operations also against Soviet Army subunits.

Late on the evening of 20 July, at 2300 hours, a group of terrorists attacked a post guarding a firearms and ammunition dump in Kirovakan. Earlier they had managed to cut the power supply to the garrison. A reserve group, which came to the assistance of the guard, came under fire from automatic weapons. In the ensuing fire-fight squad leader Junior Sergeant N. Elmuratov was mortally wounded. The bandits fled under cover of darkness.

And here is a fresh report on the latest act of terrorism. On 20 July, at around 0200 hours in the night, a large group of extremists mounted an armed attack on an army subunit some 20 km southwest of Yerevan. They cut telephone communications and seized 37 automatic weapons with 870 cartridges and a grenade launcher. The criminals fled in their cars.

Investigations are in progress in connection with both these incidents.

...So here are two new cases of banditry and terrorism against Army subunits. They bear the same hallmark: Attack under cover of darkness, on the sly, a shot in the back, banking on the element of surprise. And they pursue the same aim—seizure of weapons. Against whom will they be used, and how long can this escalation of violence and recklessness continue? People have given up waiting for answers to these question. When will the law come into force?

AFP Report

AU2107135290 Paris AFP in English 1220 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 21 (AFP)—A large number of Armenian extremists attacked a Soviet Army unit in the early hours of Friday [20 July] some 20 kilometres 12 miles south-west of Yerevan, the Armed Forces RED STAR (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA) daily reported here Saturday. The extremists seized 37 automatic rifles, ammunition and a grenade launcher, the paper said. The paper did not say whether there were any casualties, but added that the attackers escaped.

In another incident on Wednesday, a sergeant was killed after a group of "terrorists" attacked an arms depot in Kirovakan, northern Armenia. The "bandits" escaped, the paper said.

Union Official Views Armenian Situation

PM2007144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jul 90 Second Edition p8

[TASS report: "Situation Remains Complex"]

[Excerpts] The first session of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet opens on 20 July. It is assumed that the question of the situation in the republic will be discussed among others. At the request of TASS correspondent V. Gondusov, Lieutenant General B. Smyslov, first deputy commander of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops, talked about the situation as it is today. [passage omitted]

[Smyslov] With their criminal actions, illegal armed formations appear to be putting on a show of strength and mainly threaten law enforcement bodies. We used to hope that the terrorists would realize the illegality and unlawfulness of their existence. But that has not happened. Essentially the tolerance shown by the republic's leadership has given them a free hand and encouraged them to take more daring, brutal actions. Not only against members of the militia and military personnel but also against their own fellow citizens, many of whom have changed their opinion about these illegal armed formations.

Passions are still being fueled with regard to the Army and Internal Troops. The movement of personnel and equipment is constantly monitored. Servicemen are still being attacked. In the Azerbaijan SSR's Kelbadzharskiy Rayon, Armenian terrorists attacked internal troop posts with submachineguns and mortars for several hours. The servicemen opened fire in response, which were really warning shots. But they could have fired in deadly earnest. Who would then be responsible for the new casualties?

I think that the republic's Supreme Soviet will make a sensible assessment of the situation and adopt a decision that will make it possible to stabilize the situation.

Armenian Deputies on 'Deportation' Remarks

NC2007115090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 20 Jul 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] A report by Zori Balayan, people's deputy of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and Robert Kocharyan, people's deputy of the republic, which is published in today's issue, states: On July (?17) 1990, at about 1700 Moscow time, the so-called (?organizational committee) in Stepanakert held discussions during which Polyanichko, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, voiced an opinion on the deportation of the Armenian residents from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. In Polyanichko's view, this should be carried out by buses and trains [word indistinct].

Having been informed of this (?impudent) provocation, we contacted the (?head) of the NKAO Internal Affairs Administration, who confirmed Polyanichko's remarks.

We appeal to the Armenian parliament, demanding that the above information be made available to the Armenian people, the Armenians (?throughout the world), and all the parliaments of the world so that they will all know that, as always, the Karabakhians will not leave the land of their fathers and will defend their homes.

Situation in Border Regions Detailed

NC2007133590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] The Armenian bandits behave in ways that are not peaceful. They continue to frequently attack the border towns of our republic. In a statement to an AZERINFORM correspondent, Shamil Allakhverdiyev, chairman of the Kazakhskiy Rayon People's Deputies Soviet Executive Committee, said:

There is not a night in which Barkhudarly town is not fired upon. This act of violence has forced us to take measures to transfer the women and children to a safer place. Only (?a number of people), including troops and a group of employees of the rayon's internal affairs department, have remained in the town. The bandits are also attacking the railway station in Barkhudarly. The freight cars bound for Armenia have to cross through this station. Their disgusting objective is quite clear. The Armenian nationalists wish to threaten the life of the railway engineers in order to make them agree not to drive the trains. Their intention is to create an uproar saying that the suffering Armenian people have again been besieged. However, regardless of the dangerous situation, the rural workers are bravely going out to take care of the cultivated fields and the cattle. It must be noted that the people are performing conscientious work regardless of the fearful conditions. Nearly 20,000 tons of grain have been heaped in the rayon thus far. The harvesting of grain in the border region has been completed, of course, under (?effective) protection.

Meanwhile, the situation in Lachinskiy Rayon has also been strained. An AZERINFORM correspondent has been informed by the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry that Armenian terrorists opened fire on a number of the employees of the operations and investigation group on 17 July. The attack of the Armenian bandits was obstructed. However, Khalilov, a militia [word indistinct], was wounded during the effort that was made to ward off the attack. He is now in the hospital. The procuracy of Lachinskiy Rayon has launched an investigation.

Gadzhikabul Rayon Party Chairman Elected

NC2007122790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] A party conference has been held in the newly established Gadzhikabul Rayon; organization was discussed. Guseynov, who earlier worked as the chairman of the [name indistinct] City People's Deputies Soviet Executive Committee, was unanimously elected by the meeting participants as the chairman of the Gadzhikabul Rayon Party Committee. Muradaliyev, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the meeting.

Tbilisi Publishing House Picketed

PM2307120790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Besik Urigashvili: "Pickets Outside Publishing House"]

[Text] Tbilisi—Georgia has found itself in an information blockade. There has not been a single newspaper in the kiosks since morning.

This has been caused by the aggravation of relations between two opposition groups: the parties belonging to the coordination center of the National Liberation Movement on the one hand and the parties united in the "roundtable" of the National Liberation Movement on the other.

On 18 July representatives of the National Democratic Party, which belongs to the coordination center, came to the editorial office of the youth newspaper AKHALGAZRDA IVERIYELI demanding the publication of a statement containing accusations against the "roundtable" leaders. The editorial office declined to publish it, giving as its reason that the accusations were too serious and unproven. The city newspaper TBILISI gave the same reason for refusing. Then they decided to place pickets outside the newspaper block of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee publishing house in order to impede the distribution of these newspapers. The aim was achieved—neither the city newspaper nor the youth newspaper reached subscribers or the retail trade that day. The next day the number of pickets increased. It was decided to prevent the publication of all

newspapers. In the evening there were clashes between the pickets and militia detachments which had come in.

In a talk with me, Robinzon Tushchurashvili, chief of the city internal affairs administration, said that the pickets had insulted the militiamen and hurled stones at them. With difficulty the militiamen were successfully restrained from retaliating.

The representatives of the parties taking part in the action said that they were obliged to resort to such an extreme measure because the republican mass media are giving representatives of the "roundtable" a broad opportunity to express their views and are blocking their opponents. At the same time the methods to which these parties themselves are resorting are far removed from models of democracy and pluralism. On the day of 19 July a group of their representatives seized the vestibule of the district Officers Center and installed pickets. The demand was to hand over the building to the city.

In the evening an appeal from the television workers to the Georgian people was read out on television. It was stated that coercion to disseminate information, from whoever it may proceed, is a gross violation of human rights... We can also resort to protest actions, the appeal said, but it is a pernicious path.

Central Asia

Police, Army Ordered To Curb Osh Unrest

LD2307091790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 23 Jul 90

[Text] News of the further aggravation of the situation in Osh Oblast has arrived from Kirgizia. Fighting between the Kirgiz and Uzbeks has taken place in the town and two residential buildings were set on fire. The situation in Uzgen rayon remains uneasy. Personnal of the law-enforcement organs and Army units have received instructions to resolutely stop the mass disturbances.

Clashes Continue

LD2207045190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 22 Jul 90

[Text] The situation in the Osh Oblast of Kirghizia still remains tense. In the oblast center and a number of rayons clashes between the Kirghiz and the Uzbek population continue. Road blocks on the routes leading out of the town have been strengthened. The hours of the curfew have been extended. In the Uzgen Rayon the Osh-Uzgen road was completely blocked yesterday, mainly by women. In Naukatskiy Rayon militia employees detained eight troublemakers who were spreading provocative rumors around. Two of them were arrested, others were fined. In some rayons hundreds of people got together and demanded that normalization of the situation and the return of refugees to their permanent addresses take place as soon as possible.

People Flee Settlements

LD2207121790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 22 Jul 90

[Text] Alarming news has again arrived from Kirghizia. A fight has taken place in Osh between Kirghizians and Uzbeks. Two houses have been set on fire. Around 3,000 people fleeing settlements tried to enter the city of Uzgen. Special measures had to be taken by military details and militiamen in order to halt the crowd. Thirteen active participants in these crimes have been arrested.

Situation 'Tense'

LD2107164490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 21 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The situation in Osh Oblast, Kirghizia, remains tense. Clashes between the Kirghiz and Uzbeks continue. There are cases of arson. Unsanctioned meetings at which the working people demand that the situation be brought back to normal as speedily as possible are taking place in the oblast center and in a number of rayons. The war, party and labor veterans have had meetings with the republican leaders in Osh and in Kara-Suyskiy Rayon. They noted unanimously that the emotionality attendant on the rallies ought, first and foremost, to be dampened, along with the grievances and counter-grievances, and that the situation ought then to be sorted out in a calm atmosphere. [video shows an armored personnel carrier on the move, a building marked "Mikrorayon Zapadnyy", entrance to Osh Market, blue-beretted soliders eating next to a jeep, two civilians and one child looking on, ramshackle village, city scene, overturned burned out passenger car next to a building]

The situaiton in Osh and in a number of rayons of the oblast remains tense. The districts and villages which used to have an ethnic mix before have begun to divide along ethnic lines—boundary strips and obstacles are springing up. Refugee camps, which have a whole range of serious welfare problems, are a sad novelty. They are in Uzgen, in (?Ael) and in Mirza-Aki, and this one is in the oblast center. It was the tourist base that provided the roof over their heads, but, as for food—the famous Osh Market is practically idle. Many shops are closed. The dairy works and other enterprises are working at half capacity. All this naturally damages the economy—the losses have exceeded R44 million and they will go higher still. Agriculture is also sustaining losses.

All this exacerbates the social and economic situation in the oblast, a situation which is serious enough as it is. It would be unfair to say that nothing has been done here to improve the life of the people, but the low living standard remains a fact. Tens of thousands of men, tens of thousands of women and young people do not have permanent employment and therefore have no earnings either. As for the child mortality rate, it gives rise to alarm over the region's stock of genetic material. This is,

of course, not the only cause of the conflict which has taken on the ugly forms of interethnic enmity. It is simply more noticeable than others. Unfortunately, even today, the emergency measures to put the fire out give rise, among some of the population, to a longing for taking things firmly in hand and to the restoration of the rule of force by the commandant's office, although it is precisely this way of doing things which, by preserving poverty and lawlessness, brought things to the point of explosion.

[Unidentified man, standing among a small group of people] The biggest question is, of course, how to reconcile both peoples, peoples who used to live in harmony and peace, as though a single family—one could only rejoice. Unfortunately, a group of people with extremist tendencies emerged—here I would choose the strongest possible word and I would use it, because when you see all this, you ask yourself how is it that they succeeded in getting thousands and tens of thousands of people to follow them? How did they succeed in getting people to quarrel with each other, in getting them so divided, something that it is now very difficult to obliterate. Here, simple solutions will be of no help. No matter who proposes them, that person fails to understand that it is now impossible. Only patience, only a desire to somehow meet each other half-way...[speaker leaves sentence unfinished]

Commission Begins Work

PM2007203190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jul 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent Yu. Razgulyayev under the rubric "Emergency Situation" "Kirghizia: Barricades in the Streets"]

[Text] Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic—A USSR Supreme Soviet special commission headed by People's Deputy G. Kryuchkov has begun its work in Osh Oblast. This is a further attempt to investigate the causes of the extremely complex situation in the south of Kirghizia and to reconcile the warring sides.

Also participating in the meetings and talks with Osh residents are A. Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee; A. Dzhumagulov, chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Colonel General Yu. Shatalin, commander of the country's Internal Troops. It is proving to be an acute dialogue.

The fire of conflicts and clashes has again embraced practically all the Osh Oblast rayons bordering on Uzbekistan. Barricades are now being erected not only in the streets but also on highways.

Curfew Extended in Osh

LD2107150890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1408 GMT 21 Jul 90

[Text] According to information from the press center of the Kirghiz Ministry of Internal Affairs, 38 crimes and incidents have been registered in the oblast over the last 24 hours. On the whole, the situation in the oblast center and a number of rayons remains tense. Internationalist detachments for protecting order are being set up in town districts. A decision has been adopted on extending the curfew. It will continue from 2100 to 0600 in Osh now. It has been decided as well to strengthen checkpoints at the outskirts of the town. The situation in Uzgenskiy Rayon remains tense, too.

Throughout yesterday, the Osh-Uzgen motorway was almost completely blocked, mostly by women. In Sovetskiy Rayon, about 400 people gathered in front of the rayon party committee demanding that Kirghiz refugees be returned to Osh and Uzgen as soon as possible and that transportation be provided for visiting their relatives in Osh.

In Naukatskiy Rayon militia workers have detained eight instigators who spread provocative rumors. Two of them have been arrested, the others fined. As we have already reported, a commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet has begun its work in Osh Oblast. It is to study the situation that has come about and work out practical recommendations to normalize it.

The commission, led by Kryuchkov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee fof issues of legislation, legality, and law and order, also includes USSR people's deputies Mamedov from Azerbaijan, Solovyev from Moscow, and Lieutenant-General Ovchinnikov. Members of the USSR Supreme Soviet commission have met with representatives of the mass media in Osh. Participants in the meeting noted that particular responsibility is laid on journalists for objective and balanced appraisals in covering the ongoing events. Commission members said that during meetings with oblast residents many people spoke with indignation about the fact that one-sided and unverified information had been used in a number of publications. Well, this is so. Truth and objectivity, however bitter, on the pages of newspapers and magazines, in radio and television programs is yet another way toward achieving peace and harmony.

Public Transportation Curtailed

PM2007125590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 19 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text][Announcer] Now a word about some other current events. We are all watching attentively, with pain, and, in constant hope to see how the interethnic conflict progresses in Osh City. The situation in this Kirghiz center is still tense at the moment.

Public transport enterprises are still not operating here, or are operating only partially. Interethnic clashes occurred 18 July between Kirghiz and Uzbek nationals. Roads leading into Uzgen City are blocked. Roughly 1,500 Uzbek nationals came along for a meeting with Chepelev, second secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, which took place in Uzgen in front of the party raykom [rayon committee]. They discussed questions relating to the construction of the Uzgen-Sovetabad highway, transferring the rayon center to another population center, and the mass media's objective coverage of events. Demands were made for the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] president to come to the city.

New Reform Organization Formed in Kazakhstan

LD2207163190 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jul 90 p 4

[Text] The constituent conference of "Azat," a movement of citizens of Kazakhstan, has taken place in the conference room of the Writers' Union of Kazakhstan. Taking part in it were representatives of the republic's independent organizations and public groups.

The new sociopolitical organization intends to take an active part in implementing political, economic, and social reforms in Kazakhstan and to campaign for its real sovereignty.

The conference elected a coordinating council and other leadership bodies of the new social group.